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Technology has greatly impacted how economic agents interact in various mar-
kets, including transportation and online display advertising. This calls for a better
understanding of some of the key features of these marketplaces and the develop-
ment of fundamental insights for this class of problems. In this thesis, we study
markets for which spatial and incentive considerations are crucial factors for their
operational and economic success. In particular, we study pricing and staffing deci-
sions for ride-hailing platforms. We also consider the contract design problem faced
by Ad Exchanges when buyers’ strategic behavior and inherent business constraints
limit these platforms’ decisions. Firstly, we investigate the pricing challenges of ride-
hailing platforms and propose a general measure-theoretical framework in which a
platform selects prices for different locations, and drivers respond by choosing where
to relocate based on prices, travel costs, and market congestion levels. Our results
identify the revenue-maximizing pricing policy and showcase the importance of ac-
counting for global network effects. Secondly, we develop a queuing approach to study
the link between capacity and performance for a service firm with spatial operations.
In a classical M/M/n queueing model, the square root safety (SRS) staffing rule bal-
ances server utilization and customer wait times. By contrast, we find that the SRS
rule does not lead to such a balance in spatial systems. In these settings, a service
firm should use a higher safety factor, proportional to the offered load to the power of
2/3. Lastly, motivated by the online display advertising market where publishers fre-
quently use transaction-contingent fees instead of up-front fees, we study the classic
sequential screening problem and isolate the impact of buyers? ex-post participation
constraints. We characterize the optimal selling mechanism and provide an intuitive
necessary and sufficient condition under which screening is better than pooling.
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Introduction
Marketplaces are a fundamental part of how agents in society interact. Before the
internet, most of these interactions occurred in a physical fashion. In search for ba-
sic goods consumers would go to a nearby store; for transportation they would take
the bus, subway or a cab; for information they would look in newspapers or maga-
zines. However, technological developments have fostered exciting changes in almost
all marketplaces which, in turn, have forever changed the way economic agents inter-
face with each other. Now people can shop online and have their goods delivered to
their homes within two days. Instead of hailing a cab on the street, consumers can
now “Uber” to anywhere they need to go right from their front door. The search for
information is now at the palm of our hand, easier than ever. These innovations have
impacted virtually every industry, from retail, to transportation, to advertising, and
beyond. There is a great deal of excitement and interest in the academic community
for understanding the new practical challenges these industries face; in turn, there
is equal excitement for designing policies and selling mechanisms to address those
challenges. In this thesis we explore practical economic and operational considera-
tions for a select group of online marketplaces that have recently revolutionized their
industries. In particular, we study ride-hailing systems and aim to understand how to
better design pricing and staffing policies while keeping in mind the spatial nature of
this market. We also explore online advertising through the lens of mechanism design,
considering buyers with rational behavior particular to this market that constrains
the way sellers can sell impressions.
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Ride-hailing services such as Uber, Lyft, and DiDi have changed the way people
move in cities. For example, from 2013 to 2017 the number of average weekday
taxi trips in New York has declined by approximately 100,000, and it has nearly been
matched by on-demand transportation platforms.1 On these platforms, riders can now
seamlessly request rides from their smartphones, while drivers possess information
about the system that helps them make real-time strategic decisions about when
and where to work. This has created an environment of unprecedented complexity
that prompts exciting practical and academic questions. This complexity stems from
both their spatial operational nature and the presence of strategic self-interested
agents. For instance, managing supply-demand imbalances in space entails solving
high-dimensional optimization problems in which complicated network effects have to
be taken into account. Strategic interactions between agents add yet another layer of
complexity, as the right incentives must be in place. In Chapter 1 and 2, we consider
these challenges and bring a new understanding to classical questions in operations
and revenue management.
In Chapter 1 we study how a revenue-maximizing ride-hailing platform should
select prices across city locations while taking into account drivers’ strategic repo-
sitioning behavior. We use a general game-theoretical framework that accounts for
spatial frictions that arise due to congestion and driving costs to elucidate the in-
terplay between local and global price effects. Local changes in price might have a
local effect on demand but, since supply is strategic and can reposition, they might
induce a non-trivial global supply response. To tackle this challenge we first establish
that the platform’s optimization problem can be decoupled into local subproblems
associated with smaller regions of the city, each of which can be solved via a coupled,
bounded knapsack relaxation. Then, by pasting these local solutions together we
obtain the global optimal solution. Our solution showcases a surprising insight that
1Fix, N.Y.C. “Advisory Panel Report” (2018).
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highlights how space impacts the design of optimal prices and drivers’ strategic be-
havior: in order to incentivize the repositioning of drivers to high-demand areas, the
platform can damage regions where drivers are not needed and, by doing so, boost
revenues. These damaged regions are characterized by low prices and high conges-
tion, the combination of which creates enough incentive to steer drivers to locations
that are more profitable for the platform. The framework we develop has applications
in other settings, e.g., where strategic workers must plan their working schedules or
spatial equilibrium models of labor mobility.
Another central matter in operations management is capacity planning. For a tra-
ditional multi-server queueing system it is well known that in heavy traffic a square-
root staffing (SRS) rule can maintain the balance between customers’ waiting time
and servers’ efficiency (QED regime). In systems where customers arrive to ran-
dom locations in space, such as ride-hailing platforms or automated warehouses, and
servers have to spend time not only servicing customers but also reaching them before
service starts, this balance may no longer hold. How should “capacity thinking” be
adapted in such settings? In Chapter 2, we analyze this question. We consider a
Markovian stochastic system that captures the key aspects of a spatial multi-server
system. We establish that, in stark contrast with a standard multi-server system, the
SRS rule brings the spatial multi-server system to the ED (efficiency driven) regime.
The reason is that, because customers have to be reached before service starts, the
time a server spends on them is larger than in a standard queuing setting and, there-
fore, more servers are required to achieve QED performance. In addition, we fully
characterize the system’s performance under a range of scalings, thereby showing how
it shifts from the ED to QD (quality driven) regimes by passing through the QED
regime. Interestingly, reaching the QED regime in our model is more subtle. It can
only happen when the buffer term in the classic SRS staffing formula is raised to
the power of 2/3 instead of 1/2, and for a specific value of the SRS parameter. Our
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results suggest that in a spatial setting, operating in the QED regime depends not
only on the rate at which we scale the system but also on how we approach such a
rate. The results in this paper imply that common rules of thumb such as the SRS
rule will no longer be valid for firms that operate in space and, therefore, new staffing
rules of thumb are necessary. This has implications for fleets of self-driving cars and
for how to think about trade-offs for this fast-approaching technology.
A market that has drawn a great deal of attention in the Revenue Management
community is online display advertising. The wide adoption of auctions as the pre-
dominant selling mechanism in this market showcases the existence of a type of “busi-
ness constraint”: buyers never pay more than they are willing to pay for impressions.
In addition, it is common that for the same impression multiple auctions are used to
provide different service levels to buyers and, by doing so, to price-discriminate them.
An important practical example are the so-called “waterfall auctions,” in which bid-
ders can decide to participate in one of two auctions: (1) an auction with “first-look”
priority but a high reserve price, or (2) another with access only to the leftover inven-
tory that was not cleared in the first auction, but a low reserve price. The purpose
of this mechanism is screening; high valuation buyers should select the first auction
and low valuation buyers should select the second one. A natural practical question
is whether this is an effective price discrimination device. This brings to the forefront
the question of how to design an optimal screening selling contract assuming that
buyers satisfy ex-post individual rationality; that is, like in typical auctions, buy-
ers are always willing to participate even after learning their valuation. In Chapter
3 we isolate the essential parts of this problem and address it using a mechanism
design formulation. We study the problem faced by a monopolist selling a single
item to a two-type buyer who privately, and sequentially, learns her valuation in two
stages. The distinctive feature of our problem is that after the buyer completely
learns her valuation she is still willing to buy the item. Leveraging a connection with
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marginal revenues, we obtain a full characterization of the optimal selling mechanism
and establish that its structure depends on an intrinsic economic quantity that we
call profit-to-rent ratio. It measures the change in the seller’s revenue per unit of
information rents given to the buyer. We show that, depending on how this economic
quantity behaves around the optimal posted price, the optimal contract can be either
a simple posted price that pools types or a more elaborate randomized mechanism
that separates types. The latter contract randomizes the low-type buyer and offers
her a low price, while it allocates with certainty the item to the high-type buyer and
offers her a high price. Importantly, despite the fact that we are in a setting with one
buyer and a single item, the presence of ex-post participation constraints makes our
optimal solution different from the classic bang-bang solution in mechanism design.
Moreover, we establish that the randomized contract can outperform the posted price
contract by up to 25%. Finally, we also provide extensions to the setting with an
arbitrary number of types.
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Chapter 1
Surge Pricing and Its Spatial Supply Response
1.1 Motivation and Overview of Results
Pricing and revenue management have seen significant developments over the years
in both practice and the literature. At a high level, the main focus has been to
investigate tactical pricing decisions given the dynamic evolution of inventories, with
prototypical examples coming from the airline, hospitality and retail industries ([64]).
With the emergence and multiplication of two-sided marketplaces, a new question has
emerged: how to price when capacity/supply units are strategic and can decide when
and where to participate. This is particularly relevant for ride-hailing platforms such
as Uber and Lyft. In these platforms, drivers are independent contractors who have
the ability to relocate strategically within their cities to boost their own profits. On
the one hand, this leads to a more flexible supply. On the other hand, one is not
able to simply reallocate supply across locations when needed, but rather a platform
needs to ensure that incentives are in place for a “good” reallocation to take place.
Consider the spatial pricing problem within a city faced by a platform that shares
its revenues with drivers. Suppose there are different demand and supply conditions
across the city. The platform may want to increase prices at locations with high
demand and low supply. Such an increase would have two effects. The first effect
is a local demand response, which pushes the riders who are not willing to pay a
higher price away from the system. The second effect is global in nature, as drivers
throughout the city may find the locations with high prices more attractive than the
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ones where they are currently located and may decide to relocate. In turn, this may
create a deficit of drivers at some locations. In other words, prices set in one region
of a city impact demand and supply at this region, but also potentially impact supply
in other regions. This brings to the foreground the question of how to price in space
when supply units are strategic.
The central focus of this chapter is to understand the interplay between spatial
pricing and supply response. In particular, we aim to understand how to optimally set
prices across locations in a city, and what the impact of those prices is on the strategic
repositioning of drivers. To that end, we consider a short-term model over a given
timeframe where overall supply is constant. That is, drivers respond to pricing and
congestion by moving to other locations, but not by entering or exiting the system.
In our short-term framework, the platform’s only tool for increasing the supply of
drivers at a given location is to encourage drivers to relocate from other places. In
turn, this time scale permits us to isolate the spatial implications on the different
agents’ strategic behavior. In this sense, our model can be thought of as a building
block to better understand richer temporal-dynamic environments.
In more detail, we consider a revenue-maximizing platform that sets prices to
match price-sensitive riders (demand) to strategic drivers (supply) who receive a
fixed commission. In making their decisions, drivers take into account prices, supply
levels across the city, and transportation costs. More formally, we consider a measure-
theoretical Stackelberg game with three groups of players: a platform, drivers and
potential customers. Supply and demand are non-atomic agents, who are initially
arbitrarily positioned. We use non-negative measures to model how these agents are
distributed in the city. All the players interact with each other in two dimensional
city. Every location can admit different levels of supply and demand. The platform
moves first, selecting prices for the different locations around the city. Once prices
are set, the mass of customers willing to pay such levels is determined. Then, drivers
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move in equilibrium in a simultaneous move game, choosing where to reposition based
on prices, supply levels and driving costs. In fact, besides prices and transportation
costs, supply levels across the city are a key element for drivers to optimize their
repositioning. If too many other drivers are at a given location, a driver relocating
there will be less likely to be matched to a rider, negatively affecting that driver’s
utility. The platform’s optimization problem consists of finding prices for all locations
given that drivers move in equilibrium.
Main contributions. Our first set of contributions is methodological. We pro-
pose a general framework that encompasses a wide range of environments. Our
measure-theoretical setup can be used to study spatial interactions in both discrete
and continuous location settings. In this general framework, our main result provides
a structural characterization of the optimal prices, and resulting equilibrium driver
movement in regions of the city where drivers relocate. In particular, we first establish
that the platform’s objective can be reformulated as a function of only the equilib-
rium utilities of drivers and their equilibrium post-relocation distribution. In turn, we
develop structural properties on these two objects. We first characterize properties
of the drivers’ equilibrium utilities and prove that the city admits a form of spatial
decomposition into regions where movement may emerge in equilibrium, “attraction
regions,” and the rest of the city. Furthermore, we establish that the equilibrium
utility of drivers and the local equilibrium post-relocation supply are linked through
a congestion bound. The former admits a fundamental upper bound parametrized by
the latter. Driven by these properties and our objective reformulation, we derive a re-
laxation to the platform’s problem that takes the form of coupled continuous bounded
knapsack problems. Notably, we establish that this relaxation is tight and in turn,
leveraging the knapsack structure, we obtain a crisp structural characterization of an
optimal pricing solution and its supply response.
In our second set of contributions, we shed light on the scope of prices as an
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incentive mechanism for drivers and provide insights into the structure of an optimal
policy. To that end, we study a special family of cases in a linear city environment
in which a central location in the city, the origin, experiences a shock of demand.
To put the optimal policy in perspective, we first characterize an optimal local price
response policy, a pricing policy that only optimizes the price at the demand shock
location. Such a policy increases prices at the demand shock location leading to an
attraction region around the shock in which drivers move toward the origin.
Leveraging our earlier methodological results in conjunction with the derivation
of new results, we characterize in quasi-closed form the optimal pricing policy and its
corresponding supply response. The optimal policy admits a much richer structure.
Quite strikingly, the optimal pricing policy induces movement toward the demand
shock but potentially also away from the demand shock. The platform may create
damaged regions through both prices and congestion to steer the flow of drivers toward
more profitable regions. Compared to the local price response policy, the optimal

























No movement No movement
Figure 1.1: The optimal solution creates six regions.
The optimal pricing policy splits the city into six regions around the origin (Figure
1.1). The mass of customers needing rides at the location of the shock is serviced by
three subregions around it: the origin, the inner center and the outer center. The
origin is the most profitable location and so the platform surges its price, encouraging
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the movement of a mass of drivers to meet its high levels of demand. These drivers
come from both the inner and outer center. In the former, locations are positively
affected by the shock, and some drivers choose to stay in them while others travel
toward the origin. In the latter, drivers are too far from the demand shock and
so the platform has to deliberately damage this region through prices (e.g., to shut
down demand) to create incentives for drivers to relocate toward the origin. However,
drivers in this region have an option: instead of driving toward the demand shock
at the origin, they could drive away from it. This gives rise to the next region,
the inner periphery. Consider the marginal driver, i.e., the furthest driver willing to
travel to the origin. To incentivize the marginal driver to move to the origin, the
platform is obligated to also damage conditions in the inner periphery. The optimal
solution creates two subregions within the inner periphery. In the first, conditions are
degraded through prices that make it unattractive for drivers. Drivers in this region
leave toward the second region. That is, they drive in the direction opposite to the
demand shock. The action of the platform in the second region is more subtle. Here,
the platform does not need to play with prices. The mere fact that drivers from the
first region run away to this area creates congestion, and this is sufficient degradation
to make the region unattractive for the marginal driver. The final region is the outer
periphery, which is too far from the origin to be affected by its demand shock.
We complement our analysis with a set of numerics that highlights that the op-
timal policy can generate significantly more revenues than a local price response. In
other words, anticipating the global supply response and taking advantage of the full
flexibility of spatial pricing plays a key role in revenue optimization.
1.2 Related Literature
Several recent papers examine the operations of ride-hailing platforms from diverse
perspectives. We first review works that do not take spatial considerations into
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account. There is a recent but significant body of work on the impact of incentive
schemes on agents’ participation decisions. [35] study the cost of self-scheduling
capacity in a newsvendor-like model in which the firm chooses the number of agents
it recruits and, in each period, selects a compensation level as well as a cap on
the number of available workers. [22] analyze various compensation schemes in a
setting in which the platform takes into account drivers’ long-term and short-term
incentives. They establish that in high-demand periods all stakeholders can benefit
from dynamic pricing, and that fixed commission contracts can be nearly optimal.
The performance of such contracts in two-sided markets is analyzed by [40] who
derive performance guarantees. [65] considers how uncertainty affects the price and
wage decisions of on-demand platforms when facing delay-sensitive customers and
autonomous capacity. [53] focuses on the effect of market thickness and competition
on wages, prices and welfare and shows that, in some circumstances, more supply
could lead to higher wages, and that competition across platforms could lead to high
prices and low consumer welfare.
In the context of matching in ride-hailing without pricing, [31] compare the waiting
time performance, in a circular city, of on-demand matching versus traditional street-
hailing matching. [39] analyze a dynamic matching problem as well as the structure
of optimal policies. Relatedly, [54] develop a heuristic based on a continuous linear
program to maximize the number of matches in a network. [1] study demand admis-
sion controls and drivers’ repositioning in a two-location network, without pricing,
and show that the value of the controls is large when both capacity is moderate and
demand is imbalanced.
Most closely related to our work are papers that study pricing with spatial con-
siderations. [23] take space into account, but only in reduced form through the shape
of the supply curve. This chapter points out that surge pricing can help to avoid
an inefficient situation termed the “wild goose chase” in which drivers’ earnings are
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low due to long pick-up times. [12] consider a queueing network where drivers do
not make decisions in the short-term (no repositioning decisions) but they do care
about their long-term earning. They prove that a localized static policy is optimal
as long as the system parameters are constant, but that a dynamic pricing policy is
more robust to changes in these parameters. [10] find approximation methods to find
source-destination prices in a network to maximize various long-run average metrics.
Customers have a destination and react to prices, but supply units do not behave
strategically. [17] focus on pricing for steady-state conditions in a network in which
drivers behave in equilibrium and decide wether and when to provide service as well
as where to reposition. They are able to isolate an interesting “balance” property
of the network and establish its implications for prices, profits and consumer sur-
plus. [20] structurally estimates a spatial model to understand the welfare costs of
taxi fare regulations. These papers investigate long-term implications of spatial pric-
ing. In contrast, our work examines how the platform should respond to short-term
supply-demand imbalances given that the supply units are strategic.
From a methodological point of view, our work borrows tools from the literature
on non-atomic congestion games. Our equilibrium concept is similar to the one used
by [58] and [26] to analyze selfish routing under congestion in discrete settings: in
equilibrium, drivers only depart for locations that yield the largest earnings. We
consider a more general measure-theoretical environment that can be traced back to
[61] and [48]. Our work is also related to the literature on optimal transport (see
[18]). Once the platform sets prices, drivers must decide where to relocate. This
creates a “flow” or a “transport plan” in the city from initial supply (initial measure)
to post-relocation supply (final measure). However, in our problem, the final measure
is endogenous.
Finally, some of our insights relate back to the damaged goods literature. [29]
explain that a firm can strategically degrade a good in order to price discriminate. In
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our setting the platform can damage some regions in the city through prices and con-
gestion to steer drivers toward more profitable locations and thus increase revenues.
Our linear city framework relates to the class of Hotelling models [38], which are
typically used to study horizontal differentiation of competing firms. In contrast to
this classical stream of work, we consider a monopolist who can set prices across all
locations. Furthermore, these prices affect the capacity at each location and supply
units can choose among all regions of the city to provide service.
1.3 Problem Formulation
Preliminaries. Throughout the chapter, we will use measure-theoretic objects to
represent supply, demand and related concepts. This level of generality will enable
us to capture the rich interactions that arise in the system through a continuous
spatial model. The continuous nature of space simplifies our solution, enabling us to
express the solution to special cases of interest in quasi-closed form. To that end,
we introduce some basic notation. For an arbitrary metric set X equipped with a
norm ‖ · ‖ and the Borel σ−algebra, we let M(X ) denote the set of non-negative
finite measures on X . For any measure τ , we denote its restriction to a set B by τ |B.
The notation τ  τ ′ represents measure τ being absolutely continuous with respect
to measure τ ′. The notation ess supB corresponds to the essential supremum, which
is the measure-theoretical version of a supremum that does not take into account
sets of measure zero. To denote the support of any measure τ we use supp(τ). The
notation τ − a.e. represents almost everywhere with respect to measure τ . For any
measure τ in a product space B ×B, τ1 and τ2 will denote, respectively, the first and
second marginals of τ . We use 1{·} to denote the indicator function, and So, ∂S, S, Sc
to represent the interior, boundary, closure and complement of a set S respectively.
We denote the close and open line segment between two points by [x, y] and (x, y),
respectively. When x, y are in the same line segment we write x ≤ y or x < y to
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denote the order in the line segment. If F (·) is a cumulative distribution function,
then F (q) = 1−F (q). For consistency, we use masculine pronouns to refer to drivers
and feminine ones to refer to customers.
1.3.1 Model elements
Our model contains four fundamental elements: a city, a platform, drivers and po-
tential customers. We represent the city by a convex, compact subset C of R2, and
a measure Γ in M(C). We refer to this measure as the city measure and it charac-
terizes the “size” of every location of the city. For example, if Γ has a point mass at
some location then that location is large enough to admit a point mass of supply and
demand.
Demand (potential customers) and supply (drivers) are assumed to be infinitesi-
mal and initially distributed on C. We denote the initial demand measure by Λ(·) and
the supply measure by µ(·), with both measures belonging to M(C). For example,
if µ is the Lebesgue measure on C, then drivers are uniformly distributed over the
city. Both the demand and supply measures are assumed to be absolutely continuous
with respect to the city measure, i.e., Λ, µ  Γ. Customers at location y ∈ C have
their willingness to pay drawn from a distribution Fy(·). For all y ∈ C, we assume
the revenue function q 7→ q · F y(q) is continuous and unimodular in q and that Fy is




, for some finite positive V .
We model the interactions between platform, customers and supply as a game.
The first player to act in this game is the platform. The platform selects fares across
locations and facilitates the matching of drivers and customers. Specifically, the
platform chooses a measurable price mapping p : C → [0, V ] so as to maximize its
citywide revenues.
After prices are chosen, drivers select whether to relocate and where to do so.
The relocation of drivers generates a flow/transportation of mass from the initial
measure of drivers µ to some final endogenous measure of drivers. This final measure
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corresponds to the supply of drivers in the city after they have traveled to their
chosen destination. The movement of drivers across the city is modeled as a measure
on C × C, which we denote by τ . Any feasible flow has to preserve the initial mass of
drivers in C. That is, the first marginal of τ should equal µ. Moreover, τ generates
a new (after relocation) distribution of drivers in the city, which corresponds to the
second marginal of τ , τ2. Formally, the set of feasible flows is defined as follows
F(µ) = {τ ∈M(C × C) : τ1 = µ, τ2  Γ}.
The first condition ensures consistency with the initial positioning of drivers, the
second condition ensures that there is no mass of relocated supply at locations where
the city itself has measure zero. In particular, given the latter, the Radon-Nikodym
derivatives of τ2 and Λ with respect to Γ, dτ2(y)/dΓ and dΛ(y)/dΓ, are well defined
and for ease of notation we let, for any y in C,
sτ (y) , dτ2
dΓ
(y), and λ(y) , dΛ
dΓ
(y).
Physically, sτ (y) represents the post-relocation supply at location y normalized by the
size of location y, and λ(y) corresponds to the potential demand at location y also
normalized by the size of such location. Here and in what follows, we will refer to sτ (y)
and λ(y) as the post-relocation supply and potential demand at y, respectively. We
use the notation Cλ to represent the set of locations with positive potential demand
in the city, i.e., Cλ = {y ∈ C : λ(y) > 0}.
Given the prices in place, the effective demand at a location y is given by λ(y) ·
F y(p(y)), as at location y, only the fraction F y(p(y)) is willing to purchase at price
p(y). At the same time, the supply at y is given by sτ (y). Therefore, the ratio of
effective (as opposed to potential) demand to supply at y is given by
λ(y) · F y(p(y))
sτ (y)
,
assuming sτ (y) > 0. Since a driver can pick up at most one customer within




1, λ(y) · F y(p(y))/sτ (y)
}
, assuming sτ (y) > 0. The effective utilization can be
interpreted as the probability that a driver who relocated to y will be matched to a
customer within the time frame of our game. In particular, if sτ (y) > λ(y) ·F y(p(y)),
there is driver congestion at location y, and not all drivers will be matched to a
customer. If sτ (y) = 0 at location y, we say the utilization rate is one if the effec-
tive demand at y is positive and zero if the effective demand is zero. Formally, the
utilization rate at location y is given by
R
(









if sτ (y) > 0;
1 if sτ (y) = 0, λ(y) · F y(p(y)) > 0;
0 if λ(y) · F y(p(y)) = 0.
When deciding whether to relocate, drivers take three effects into account: prices,
travel distance and congestion. The driver congestion effect (or utilization rate) is
the one described in the paragraph above. We assume that the platform uses a
commission model and transfers a fraction α in (0, 1) of the fare to the driver. As




y, p(y), sτ (y)
)
, α · p(y) ·R
(
y, p(y), sτ (y)
)
. (1.1)
That is, the utility is given by the compensation per ride times the probability of a
match. We model the cost for drivers of repositioning from location x to location y
through the distance between the locations, ‖y − x‖. Therefore, a driver originating
in x who repositions to y earns utility
Π
(




y, p(y), sτ (y)
)
− ‖y − x‖. (1.2)
When clear from context, and with some abuse of notation, we omit the dependence
on price and the supply-demand ratio, writing U(y) and Π(x, y). We are now ready
to define the notion of a supply equilibrium.
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x, ·, p(·), sτ (·)
)})
= µ(C),
where the essential supremum is taken with respect to the city measure Γ.
That is, an equilibrium flow of supply is a feasible flow such that essentially no driver
wishes to unilaterally change his destination. As a result, the mass of drivers selecting
the best location for themselves has to equal the original mass of drivers in the system.
The platform’s objective is to maximize the revenues it garners across all locations
in C. From a given location y, it earns (1 − α) · p(y) · min{sτ (y), λ(y) · F y(p(y))}.
The term (1 − α) · p(y) corresponds to the platform’s share of each fare at location
y, and the term min{sτ (y), λ(y) · F y(p(y))} denotes the quantity of matches of po-
tential customers to drivers at location y. If location y is demand constrained, then
min{sτ (y), λ(y) · F y(p(y))} equals λ(y) · F y(p(y)), while if location y is supply con-
strained, then min{sτ (y), λ(y) · F y(p(y))} amounts to sτ (y). The platform’s price






p(y) ·min{sτ (y), λ(y) · F y(p(y))} dΓ(y) (P1)





Remark. Our model may be interpreted as a basic model to understand the
short-term operations of a ride-hailing company. In particular, each driver completes
at most one customer pickup within the time frame of our game and there is not
enough time for the entry of new drivers into the system. In the present model,
we do not account explicitly for the destinations of the rides. We do so in order to
isolate the interplay of supply incentives and pricing. In that regard, one could view
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our model as capturing origin-based pricing, a common practice in the ride-hailing
industry.
1.4 Structural Properties and Spatial
Decomposition
A key challenge in solving the optimization problem presented in (P1) is that the
decision variables, the flow τ and the price function p(·), are complicated objects.
The flow τ , being a measure over a two-dimensional space, is obviously a complex
object to manipulate. The price function will turn out to be a difficult object to
manipulate as well in that the optimal price function will often be discontinuous.
In order to analyze our problem, we will need to introduce a better-behaved object.
This object, which will be central to our analysis, is the (after movement) driver
equilibrium utility.
Drivers’ utilities. For a given price function p and flow τ , we denote by
VB(x| p, τ) the essential maximum utility that a driver departing from location x
can garner by going anywhere within a measurable region B ⊆ C. In particular, the
mapping VB(·| p, τ) : C → R is defined as
VB(x| p, τ) , ess sup
B
Π (x, ·, p(·), sτ (·)) . (1.3)
When B = C, we use V instead of VC. By the definition of a supply equilibrium,
essentially all drivers departing from location x earn V (x| p, τ) utility in equilibrium.
We now show that the equilibrium utility VB(·| p, τ) must be 1-Lipschitz continu-
ous. Intuitively, drivers from two different locations x and y that consider relocating
to B see exactly the same potential destinations. Hence, the largest utility drivers
departing from x can garner must be greater or equal to that of the drivers de-
parting from y minus the disutility stemming from relocating from x to y, that is,
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VB(x) ≥ VB(y)−‖x−y‖. Since this argument is symmetric, we deduce the 1-Lipschitz
property.
Lemma 1.1 (Lipschitz) Consider a measurable set B ⊆ C such that Γ(B) > 0. Let p
be a measurable mapping p : B → R+, and let τ ∈ F(µ). Then, the function VB(·|p, τ)
is 1-Lipschitz continuous.
We now introduce a reformulation of (P1) that focuses on the equilibrium utility
V and the post-relocation supply sτ as the central elements. We then establish
important structural properties of V and establish a spatial decomposition result
that is based on the equilibrium behavior of drivers.
1.4.1 Reformulating the Platform’s problem
In what follows, we define γ , (1 − α)/α. In the next result, we establish that the
platform’s objective can be rewritten in terms of the utility function V (·| p, τ) and
the post-relocation supply sτ , yielding an alternative optimization problem.






V (x| p, τ) · sτ (x) dΓ(x) (P2)
s.t. τ is an equilibrium flow,










admits the same value as the platform’s optimization problem (P1), and a pair (p, τ)
that solves (P2) also solves (P1).
The first step in the proof of the proposition above is to rewrite the platform’s
objective in terms of the post-relocation supply sτ (x) and the pre-movement utility
function U (x, p(x), sτ (x)) (see Eq. (1.1)). This transformation is not particularly
useful per se, since the function U (x, p(x), sτ (x)) is not necessarily well-behaved.
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The next step consists of establishing that U (x, p(x), sτ (x)) coincides with V (x| p, τ)
whenever a location has positive post-movement equilibrium supply (see Lemma A.2
in the Appendix). Indeed, whenever the equilibrium outcome is such that a location
has positive supply, the utility generated by staying at that location has to be equal to
the best utility one could obtain by traveling to any other location. This is intuitive
in that if it were not the case, no driver would be willing to stay at or travel to
that location. In turn, one can effectively replace U (x, p(x), sτ (x)) with V (x| p, τ)
in the objective, which yields the alternative problem. The main advantage of this
new formulation is that the equilibrium utility V (x|p, τ) connects our problem to the
theory of optimal problem and it admits significant structure, as we show in the next
two subsections.
1.4.2 Connection to Optimal Transport
Our equilibrium concept is closely related to the notion of optimal transport plan
in the theory of optimal transport. In any equilibrium τ the total mass of drivers
repositions in the most efficient way as to minimize the total transportation cost.
Let τ be an equilibrium flow with second marginal τ2 then





s.t γ1 = µ, γ2 = τ2
Indeed, let γ be a feasible transport plan and let us use W(γ) to denote the optimal
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This establishes that given the final supply of drivers τ2 then an equilibrium flow with
second marginal τ2 minimizes the total transportation cost. In our problem, τ2 is an
endogenous object that we need to find via optimization.
1.4.3 Indifference and Attraction Regions
A key feature of the problem at hand is that, in equilibrium, conditions at different
locations are inherently linked as drivers select their destination among all locations.
An important object that will help capture the link across various locations is the
indifference region of a driver departing location x. The indifference region of x rep-
resents all the destinations to which drivers from x are willing to travel to. Formally,
the indifference region for a driver departing from x ∈ C under prices p and flow τ is
given by
IR(x| p, τ) ,
{
y ∈ C : lim
δ↓0
VB(y,δ)(x|p, τ) = V (x|p, τ)
}
,
where B(y, δ) is the open ball in C of center y and radius δ. Intuitively, the definition
above says that if y ∈ IR(x| p, τ), then drivers departing from x maximize their
utility by relocating to y.
Indifference regions describe the set of best possible destination for a given loca-
tion. The converse concept which will turn out to be fundamental in our analysis is
21
the attraction region of a location z. The attraction region of z represents the set of
all possible sources for which location z is their best option. In addition, location z
is called a sink if it is not willing to travel to any other location. These regions are
rich in the sense that they enjoy several appealing properties and, as we will see in
Section 1.5, we can solve for the platform’s optimal solution within them. Below we
provide a formal definition for an attraction region and a sink location.
In line with the literature on optimal transport, see e.g [5], it will be useful in our
analysis to study the behavior of drivers along rays around a particular location z.
We use Rz to denote the set of all rays originating from z (excluding z) and index
the elements of Rz by a. The advantage of this is that now we can disintegrate the
city measure into a family of measures concentrated along the rays, {Γa}, which we
can integrate with respect to another measure Γp in Rz to obtain Γ, that is,




In what follows we will use interchangeable Γ and Eq. (1.4).
Definition 1.2 (Attraction Region) Let (p, τ) be a feasible solution of (P2). For
any location z ∈ C, its attraction region A(z| p, τ) is the set of locations from which
drivers are willing to relocate to z, i.e.,
A(z| p, τ) , {x ∈ C : z ∈ IR(x| p, τ)}.
We call a location z ∈ C a sink if its attraction region A(z| p, τ) is non-empty and
z /∈ A(z′| p, τ) for all z′ 6= z. When z is a sink, we represent the endpoints of its
attraction region along a ray a ∈ Rz by
Xa(z| p, τ) , sup{x ∈ Aa(z| p, τ)},
where Aa(z| p, τ) is the restriction of A(z| p, τ) in the direction of ray a.
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Definition 1.3 (In-demand location) We say a location z is in-demand whenever






1{λ(x)>0}dΓa(x)dΓp(a) > 0, ∀δ > 0.
The next result characterizes the shape of attraction regions.
Lemma 1.2 (Attraction Region) Let (p, τ) be a feasible solution of (P2). For any
sink z ∈ C, its attraction region A(z| p, τ) is a closed set containing z, Aa(z| p, τ) =
[z,Xa(z| p, τ)] and




The lemma above establishes an intuitive but important transitivity result. Let
x < y < z be such that x is in the attraction region of z. Then, y must also be in the
attraction region of z.
The structure of the utility function V at a supply equilibrium will play a central
role in our analysis. The following lemma establishes the shape of V within attraction
regions.
Lemma 1.3 (Utility Within an Attraction Region) Let (p, τ) be a feasible so-
lution of (P2), then for any z ∈ C the equilibrium utility satisfies
V (x| p, τ) = V (z| p, τ)− ‖z − x‖, for all x ∈ A(z| p, τ).
This result is closely related to the Envelope Theorem, which is widely used in
mechanism design (see [49]). If a driver originating from x is indifferent to relocating
to z, then V (z| p, τ)− V (x| p, τ) must be equal to the relocation cost ‖z − x‖.
Importantly, attraction regions emerge as soon as drivers move in the city, as
formalized in the next proposition.
Proposition 1.2 (Existence of attraction regions) Let (p, τ) be a feasible solu-
tion of (P2) and suppose that y ∈ IR(x| p, τ) for some x 6= y. Then, there exists a
sink location z ∈ C such that x, y ∈ A(z| p, τ) and x, y, z are collinear points.
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In other words, as soon as there is potential for movement, in the sense that drivers
at some location weakly prefer to travel to another location, necessarily an attraction
region exists.
1.4.4 Spatial Decomposition
Next, we show that attraction regions lead to a natural decoupling of the platform’s
problem, as they provide a natural way of segmenting the city. The next result
establishes a flow separation property induced by attraction regions.
Proposition 1.3 (Flow Separation) Let (p, τ) be a feasible solution of (P2), and
let z ∈ C be a sink. Then, there is no flow crossing the endpoints of the attraction
region, and there is no flow crossing the sink, z. Formally, with some abuse of
notation, let L(z| p, τ) denote ⋃a∈Rz{Xa(z| p, τ)} then
(i) τ(A(z| p, τ)c × A(z| p, τ)) = 0 and
τ(
⋃
a∈Rz [z,Xa(z| p, τ)×
(
A(z| p, τ)c ∪ L(z| p, τ) \ {z}
)
) = 0.










The first part of this result characterizes attraction regions as flow-isolated sets.
There is no flow of drivers traveling to an attraction region from outside of it. And
drivers in the interior of an attraction region do not travel outside the region.1 In
this sense, attraction regions are flow-separated subsets of C. This will enable us to
“decouple” the platform’s problem in an attraction region from the rest of the city
in Section 1.5.2. The second part of the proposition establishes that in an attraction
region, no flow crosses between rays. However, there could be flow stemming from
1We clarify here that Proposition 1.3 does not impose anything on the direction of flow emerging
from the end points Xa(z| p, τ) for a ∈ Rz. That is, if there is a mass of drivers starting from one
of these boundary points, these drivers could move either into or out of the attraction region.
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any ray that travels to the sink. That is, the segments {(z,Xa(z| p, τ ]}a∈Rz of the
attraction region are flow-separated regions coupled by the sink location. Figure 1.2
illustrates this proposition.
C
A(z| p, τ )
z
Xa(z| p, τ )
ray a






Figure 1.2: Flow separation. Illustration of the result in Proposition 1.3. No flow
crosses the boundaries of A(z| p, τ).
This flow separation result will enable us to geographically decompose the plat-
form’s problem into multiple weakly coupled local problems. To that end, we intro-
duce some additional notation that will allow us to “localize the analysis”. Formally,
for any measurable B ⊂ C and measure µ˜ ∈M(B), we define the set of feasible flows
restricted to B to be
FB(µ˜) = {τ ∈M(B × B) : τ1 = µ˜, τ2  Γ|B}.
In addition, we define local equilibria as follows.
Definition 1.4 (Local Equilibrium) For any B ⊂ C such that Γ(B) > 0 and µ˜ ∈
M(B), a flow τ ∈ FB(µ˜) is a local equilibrium in B if it satisfies
τ
({
(x, y) ∈ B × B : Π(x, y, p(y), sτ|B(y)) = ess supB Π
(
x, ·, p(·), sτ|B(·)
)})
= µ˜(B).
That is, a local equilibrium in B is a feasible flow such that no driver wishes to
unilaterally change his destination when restricting attention to the set B. With this
definition in hand, we may now state our next result. Informally, this result states the
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following “pasting” property. Suppose we start from a price-equilibrium pair (p, τ)
and a sink z and its attraction region A(z| p, τ). Then, we can replace the flow that
occurs within A(z|p, τ) with any other local equilibrium within that attraction region
as long as we maintain the same conditions at the boundary ∂A(z| p, τ).
Proposition 1.4 (Pasting) Let (p, τ) be a feasible solution of (P2), and let z ∈ C
be a sink. Denote A = A(z| p, τ) and L = ⋃a∈Rz{Xa(z| p, τ)}. Let µ˜ ∈ M(A) be
the measure representing drivers that stay within A according to flow τ , i.e., µ˜(B) ,
τ(B × A) for any measurable set B ⊆ A. Suppose there exists a measurable price
mapping p˜ : A → [0, V ] and a flow τ˜ ∈ FA(µ˜) such that τ˜ is a local equilibrium in A
under pricing p˜. Furthermore, suppose VA(·| p˜, τ˜) equals V (·| p, τ) in ∂A. Define the
pasted pricing function pˆ : C → [0, V ],
pˆ(x) ,

p˜(x) if x ∈ A;
p(x) if x ∈ Ac,
and the pasted flow τˆ ∈ F(µ), where for any measurable B ⊆ C × C
τˆ(B) , τ(B ∩ ((Ac ∪ L)×Ac)) + τ˜(B ∩ (A×A)).
Then, the pasted solution (pˆ, τˆ) is a feasible solution of problem (P2) such that
sτˆ =

sτ˜ (x) if x ∈ A;
sτ (x) if x ∈ Ac,
and V (x| pˆ, τˆ) =

VA(x| p˜, τ˜) if x ∈ A;
V (x| p, τ) if x ∈ Ac.
Propositions 1.3 and 1.4 suggest a natural structure for the induced flows by any
pricing policy. For a given sink z, Proposition 1.3 establishes that the attraction
region of z and its complement are flow separated. Now Proposition 1.4 applies
this flow separation result and shows how to make local deviations to a feasible
solution while maintaining feasibility. More precisely, an equilibrium in C can be
locally modified in the attraction region of z, without losing feasibility, as long the
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equilibrium utilities of drivers in the boundaries of the attraction region are not
modified. The new solution (pˆ, τˆ) in C merges the old solution (p, τ) in A(z|p, τ)c
with the modified solution (p˜, τ˜) in the attraction region A(z|p, τ).
1.5 Congestion Bound and Optimal Flows
In the prior section, we showed that the platform’s optimization problem can be re-
formulated as a problem over equilibrium utilities V and post-relocation supply sτ .
We also showed that V is a well-behaved function: it is 1-Lipschitz continuous and
it has derivative equal to +1 or -1 over attraction regions. Furthermore, we demon-
strated how to use attraction regions to decompose the platform’s global problem
into localized problems. In this section, we focus on the optimal relocation of drivers
within attraction regions. That is, we will prove that, without loss of optimality, we
can restrict attention to flows within attraction regions that take a very specific form.
In order to do so, we first need to formalize the notion of congestion level of a given
location.
1.5.1 Congestion Bound
We first introduce some quantities that will be useful throughout our analysis. These
quantities emerge from a classical capacitated monopoly pricing problem. Let us
consider any location x ∈ C and ignore all other locations in the city. The problem
that a monopolist faces when supply at x is s and demand is λx can be cast as
Rlocx (s) , max
q∈[0,V ]
q ·min{s, λx · F x(q)}, (1.5)
with the price ρlocx (s) being defined as the argument that maximizes the equation
above. Since q · F x(q) is assumed to be unimodular in q, the optimal price ρlocx (s) is
uniquely determined and is characterized as follows





That is, the optimal local price either balances supply and demand or maximizes the
unconstrained local revenue.
For a given local supply s, the maximum revenue that can be generated at location
x is Rlocx (s), with a fraction α of that revenue being paid to the drivers. Therefore,
α · Rlocx (s)/s is the maximum revenue a driver staying at this location can earn. To
capture this notion, we introduce for every location x the supply congestion function
ψx : R+ → [0, α · V ], which is defined as:
ψx(s) ,

α ·Rlocx (s)/s if s > 0;
α · V if s = 0, λ(x) > 0;
0 if s = 0, λ(x) = 0.
The congestion function ψx must be decreasing since more drivers (in a single location
problem) imply lower revenues per driver.
Lemma 1.4 For any x ∈ Cλ the congestion function ψx(·) is a strictly decreasing
function.
More importantly, the congestion function ψx yields an upper bound for the utility
of drivers at almost any location with respect to the city measure.
Proposition 1.5 (Congestion Bound) Let (p, τ) be a feasible solution of (P2).
Then the equilibrium driver utility function is bounded as follows:
V (x| p, τ) ≤ ψx (sτ (x)) Γ− a.e. x in Cλ.
When there is a single location, the inequality above is an equality by the definition of
ψx. For multiple locations, drivers may travel to any location and there is no a priori
connection between the utility that drivers originating from x can garner, V (x| p, τ),
and ψx(s
τ (x)). The result above establishes that the latter upper bounds the former.
The bound captures the structural property that as equilibrium supply increases at
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a location, and hence driver congestion increases, the drivers originating from that
location will earn less utility.
1.5.2 Optimal Supply Reallocation in Attraction Regions
We now consider the problem of how to optimize flows within an attraction region.
The key idea is to use the structural properties about the equilibrium utility function
as well as the pasting result developed in Section 1.4, in conjunction with a relaxation
to the platform’s problem within an attraction region that leverages the congestion
bound established in Proposition 1.5.
Consider a feasible solution (p, τ) of (P2). Let z ∈ C be a sink and A(z| p, τ) its
corresponding attraction region. We will now show how to construct a second feasible
solution of (P2) for which the revenue is weakly larger and we can fully characterize
its prices and flows within the attraction region A(z| p, τ) as defined by the original
solution (p, τ).
Theorem 1.1 (Optimal Supply Within an Attraction Region) Consider a feasible
solution (p, τ) of (P2), and let z ∈ C be an in-demand sink. Then, there exists
another feasible solution (pˆ, τˆ) that weakly revenue dominates (p, τ), and is such that




ψ−1x (V (z| p, τ)− ‖x− z‖) · 1{λ(x)>0} if x ∈
⋃
a∈Rz [z, ra);
si if x = ra, a ∈ Rz;
0 otherwise,




τˆ (x)) if x ∈ A(z| p, τ) \⋃a∈Rz{ra};
pi if x = ra, a ∈ Rz,
where pa is such that U(ra, pa, sa) = V (ra| p, τ) · 1{λ(ra)>0} for a ∈ Rz.
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The theorem above characterizes an optimal solution, including both prices and
flows, within an attraction region. In particular, the optimality of a pricing policy
implies that it is sufficient to focus on solutions that have post-movement equilibrium
supply around the sink z in
⋃
a∈Rz [z, ra] while potentially creating regions with zero
equilibrium supply away from the sink, in the segments {(ra, Xa]}a∈Rz . These regions
“feed” the region around the sink z with drivers. Furthermore, the optimal prices are
fully characterized in any attraction region through the post-relocation supply. We
will highlight the main implications of Theorem 1.1 through a prototypical family of
instances in Section 1.6, where we will characterize the optimal solution across the
city in quasi-closed form.
Key ideas for Theorem 1.1. The key idea underlying the proof of the result is
based on optimizing the contribution of the attraction region A(z| p, τ) to the overall
objective by reallocating the supply around the sink, and then showing that this
reallocation of supply constitutes an equilibrium flow in the original problem.
In order to optimize the supply around the sink we consider the following opti-





V (x| p, τ) · s˜(x) dΓ(x) (PKP (z))
s.t s˜(x) ≤ ψ−1x (V (x)) Γ− a.e. x in Cλ, (Congestion Bound)∫
A(z| p,τ)
s˜(x)dΓ(x) = τc, (Flow Conservation)∫
(z,Xa]
s˜(x)dΓa(x) ≤ τa, Γp − a.e. a ∈ Rz. (No Flow Crossing Rays)
where τc corresponds to the total flow that τ transports from A(z| p, τ) to A(z| p, τ),
and τa correspond to the total flow in A(z|p, τ) that is transported to ray a, excluding




represents the post-relocation supply induced by s˜ in B. Thus, the last three con-
straints in (PKP (z)) stand for consistency of the total post-relocation supply in each
one the relevant subregions of A(z| p, τ). The key is to observe that this is a relax-
ation of the original problem in the attraction region. In particular, the equilibrium
constraint implies the conservation constraint (see Proposition 1.3(i)), and the no-
flow-crossing constraints (see Proposition 1.3(ii)). The congestion bound is also a
consequence of the equilibrium constraint (see Proposition 1.5). In words, in this
formulation, we relax the equilibrium constraint but impose implications of it. We
constrain the amount of mass that we can allocate on each direction around z but we
fix the total amount of mass in A(z| p, τ).
In (PKP (z)), we fix the driver utilities and ask what should be the optimal al-
location of drivers while satisfying flow balance in the regions {[z,Xa]}z∈Rz and im-
posing the congestion bound. Clearly selecting s˜ = sτ is feasible for the problem
above and hence the optimal value upper bounds the value generated by the initial
price-equilibrium pair (p, τ) in the region A(z| p, τ). In the proof, we show that this
relaxation is tight. Namely, it is possible to construct prices and equilibrium flows
achieving the value of Problem (PKP (z)). The proof consists of two main steps: 1)
solving problem (PKP (z)) and 2) showing that the post-relocation supply that solves
the relaxation can actually be obtained from appropriate prices and flows. For step
1), the main idea relies on recognizing that Problem (PKP (z)) is a measure-theoretical
instance of a coupled collection of Continuous Bounded Knapsack Problems. In par-
ticular, the congestion constraint corresponds to the availability constraint in the
classical knapsack problem. The solution to (PKP (z)) is obtained by allocating as
much as possible at locations where we can make the most revenue per unit of vol-
ume, i.e., we would like to make s˜(x) as large as possible at locations where V (x|p, τ)
is the largest. Hence the solution starts by allocating as much supply as possible
at location z. The challenge here is that flow-crossing conditions need also to be
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satisfied and hence whether flow is sent to z from one ray or another is key and needs
to be tracked. For step 2), we explicitly construct prices, and the flow correspond to
the integration of the solution of a collection of optimal transport problems. Along
each segment (z,Xa] we solve an optimal transport problem with cost function equal
to the distance between any two points, initial measure equal to the reminder mass
that was not sent to z, and final measure equal to the restriction of the solution of
Problem (PKP (z)) in (z,Xa]. Finally, we apply the pasting result (Proposition 1.4)
to obtain a feasible price-equilibrium in the whole city C.
1.6 Response to Demand Shock: Optimal
Solution and Insights
The results derived in the previous sections characterize the structure of an optimal
pricing policy and the corresponding supply response in attraction regions for general
demand and supply conditions in a two dimensional region. In this section, to crisply
isolate the interplay of spatial supply incentives and spatial pricing, we focus on a
special family of instances that will be rich enough to capture spatial supply-demand
imbalances while isolating the interplay above.
In particular, to simplify exposition we focus on a one dimensional city and a fam-
ily of models that captures a potential local surge in demand. Namely, we specialize
the model to the case where the city measure is supported on the interval [−H,H]
and is given by
Γ(B) = 1{0∈B} +
∫
B
dx, for any measurable set B ⊆ [−H,H]2
that is, the origin may admit point masses of supply and demand while the rest of
the locations in [−H,H] only admit infinitesimal amounts of supply and demand. In
what follows, without loss of generality we will use C to denote [−H,H], that is, the
2Observe that thanks to the generality of our measure theoretical framework, all the theoretical
results develop thus far apply to this one dimensional setting.
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city now corresponds to the one dimensional interval over which the city measure is
supported. We fix the city measure throughout, but we parametrize the supply and
demand measures.
Supply is initially evenly distributed throughout the city, with a density of drivers
equal to µ1 everywhere. Potential demand will be also assumed to have a uniform
density on the line interval, except potentially at the origin.
We analyze what happens when a potential demand shock at the origin (the
potential high demand location) materializes and, in particular, we investigate the
optimal pricing policy in response to such a shock. We represent the demand shock
by a Dirac delta at this location. Therefore, for any measurable set B ⊆ C, the
potential demand measure (after the shock) is given by




where λ0 ≥ 0 and λ1 > 0. In particular, we refer to the case λ0 = 0 as the pre-demand
shock environment and the case λ0 > 0 as the demand shock environment.
For this family of models, we assume that customer willingness to pay is drawn
from the same distribution F (·) for all locations in the city (and this function is
assumed to satisfy the regularity conditions of Section 3.3). Figure 1.3 provides a
visual representation of this family of cases.
This special structure will enable us to elucidate the spatial supply response in-
duced by surge pricing and the structural insights on the optimal policies that emerge.
Throughout this section we will use short-hand notation to present the optimal
solution in a streamlined fashion. Let (p, τ) be a price equilibrium pair we use A(0), Xl
and Xr to denote A(0| p, τ), and the end points of the left and right rays around z,






Figure 1.3: Prototypical family of models with demand surge. The supply
is initially uniformly distributed in the city with density µ1, and potential demand
is uniformly distributed in the city with density λ1, with a sudden demand surge at
location 0.
1.6.1 The Pre-demand Shock Environment
We start by analyzing the pre-shock environment. In this environment, there is no
demand shock, λ0 = 0, and both demand and supply are uniformly distributed along
the city, with respective densities λ1 and µ1. If one were to look at each location in
isolation, the optimal local price at a location x with demand density λ1 and supply
density µ1 is ρ
loc
x (µ1), as defined in Eq. (1.6). Note that in the current environment
ρlocx (µ1) is not location dependent and we denote it by ρ1 throughout, we do the same
with ψx(µ1) which we denote by ψ1.
Proposition 1.6 (Pre-demand Shock Environment) Suppose λ0 = 0. Then,
the optimal policy and corresponding supply equilibrium and flows can be characterized
as follows.
(i) (Prices) The optimal pricing policy is given by p(x) = ρ1, for all x in C.
(ii) (Flow) All supply units stay at their original locations.
Furthermore, the optimal revenue equals γ · ψ1 · µ1 · 2H.
This result simply says that if the initial demand-supply conditions are identical across
the city, then the optimal price policy does not induce any movement for supply, and
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the optimal price at each location is simply that of a single location capacitated
pricing problem. In such a solution, the expected utilization of all drivers is equal
to 1 if µ1 ≤ λ1 · F (ρu), and otherwise is strictly below 1. In the latter case, there
is oversupply and driver congestion at all locations. The optimal revenue, recalling
the reformulation in Proposition 1.1, is given by the equilibrium utility of drivers
ψ1, times the density of equilibrium supply, integrated across all locations (times a
scaling factor).
1.6.2 Benchmark: Local Price Response to a Demand
Shock
We next start our analysis of the demand shock environment. Before turning our
attention to an optimal policy in Section 1.6.3, we first focus on a simple type of
pricing heuristic which responds to changes in demand conditions through changes in
prices only where these changes occur. In particular, in the context of the demand
shock model, this corresponds to responding to a shock in demand at the origin by
only adjusting the price at the origin; we call this policy the local price response.
This provides a benchmark to better understand the structure and performance of
an optimal policy. We next characterize an optimal local price response, when prices
are fixed everywhere at the pre-demand shock environment solution, except at the
origin.
Proposition 1.7 (Local Price Response to a Demand Shock) Fix λ0 > 0. Sup-
pose that p(x) = ρ1 for all x in C \ {0} and that the firm optimizes for the price p(0).
Then,
(i) (Prices) The optimal price at the origin is given by p(0) = ρloc0 (s
τ (0)), and
p(0) ≥ ρ1.
(ii) (Movement) There exists two thresholds Xr ≥ X0r ≥ 0, such that Xr > 0 and:
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• for all x in [−X0r , X0r ], all of the supply units move to the origin,
• for all x in [−Xr,−X0r ] and all x in [X0r , Xr], a fraction of the supply units
move to the origin and the other fraction does not move,
• for all x in C \ [−Xr, Xr], no supply unit moves.







Figure 1.4: Optimal local price response: induced supply response for a
case with µ1 > λ1 · F (ρu).
The result above characterizes the structure of an optimal local price response
as well as the structure of the supply movement it induces. Figure 1.4 depicts the
structure of the supply response. In particular, the optimal local price response leads
to a higher price at the origin to respond to the surge of demand at that location.
In turn, this higher price attracts drivers from a symmetric region around the origin.
In that region, for locations close to the origin, all supply units move to the origin.
After a given threshold X0r , only a fraction of the drivers will move to the origin.
Intuitively, as one gets further from the origin, traveling to the origin becomes a less
attractive option, compared to staying put or traveling elsewhere. As that becomes
the case, a smaller and smaller fraction of units travels to the origin. Furthermore, we
establish that supply units have no incentive to travel anywhere else in the city and,
as a result, units that do not travel to the origin stay put and serve local demand.
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Beyond the threshold Xr, no supply units move in the equilibrium induced by the
optimal local price response.
The threshold Xr corresponds to the location of the last drivers willing to travel
to the origin. In the current environment, prices are not flexible and, therefore, Xr
must equals V (0)− ψ1 since drivers who are further than that will prefer to earn ψ1
by staying put compared to driving to the origin to earn V (0) minus driving costs.
If we are in a supply constrained regime, µ1 ≤ λ1 · F (ρu), then all drivers within
[−Xr, Xr] drive to the origin, i.e., X0r = Xr. However, in a supply unconstrained
regime, µ1 > λ1 · F (ρu), the two thresholds are different, X0r < Xr, as depicted in
Figure 1.4. This occurs because in locations further from the origin but still within
[−Xr, Xr], as underutilized drivers drive toward the origin, conditions at the departing
point improve and in equilibrium, staying put becomes competitive with driving to
the origin.
1.6.3 Optimal Solution
The previous subsection provided an optimal local price response to a demand shock
and the supply movement it induces. In this subsection, we focus on the optimal
global price response across all locations in the city. To that end, we will leverage the
results developed for the general model to obtain a quasi-closed form solution to the
platform’s problem in this specialized setting.
We begin by showing that the origin is an in-demand sink location and, therefore,
the results from Sections 1.4 and 1.5 apply to the attraction region of the origin.
By leveraging structural properties of the equilibrium utility function, the con-
gestion bound, and a novel flow-mimicking technique, we next fully characterize in
Theorem 1.2 the optimal equilibrium utility of supply units V (·), not only in the
attraction region of the origin, but across the entire city. In particular, this char-
acterization yields a spatial separation of the city into three attractions regions and
regions of no-movement. Leveraging Theorem 1.1 and a symmetry argument, we solve
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for the optimal sτ and the corresponding prices in each attraction region. The solu-
tion for the no-movement regions reduces to the pre-shock environment. Leveraging
the pasting result (cf. Proposition 1.4) yields the optimal solution to the platform’s
problem as presented in Theorem 1.3.
Our first result in this section demonstrates that we can focus on price-equilibrium
pairs such that the high demand location is a sink that has drivers coming towards
it from left and right.
Lemma 1.5 (Origin is in-demand sink) Without loss of optimality, one can re-
strict attention to price-equilibrium pairs (p, τ) such that the origin is an in-demand
sink such that Xl < 0 < Xr.
The intuition behind this proposition harks back to the fact that the performance of
the pre-shock environment is dominated by that of the local price response solution.
Solutions for which the origin is not an in-demand sink have revenues capped by that
of the pre-demand shock environment. At a high-level, in those solutions, there is
no positive mass of drivers willing to travel to the demand shock location and, thus,
the city resembles a city without a demand shock. However, the local price response
solution incentivizes drivers from both sides to travel to the demand shock and has a
strictly larger revenue. This implies that at optimality we must have drivers coming




Left periphery Center Right peripheryXrXl
Figure 1.5: Three region-decomposition.
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In what follows we solve for the key objects of the platform’s optimization problem
(P2). To make our exposition clear and highlight the solution’s spatial aspects, we
call the interval [Xl, Xr] the center region, and the region outside of it will be referred
to as the periphery (see Figure 1.5).
1.6.3.1 Equilibrium Utilities
In this subsection we characterize V (·) throughout C. We begin by stating the main
result of this subsection. We then we discuss some of the implications and associated
intuition.
Theorem 1.2 (Equilibrium utilities) Under an optimal price-equilibrium pair (p, τ),
the equilibrium utility function V (·) is fully parametrized by the three values V (0) and
Xl, Xr as follows:
V (x) =

V (0)− |x| if x ∈ [Xl, Xr],
min{V (0)− 2Xr + x, ψ1} if x > Xr,
min{V (0)− 2|Xl|+ |x|, ψ1} if x < Xl.
Moreover, V (0) > ψ1 and V (Xl), V (Xr) ≤ ψ1.




Figure 1.6: Drivers’ equilibrium utility under an optimal pricing policy. The
equilibrium utility is fully characterized up to V (0), Xl and Xr.
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The first main implication of this result is that we know exactly how much utility
each supply unit garners under optimal prices throughout the entire city. Quite
strikingly, the characterization of V (·) is “independent” of the flows. That is, in order
to characterize the equilibrium utility we did not need to pin down the distribution
of after-movement supply.
The second implication is that the city has at most three types of regions. Figure
1.6 depicts the equilibrium utility function. The center [Xl, Xr] is by definition an
attraction region. Let Wr and Yr be defined as the points to the left and to the
right of Xr where the driver’s equilibrium utility function equals the pre-shock utility
level ψ1. To the right of the origin (and similarly to the left), we can observe three
main regions. We first have the interval [0,Wr], where drivers’ utilities are above
the pre-shock utility level. Drivers in this region are positively impacted by the
shock of demand at the origin (and the global optimal prices). The second region
[Wr, Yr] is notable. Here, drivers garner strictly less utility compared to the pre-shock
environment. In [Wr, Xr] drivers are “too far” from the origin so their utilities are
negatively affected by the cost of driving to the origin. Drivers in [Xr, Yr] are outside
the origin’s attraction region and, thus, do not relocate to the origin. Interestingly,
drivers in [Xr, Yr] suffer because the platform has to make sure that drivers in [0, Xr]
stay within the attraction region of the origin. For the marginal drivers at Xr to be
willing to travel to the origin, the conditions to the right of Xr should not be too
attractive. The final region corresponds to [Yr, H]; this region is not affected by the
shock of demand as it is effectively too far from the origin.
Key ideas for the proof of Theorem 1.2. We now present the main arguments
that enable us to establish Theorem 1.2. At a high level, we focus on each region
separately, center and periphery, and solve for V (·) in each of these regions.
We start by considering the center region, which is easy to analyze. Lemma
1.5 establishes that we can focus on solutions such that A(0) = [Xl, Xr] is a non-
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empty interval that strictly contains the origin. Our envelope result (Lemma 1.3)
characterizes the equilibrium utility function in any attraction region. In turn, this
implies that
V (x) = V (0)− |x|, for all x ∈ [Xl, Xr].
Importantly, the characterization of V (·) in this region only depends on three pa-
rameters, namely, V (0), Xl and Xr. In Section 1.7, we will leverage this fact to
numerically compute the optimal value for these parameters.
We now switch our attention to the periphery. Consider the right periphery
(Xr, H]. We first argue that, in this region, the drivers’ equilibrium utility has a
non-trivial upper bound, and then establish that this upper bound is achieved. The
treatment for the left periphery is analogous.
Lemma 1.6 (Upper bound) An optimal price-equilibrium pair (p, τ) satisfies
V (x) ≤ min{V (Xr) + x−Xr, ψ1}, for all x ∈ (Xr, H]. (1.7)
The upper bound above follows from two bounds. A first upper bound can be derived
using the 1-Lipschitz property of V (Lemma 1.1), which ensures that V can grow at
a rate of at most 1. Thus, V (x) is bounded by V (Xr) +x−Xr. A second bound may
be obtained by leveraging the congestion bound (Proposition 1.5). One may show
that that drivers from almost any location that do not have an incentive to travel
to the origin have their utilities capped by the pre-demand shock utility level ψ1.
Locations different than the origin that receive supply increase their driver congestion
with respect to the initial congestion level which, in turn, reduces the driver utility
at that location. In addition, drivers traveling to these locations have to incur a
transportation cost further decreasing their utilities. Thus V (·) has to be bounded
by ψ1 in (Xr, H].
The core of the argument toward characterizing the equilibrium utilities in the
periphery resides in establishing that the upper bound in Eq. (1.7) is always binding
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for any x in (Xr, H], a result we will present in Proposition 1.9. We show this result
in two steps: we first establish that the value function has to be non-decreasing in
[Xr, H] and then leverage this to establish that the upper bound is achieved under
an optimal pricing policy.
By our characterization of a driver’s utility in an attraction region (see Lemma
1.3), the upper bound would not be binding if there were drivers willing to move left in
(Xr, H]. That would imply the existence of an attraction region (see Proposition 1.2)
inside of which V (·) is decreasing. Our first proposition proves this cannot happen
by establishing that, in an optimal solution, V (·) is a non-decreasing function in the
right periphery.
Proposition 1.8 (Monotonicity in the periphery) Without loss of optimality, we can
focus on price-equilibrium pairs (p, τ) such that V (·) is non-decreasing in (Xr, H].
Furthermore, if V (Xr) = ψ1, then V (x) = ψ1 for all x ≥ Xr.
We first observe that the attraction region around the origin of the demand shock
location is always wider under the optimal solution than under the local best response.
That is, Alr(0) ⊂ Aopt(0). In particular, this means that more locations are affected
by a demand shock in the optimal solution than under the local price response. Hence,
the largest interval in which both solutions differ corresponds to [−Y optr , Y optr ]. We
denote this interval by Cdiff.
The key argument behind the proof of Proposition 1.8 is to construct a (strictly)
profitable deviation whenever V (·) is decreasing in some region. We illustrate the
main idea of the argument in Figure 1.7. Suppose the value function is decreasing
in some interval as illustrated in Figure 1.7(a). We will construct a deviation over
a superset of that interval, denoted by [y0, y1] in the figure. The construction of a















Figure 1.7: Illustration of the main argument in the proof of Proposition 1.8.
First, the interval [y0, y1] is constructed in such a way that it is flow separated.
That is, there is no flow of drivers leaving this interval and no drivers coming in
(τ − a.e). This separation permits us to analyze this region as an individual sub-
problem, where the behavior of drivers is relatively “controlled”. In particular, we
construct the interval [y0, y1] in such a way there is at most one maximal subinterval
where V (·) decreases at rate -1, and at most one maximal subinterval where where V
increases at rate 1. Where V (·) decreases at rate -1 drivers can only move left, and
where V (·) increases at rate 1 drivers can only move right.
Second, the best incentive compatible deviation that ensures a non-decreasing
value function coincides with the dashed blue line. Because V can increase at most
at a rate of 1, after y0 the best deviation equals V (y0) + (x − y0) (recall Eq. (1.7)).
Moreover, since the interval ends at y1 and we want the deviation to be a non-
decreasing function, it has to be bounded by V (y1).
The final idea is a subtle, but critical one. We know from Proposition 1.1 that
the platform earns revenues from a location x proportionally to V (x) · sτ (x). As a
result, one needs to focus on both V (·) and the post-movement supply sτ to establish
a profitable deviation. We need to argue that overall the platform will earn higher
revenues after the drivers move. Our argument, which relies on judicious price setting
as well as a proper mapping of revenue contributions in different space regions between
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the old and new flows, is illustrated in Figure 1.7(b). We set prices in such a way that
it is incentive compatible for drivers not to move within the interval [y0, y1], except
for the region we denote by I near y0. In this region, we set prices to incentivize the
drivers to behave as they did in region I ′ in the old (non-monotone) solution. This
enables us not only to achieve the upper bound constructed, but also to obtain a
strict revenue improvement for the platform.
In brief, at the optimal solution, V (·) must be a non-decreasing function in
(Xr, H]. This implies that drivers only move right (or do not move) in the right
peripheral region. Our next result shows that Eq. (1.7) is indeed binding.
Proposition 1.9 (Tight upper bound) Without loss of optimality, we can focus on
price-equilibrium pairs (p, τ) such that the upper bound in Eq. (1.7) is tight.
The proof of Proposition 1.9 relies on the monotonicity in the periphery of V (·)
to construct a strict improvement whenever we have a solution (p, τ) for which the
upper bound in Eq. (1.7) is not tight. We start by separating intervals that form
maximal attraction regions, that is, attraction regions with a sink at an end point.
In these regions, V (·) is differentiable and has slope equal to 1. Such intervals can be
mapped onto the interval where the upper bound in Eq. (1.7) also has slope 1. This
mapping in represented by dashed lines and arrows in Figure 1.8.
We can then use a flow mimicking argument similar to the one used in Figure
1.7(b). The solutions in the initial intervals in the mapping can be replicated in the
new intervals, which we illustrate in Figure 1.8. Thus, this mapping preserves the
platform’s revenue in the intervals being mapped. The regions that are left after
the mapping (thick black lines in the figure) are given prices such that drivers in
them prefer not to relocate, and V coincides with the upper bound. By pasting the
solutions in the intervals we obtain then a solution for which the upper bound is tight






Figure 1.8: Illustration of the main idea underlying the proof of Proposition 1.9. The
dashed lines in V (x) correspond with interval where dV (x)/dx = 1. These intervals
are mapped onto the intervals in [Xr, H] where the upper bound in Eq. (1.7) has
slope 1. The thick black lines correspond to both the intervals and parts of the upper
bound that are left after the mapping.
1.6.3.2 From Equilibrium Utilities to Supply Distribution and Optimal
Prices
Given that we pinned down the equilibrium utility function across the city, the natural
next step as prescribed by the problem reformulation in Proposition 1.1 is to solve
for prices and supply.
Theorem 1.3 (Optimal prices and flows) An optimal price-equilibrium pair (p, τ) is
such that V (·) is as in Theorem 1.2, Xr = −Xl, and prices and flows are characterized
as follows.
1. (Prices) The optimal prices are given by p(x) = ρlocx (s
τ (x)), where sτ (x) is as
below.
2. (Post-relocation supply) There exists unique βc ∈ [0,Wr] and βp ∈ [Xr, Yr] such
that∫ βc
−βc
ψ−1x (V (x))dΓ(x) = µ1 ·2 ·Xr and
∫ Yr
βp
ψ−1x (V (x))dΓ(x) = µ1 · (Yr−Xr),
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and the optimal post-relocation supply is given by
sτ (x) =

0 if x ∈ (βc, βp) ∪ (−βp, βc),
ψ−1x (V (x)) otherwise.
3. (Movement)
• for all x in [−βc, βc], drivers move in the direction of the origin,
• for all x in [−Xr,−βc) ∪ (βc, Xr], all drivers move to [−βc, βc],
• for all x in [Xr, βp), all drivers move to [βp, Yr].
• for all x in (−βp,−Xr], all drivers move to [−Yr,−βp].
• for all x in [βp, Yr], drivers move in the direction of Yr,
• for all x in [−Yr,−βp], drivers move in the direction of −Yr,
• for all x in [−H,−Yr) ∪ (Yr, H], drivers do not relocate.
The key idea underlying Theorem 1.3 is to recognize the structure of the regions.
The center [Xl, Xr] is by definition an attraction region. The other two attraction
regions correspond to the intervals [Yl, Xl] and [Xr, Yr] (to recall the definitions of
these terms, please revisit Figure 1.6). Consider the last of these intervals. In it,
V (·) increases at a rate of 1 and drivers only move towards Yr but not beyond it.
The shape of V (·) then ensures that all drivers in this region are willing to travel to
Yr and, therefore, this location has to be a sink with its associated attraction region
being [Xr, Yr]. We can thus leverage Theorem 1.1 to characterize the flow structure
within attraction regions and then paste solutions appropriately. Finally, we show
that the optimal solution has to be symmetric around the origin. In particular, now
all the relevant quantities that characterize the optimal solution depend only on two
values: V (0) and Xr.
Discussion. We depict in Figure 1.9 the structure of the solution obtained in























Figure 1.9: Supply response (solid-blue line) induced by optimal prices
(dashed-red line).
of the city, with respect to the origin, into six regions. Without loss of generality, we
focus our discussion on the right side of the city.
The origin receives a mass of supply equal to ψ−10 (V (0)). This mass of drivers
comes from two regions, the inner and the outer center, which we now define. The
first corresponds to the interval (0, βc]. Some drivers in this region choose to stay put
while others, attracted by the favorable conditions at the center of the city, choose to
drive to the origin. In equilibrium, drivers staying or traveling to the origin garner the
same utility. The outer center is the interval (βc, Xr]. Here, the platform sets prices
to V (or 0) and therefore supply is equal to zero. That is, the platform chooses prices
to shut down demand, giving no incentive for drivers to stay there (or alternatively
sets prices at zero to again give no incentive for drivers to stay there). In turn, this
incentivizes all drivers in this region to move somewhere else. In order to incentivize
these drivers to move towards the origin, the platform creates one more region: the
inner periphery.
The inner periphery corresponds to the interval (Xr, Yr]. The platforms “arti-
ficially” degrades the conditions for drivers in this interval in two different ways,
leading to the two sub regions, (i) and (ii) in Figure 1.9. In region (i), the platform
sets prices equal to V (or 0) in (Xr, βp], shutting down demand, so no drivers want
to either travel to or stay in this region. As a result the interval (βp, Yr] receives all
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drivers from (Xr, βp]. This creates driver congestion and, thus, endogenously worsens
driver conditions in the interval (βp, Yr]. The reason the platform selects these inner
periphery prices is to discourage drivers in the outer center from driving towards the
periphery. Quite strikingly, the optimal global price response to a demand shock
at the origin induces supply movement away from the origin in the inner periphery.
The final region is the outer periphery. All drivers in this region stay put, leading to
sτ (x) = µ1. Here, drivers collect the same utility they would make if there was no
demand shock at the origin.
In sum, the optimal global price response to a demand shock, while correcting the
supply-demand imbalance at the origin, also creates significant imbalances across the
city. This is driven by the self-interested nature of capacity units and the need to
incentivize them through spatial pricing. In particular, we observe that the structure
of the optimal pricing policy is very different from that of the local price response
(cf. Proposition 1.7).
1.7 Local Price Response versus Optimal
(Global) Prices
In this section, we will use the optimal local price response solution as a benchmark
for comparison to put the optimal solution in perspective. The objective is to illus-
trate through several metrics the different features of the optimal solution as well
as its performance in terms of revenue maximization and welfare. Throughout this
section, we use superscripts lr and opt to label relevant quantities associated with
the local price response and optimal solution, respectively (except when obvious from
the context).
We first observe that the attraction region around the origin of the demand shock
location is always wider under the optimal solution than under the local best response.
That is, Alr(0) ⊂ Aopt(0). In particular, this means that more locations are affected
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by a demand shock in the optimal solution than under the local price response. Hence,
the largest interval in which both solutions differ corresponds to [−Y optr , Y optr ]. We
denote this interval by Cdiff.
Next, we illustrate and discuss through a set of numerics the differences between
the two policies. We consider a range of instances that includes various levels of
supply availability. We fix the city to be characterized by H = 1 and assume that the
demand is uniformly distributed across locations with λ1 = 4. The origin experiences
a shock of demand ranging from low to high: λ0 ∈ {3, 6, 9}. We vary the initial
supply µ1 ∈ {1, 1.5, 2, . . . , 4.5, 5} so that when low, the city (excluding the origin)
is supply constrained, and when high, the city is supply unconstrained. Consumer
valuation is uniformly distributed in the unit interval. Note that the city (excluding
the origin) is supply constrained whenever µ1 < λ1 · F (pu) = 2. To eliminate any
strong dependence on the choice of H, for each instance, we compare the local price
response performance and optimal solution performances within the sub-region of the
city corresponding to the largest interval in which both solutions differ, Cdiff. Given
the symmetry of the solutions, in all that follows we focus on the right side of the
city [0, H].
Policy structure. Figure 1.10 depicts the core spatial thresholds characterizing
the optimal pricing policy and the local price response as the supply conditions µ1
changes (on the y-axis). In particular, we track the changes in Xr, βp, βc and Yr for
the optimal solution (cf. Theorem 1.3) and the changes in Xr and X
0
r for the local
price response (cf. Proposition 1.7).
The first thing to note is that the structure of supply in the attraction region
of 0 differs significantly between the local price response and the optimal policy. In
the local price response, there are no drivers who stay put around the origin; and
post-relocation, drivers are either at the origin or in [X0,lrr , X
lr
r ]. In contrast for the
























Figure 1.10: Policy structure. Spatial thresholds characterizing the optimal pricing
policy and the local price response as the the supply conditions change. The shaded
regions have no supply in equilibrium. The figure assumes λ0 = 9 and λ1 = 4.
but there are drivers in [0, βc]. This contrast can be better understood through the
reformulation of the objective in Proposition 1.1, in conjunction with the shape of
the equilibrium utility function in the attraction region of 0 (cf. Lemma 1.3). Given
the objective, the platform would ideally like to have supply as close to the origin
as possible (subject to the congestion bound constraint) as it maximizes the integral
of V (x) · sτ (x). With a local price response, as a result of the lack of flexibility in
setting prices throughout the city, the platform is unable to “optimize” the supply in
the attraction region and ends up with drivers at locations with low V in [X0,lrr , X
lr
r ]
while locations with higher V ’s have no drivers in (0, X lrr ]. Meanwhile, the optimal
policy is able to set prices so as to induces the best possible distribution of supply in
the attraction region.
In the periphery of the optimal solution, which is outside the origin’s attrac-
tion region under pricing policy, the local price response behaves exactly as in the
pre-demand shock environment. In stark contrast, the optimal solution incentivizes
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movement of drivers from the periphery away from the demand shock. In particular,
the region [Xr, Yr], which has a non-trivial size, is artificially damaged. This region
is needed for the optimal solution to steer more drivers towards the origin, an issue
we address in more detail in the revenue improvement discussion below.
Revenue Improvement. The revenue performance of the optimal solution with
respect to our benchmark in Cdiff is shown in Table 1.1.
Table 1.1: Revenue improvement (in %) of optimal solution over optimal local prices
response solution in Cdiff.
µ1 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
λ0 = 3 2.05 4.64 9.59 13.02 13.87 12.92 11.00 8.60 5.91
λ0 = 6 2.17 3.11 4.99 8.73 9.96 10.01 9.56 8.92 8.21
λ0 = 9 2.69 3.51 4.69 8.75 10.16 10.30 9.81 9.10 8.29
For any level of demand shock, we observe that the revenue improvement reaches
its maximum value for medium to high levels of supply, and can be significant, above
10%.
In order to appreciate where the revenue gains stem from, consider Figure 1.10
and Table 1.2 below, which summarizes some key quantities for the case µ1 = 3,
λ0 = 9 (so that ψ1 equals 0.27). Let us analyze the various contributions to revenues
V opt(0) sopt(0) popt(0) Xoptr Y
opt
r V
lr(0) slr(0) plr(0) X lrr X
0,lr
r
0.62 1.97 0.78 0.46 0.57 0.65 1.66 0.81 0.38 0.25
Table 1.2: Metrics for the local response and optimal solution for the case µ1 = 3,
λ0 = 9.
under both policies. We start by noticing that the drivers’ equilibrium utility at the
shock location is lower under the optimal solution than under the local price response,
V opt(0) = 0.62 and V lr(0) = 0.65. However, since Xoptr = 0.46 and X
lr
r = 0.38, the
optimal solution is able to incentivize the movement of a larger mass of drivers towards
the demand shock, leading to a mass sopt(0) = 1.97 and slr(0) = 1.66. Focusing on
the objective reformulation in Proposition 1.1, this extra mass of drivers delivers
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0.14 units (0.62× 1.97− 0.65× 1.66) of extra revenue to the platform. The revenue
difference is further increased by the fact that the remainder 0.79 units of drivers
in the attraction region of zero (2 × 3 × 0.46 − 1.97) in the optimal solution travel
to locations nearby the demand shock, where V (·) is close to 0.62. In contrast, the
benchmark solution has the remainder 0.62 drivers (2×3×0.38−1.66) staying within
[X0,lrr , X
lr
r ] where V (·) is below 0.37 (V lr(0)−X0,lrr ). Through these two mechanisms,
the optimal policy garners more revenue than the benchmark solution in the region
[−Xoptr , Xoptr ].
However, the benefits come at a cost. In particular, to induce the “right” in-
centives in the shock’s attraction region, the platform has to alter conditions to the
right of the attraction region. In order to incentivize the movement of drivers in
[−Xoptr , Xoptr ] towards the demand shock, the region [Xoptr , Y optr ] is damaged by hav-
ing the 0.22 units of drivers in it (2× (0.57−0.46)) contributing values strictly below
ψ1 = 0.27 to the platform’s objective. The same units of drivers in the benchmark
solution contribute exactly 0.27 per unit to the platform’s revenue. This cost is offset
by the proceeds that incentivizing the movement of a larger amount of drivers toward
the demand shock generates.
Welfare Implications. The revenue improvement of the optimal solutions relies
on creating a special region in which drivers’ utilities are below of what they could
earn if the platform responded only locally to the demand shock. This raises the
question of whether revenue-optimal pricing leads to lower or higher surpluses for
drivers and consumers compared to the benchmark solution.
The social welfare (SW ) equals the sum of the platform’s revenue, and the driver









sτ (x), λx·F (p(x))
}
dΓ(x).
Driver surplus corresponds to nothing more than the integral of driver equilibrium
utilities across all locations in Cdiff. Similarly, consumer surplus corresponds to the
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gains enjoyed across Cdiff by all those consumers who are willing to pay and are
matched to some driver.
In Table 1.3 we display the percentage differences of driver and consumer sur-
pluses, as well as social welfare between the optimal and benchmark solutions. We
note that there are instances where the optimal solution is a Pareto improvement
over the local price response, in the sense that it is better for the platform, drivers
and consumers. There are also instances where the platform’s revenue gain is at the
expense of both drivers and consumers.
Table 1.3: Driver surplus, consumer surplus and social welfare difference (in %) of
optimal solution over optimal local prices response solution in Cdiff.
µ1 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
DS
λ0 = 3 -0.67 3.09 11.3 13.64 14.6 12.44 10.00 7.53 4.92
λ0 = 6 -4.15 -3.99 -1.62 -2.01 -0.82 0.74 3.00 5.35 7.80
λ0 = 9 -6.22 -7.35 -7.48 -9.45 -9.72 -9.02 -8.14 -6.36 -4.32
CS
λ0 = 3 -10.96 -14.1 -18.48 -7.24 -3.15 -0.44 1.01 1.57 1.58
λ0 = 6 -12.03 -10.58 -17.15 -6.32 1.18 4.18 4.24 2.85 0.69
λ0 = 9 -14.33 -11.94 -22.43 -12.58 -1.39 5.77 9.73 10.98 10.44
SW
λ0 = 3 -1.04 0.81 4.26 8.28 9.70 8.83 7.44 5.8 3.96
λ0 = 6 -3.60 -3.56 -3.49 -1.05 1.50 3.16 4.43 5.29 5.87
λ0 = 9 -5.24 -5.95 -8.16 -6.84 -4.40 -2.32 -0.86 0.51 1.58
For a given level of supply, the driver surplus degrades with respect to the bench-
mark as the demand shock becomes more intense. We also find that, independently
of the size of the demand shock, the optimal solution performs better than the bench-
mark in terms of consumer surplus when the supply level is high. More drivers in the




2.1 Motivation and Overview of Results
Many traditional service systems are characterized by static servers and customers
that arrive stochastically and line up in a queue before receiving service. These include
call centers, health-care facilities, and amusement parks, among others. In designing
such systems, one faces a tradeoff between the cost of servers and the quality of service
as measured through the characteristics of wait time. The prevalence of such systems
has led to an extensive literature on capacity sizing that has provided important
practical guidelines about how to set capacity levels in service systems. Typically,
there is a fine balance between the two objectives. A central rule, the so-called
square root safety (SRS) staffing rule, emerges naturally from different performance
considerations. In the SRS rule, the capacity is set at the nominal offered load plus
a safety factor proportional to the square root of the offered load. If one considers
a social planner’s problem attempting to minimize the system’s total cost measured
by the aggregate of capacity and waiting costs, the SRS rule is optimal in large
systems. Another central metric in the literature and in practice is the probability
that a customer waits before being attended by a server, which has led to the coining
of various terms to describe the regimes of interest. Quality driven (QD) is the
regime where customer quality is paramount and, thus, the probability of waiting is
vanishingly small. Efficiency driven (ED) refers to the regime where cost concerns
prevail. In ED, a customer’s probability of having to wait approaches one. Quality
54
and Efficiency driven (QED) is the intermediate regime, where the probability that a
customer waits is separated from both zero and one, leading to a fine balance between
utilization and quality of service. The latter is achieved through the SRS staffing rule.
The latter capacity is sufficient to ensure that a positive fraction of customers do not
wait at all before receiving service.
However, there are other service systems in which customers arrive to random
locations in space and servers have to spend time not only servicing customers, but
also reaching them before service starts. This includes, for example, ride-hailing
systems such as Uber, Lyft, Via and DiDi. On these platforms, a customer requests a
ride from a given location and a driver is then dispatched by the platform to pick him
up and take him to his desired destination.1 Automated warehouses powered by Kiva
robots (Amazon robotics) or the Ocado smart platform provide another example. In
these warehouses, products are arranged in a grid. As orders for different products
arrive, robots are dispatched to collect the products and transport them to picking
stations. In these spatial multi-server systems, workload is larger than in traditional
systems because servers must reach customers before starting to service them, making
it unclear whether the SRS rule of thumb is still valid. The central question of this
chapter is the following: How should “capacity thinking” be adapted to spatial settings,
where servers need to reach customers before service can start?
We anchor our analysis around a spatial multi-server system in which arrivals to
a two-dimensional region follow a Poisson process. A customer draws an origin and
a destination uniformly and independently in the region. From a pool of n servers, a
central platform dispatches a server that must reposition to the origin of her assigned
customer and then take him to his desired destination. This spatial multi-server
system is different from a traditional queueing M/M/n service system in at least
1For consistency, we refer to customers as males and servers/drivers as females throughout the
chapter.
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two dimensions. First, servers must “pick up” customers by repositioning to a cus-
tomer location before starting service. This translates into extra workload added to
the system compared to a traditional system. Second, as the imbalance of servers
and customers increases, spatial economies of scale can make the system operate at
a faster pace. For example, the larger the spatial density of idle servers, the more
opportunities for better matches and the shorter the time it takes a server to pick up
an arriving customer. Similarly, the larger the spatial density of waiting customers,
the more opportunities for better matches and the shorter the time it takes an idling
server to reach a customer. That is, in a spatial multi-server system, service rate is
state-dependent and might improve with large supply-demand imbalances. This is





























Figure 2.1: Illustration of the potential for matches and the impact on pickup times.
terest, we take a macro view of the spatial system by focusing on the key features that
dictate its dynamics. More concretely, we consider a Markovian stochastic model that
captures the key characteristics of input and output rates in the spatial multi-server
system. Our Markovian model is a standard queueing system with n servers, but
with a state-dependent service rate that adequately reproduces the spatial economies
of scale of spatial systems. We analyze this queueing model in heavy traffic. On the
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one hand, the queueing setting provides guidelines for how the spatial system will
behave. On the other hand, the spatial setting provides a physical interpretation of
the queueing model results.
Main contributions. Our first contribution lies in the modeling domain. We
develop a Markovian model that captures fundamental aspects of capacity planning in
dynamic spatial environments. The system we analyze features both service speedups
and service slowdowns that emerge due to the presence of spatial economies of scale.
In addition, we ground our analysis on near-optimal dispatch rules derived from the
vehicle routing literature.
Our second contribution lies in the set of insights and fundamental results we
obtain for this class of problems. We first analyze a fluid model that highlights some
of the key properties of such systems. We characterize in closed form the two possible
stable equilibria of this deterministic model. These equilibria correspond to two types
of potential operating regimes: the first one with a high density of waiting customers
and the second one with a high density of idle servers. These equilibria are depicted in
Figure 2.1. In both of these operating points, the system is able to match customers
to servers efficiently since supply and demand are fairly imbalanced.
We then analyze the stochastic system in heavy traffic. In this setting we first
establish that, in stark contrast with a standard multi-server system, the SRS rule will
always bring the spatial multi-server system to the efficiency-driven (ED) regime, in
which customers will wait for a server to be dispatched with probability approaching
one. In other words, the added workload due to pickups is substantial enough and
cannot be compensated by simply increasing capacity levels on the order of the square
root of the offered load.
In turn, we fully characterize the asymptotic system’s performance under a range
of scalings. If the capacity buffer is of lower order than the offered load to the power
of 2/3, then the system is in the efficiency-driven (ED) regime. The system operates
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around the ED equilibrium depicted in Figure 2.1. If the capacity buffer is of higher
order than the offered load to the power of 2/3, then the system is in the quality-
driven (QD) regime. The system operates around the QD equilibrium depicted in
Figure 2.1. Hence, in a spatial environment, the QED regime may only emerge if
the safety capacity is of order the offered load to the power of 2/3. We furthermore
establish that the QED regime can indeed be achieved. The QED regime does not
correspond to a new stable operating point of the system, but to a system that
oscillates stochastically between the ED and QD equilibrium points. Reaching the
QED regime is more subtle in a spatial environment, as now it does not only depend
on the order of the safety capacity but also on second order terms. Furthermore, as
a by-product of this analysis, we can approximate the system cost and establish that
the power of 2/3 scaling is optimal in the sense that it minimizes a sum of server
costs and waiting costs, which is a natural social planner’s objective.
We show that the approximation method used, which greatly simplifies the anal-
ysis of an otherwise highly non-tractable system, captures the fundamental features
of the true system. We validate our approach via a series of numerical simulations
that show that the heavy-traffic behavior of our Markovian system closely captures
that of a simulated spatial multi-server system.
In sum, our model and results imply that common rules of thumb such as the
SRS rule will no longer be valid for spatial operations and, therefore, new staffing
rules of thumb are necessary. This has implications for how to think about such trade
offs in automated warehouses and, with the advent of fleets of self-driving cars, in
ride-hailing platforms. Our results derive new rules of thumb for the implications of
capacity levels on the type of service regime they induce.
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2.2 Related Literature
This chapter relates to several streams of literature.
Staffing. Our goal is to analyze the performance of a system with customers
arriving and being served in a spatial setting as measured by the steady-state prob-
ability of waiting in heavy traffic. The seminal work of [36] introduces the so-called
Halfin-Whitt regime in which the system is taken to heavy traffic by scaling the num-
ber of servers as R + β · √R where R is the offered load. This is also known as
the square root staffing (SRS) rule. Under this regime, the authors show that in an
M/M/n or GI/M/n, the system the probability of delay is strictly between zero and
one–the QED regime. [34] and [68] study the Erlang-A case. For more on the QED
regime with applications to call centers, we refer the reader to the survey papers by
[33] and [3]. We also refer the reader to [69] for related work, and [56] for the more
general case of the G/GI/n system. [13] study the capacity sizing problem in an envi-
ronment in which there is also parameter uncertainty for mean arrival rate, deriving
new prescriptions for such settings and articulating how to operate depending on
whether one is in an uncertainty-dominated or a variability-dominated regime. Our
work is complementary to this literature in the sense that we also analyze the perfor-
mance of the system as measured by the probability of delay. In our model, however,
the presence of spatial frictions affects dynamics and introduces state-dependencies,
leading to fundamental changes in how capacity should be scaled to achieve QED
performance. For an in depth discussion about limiting regimes (ranging from the
conventional heavy traffic regime to the Halfin-Whitt regime and passing through the
slowdown regime) and their implications for diffusion approximations in non-spatial
environments we refer the reader to [67] and [8].
State-dependent service rate. The general spatial system we aim to under-
stand is complex and generally intractable. To gain insight we consider a simpler
Markovian version of it that can be regarded as an M/MQ/n system. Our work is
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thus related to the broad literature on Markovian system and birth and death pro-
cesses, and in particular to the works that study service systems with state-dependent
processing rates; for some examples we refer the reader to [45], [46] and [55]. [25]
study an Erlang-R service system in which the service rate can be sped up whenever
congestion is above a certain threshold . Using a fluid analysis they show that, de-
pending on system parameters, speeding up service can lead to both desirable and
undesirable system congestion levels. In related work, [30] study a service system
in which agents are sensitive to individual future work load and reduce their service
rate as the system’s workload increases. They show that depending on load sensitiv-
ity, the system’s slowdowns can take it from moderate to substantial deterioration.
Our work can be considered as a combination of both speedups and slowdowns, and
the exact form of these in our context is driven by spatial economies of scale. As
the number customers in our system increases beyond n, the density of waiting cus-
tomers increases and, therefore, the next idling servers can spend less time picking
up customers, i.e., service rate speeds up. Similarly, when the number of customer
is increasing but below n, the density of idle cars decreases and, therefore, arriving
customers may experience larger pickup times, i.e., service rate is slowed down. These
effects are a result of the physical nature of our system. Related to the above papers,
and in particular [30], our system features some form of bi-stability in an underlying
tightly related deterministic model. In contrast, however, the equilibria emerge on
different scales in our setting and asymptotically in the stochastic system, these can
survive jointly.
Stochastic vehicle routing. Another related stream of related work is that
of dynamic routing problems. Routing is a highly complex class of problems and
measuring the performance of routing algorithms is challenging. [14, 15] show that
the scaling of queues in space is fundamentally different to the one when space is
ignored. In particular, [14, 15] obtain a lower bound for the minimum expected total
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time in the system under any dispatching policy given by Θ (λ/(n2(1− ρ)2)) + Θ(1)
in heavy traffic, as the offered load converges to 1. This is a remarkable result that
provides a lower bound for all dispatching policies and in turn sets a target for the
optimal expected time in the system which can be used as a guideline to measure the
performance of policies. Interestingly, the size of the system scales with 1/(1 − ρ)2
and not with 1/(1 − ρ) as happens in the standard M/M/n system. Thus the fact
that we are taking into account space fundamentally changes how the system scales
with traffic intensity.
Ride-hailing. In the young but quickly growing literature on ride-hailing sys-
tems, customers arrive in a spatial region and a platform matches them to drivers
who, in turn, take the customers to their desired destinations. For the important
problem of spatial incentives in ride-hailing system we refer the reader to [12], [17],
[23], [1] and [16].
Closer to this work are the studies that investigate the problem of matching to
optimize certain performance metrics. Using a fluid approach in a closed queueing
network, [19] study how to route empty cars in order to maximize network utility. In
related work, [54] use a fluid approach to derive policies that maximize the number
of matches. [11] study matching in a closed queueing network, and show that for a
Scaled MaxWeight policy, the proportion of dropped demand in steady state decays
exponentially fast as the number of servers in the system grows large. In a circular
city framework, [31] analyze the waiting time performance of different matching mech-
anisms. The focus of this chapter, in contrast, is to understand how to think about
capacity planning in spatial environments. Rather than optimizing over the space of
dispatching policies, we anchor the analysis around a near-optimal dispatching policy.
Closest to the present setting is [23]. There, the authors also analyze inefficiencies
stemming from additional workload in a spatial system, and study the possible use
of surge pricing to alleviate these. This study focuses on a different question, that of
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capacity planning. The two papers utilize different dispatch policies. The framework
in this chapter can be used to analyze the type of dispatching considered there, in
which the additional capacity needed would be of order the offered load. In contrast,
in this chapter, we focus on a class of provably near-optimal dispatch rules based on
the vehicle routing literature mentioned above, which, as we establish, enables one to
only need a safety capacity of the order the offered load to the power of 2/3.
2.3 Spatial Queueing Model
We introduce a stochastic model for spatial capacity planning within a bounded
region of a plane. Our model is an M/MQ/n queueing system (in Kendall’s notation
MQ stands for state-dependent service time) that captures the fundamental aspects
of a spatial system that experiences arrivals and dispatches servers to attend to those
arrivals.
2.3.1 Model
Motivation. We consider two models in this chapter. The first is what we call the
general system, where spatial elements such as origin-destination pairs of customers
are explicitly modeled. The second is a Markovian system, which is a queueing
system that approximates the general system. In the Markovian system, the spatial
frictions are captured in reduced form via a state-dependent service time. All of
the mathematical results in the chapter establish properties of the Markovian system
that can be regarded as qualitative prescriptions for the general system. Indeed, in
Section 6, we use simulation to demonstrate that the Markovian system approximates
the behavior of the general system quite well.
We are interested in gaining insights on the following general system. There is a
central platform, customers and servers that interact in a bounded connected subset
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C of R2 (the city). Customers arrive according to a Poisson process in the city at
uniformly distributed locations in the city. Each customer wishes to travel from the
point they arrive to some other point also drawn uniformly at random among all
locations in C. Customers are patient and will remain in the system until served.
There is a fixed number of servers in the system, and each one can serve one
customer at a time at a constant velocity. A server first repositions to the arrival
location of a customer, and then she transports that customer to his destination.
Upon arrival to his final destination, the customer leaves the system and the server
becomes idle and waits until the platform relocates her. The repositioning of servers
occurs according to some state-dependent dispatching algorithm and is controlled by
the platform.
Any given customer experiences a total time in the system that is composed of
three components: waiting time, pickup time and en-route time:
Time in the system = Waiting + Pickup + En-route. (2.1)
The waiting time corresponds to the time a customer spends in the system before he
is assigned a server to pick him up. The pickup time represents the time it takes for
the server to relocate from where she currently is to the customer’s origin location.
The en-route time is the time it takes to transport a customer from his origin to his
destination.
The system described at a high level above is complex and intractable to analyze
in its full generality, given the stochasticity of the system, the high-dimensional state-
space, and the complexity of the space of possible dispatching policies.
Queueing model. In this chapter we study what we call the Markovian system,
which is a simpler queueing model that still captures the spatial features of the general
system. In setting up our model, we deliberately forego the complex interactions
among agents that make the general system intractable, and focus on the overall
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physical dynamics that dictate the processing performance of the system. We further
discuss our modeling assumptions in Section 2.3.2.
We focus on a model in which customers arrive to the system according to a
Poisson process with rate λ, and stay until served. There is a total of n identical
servers that provide service to one customer at a time in a first come, first serve
fashion. We assume that the time between the assignment of a server to a customer
and the end of the service is exponentially distributed with state-dependent rate µ(·).
Upon arrival, if a customer finds a server idle, he is immediately assigned a server;
otherwise, he waits in line. This leads to an M/MQ/n queueing system. We use Q(t)
to denote the total number of customers in the system at time t, which includes both
customers waiting and in service.
The distinctive feature of the system we analyze and what makes it depart from a
traditional multi-server queue is that servers must be repositioned to serve customers.
As a result, the total time a server spends on a single customer corresponds to pickup
time plus en-route time as opposed to just en-route time—the analogue to service time
in a traditional queueing system. In turn, in order to capture the overall processing
performance of the general system, the key is to select an appropriate function µ(·)
that isolates spatial frictions through the combination of both pickup and en-route
times as highlighted in Eq. (2.1).
Any sensible choice of the service rate must be such that its inverse, 1/µ(·), has
two components: one reflecting pickup times and the other en-route times. En-route
times are simple. They correspond to the distance between two random locations in C
(properly scaled by the velocity) and do not depend on the state of the system. If we
let s¯t to denote the expected time to move between two random points in C (for some
nominal velocity), then it follows that one of the components of 1/µ(·) will be equal to
s¯t. The remaining component has to relate to pickup times. These are more involved
as they depend on how, based on the state of the system, the platform decides to do
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the assignment of servers to customers—the dispatching algorithm. To overcome this
difficulty it is convenient to look at the physics of the spatial system under a particular
dispatching algorithm. In the present study, we anchor the analysis around the
asymptotic behavior of one notable dispatching algorithm: nearest-neighbors dispatch
(NN). This algorithm is simple, intuitively appealing, and it is also near-optimal.2 If
there are more servers than customers, NN assigns the next arriving customer to its
closest available servers. If there are less servers than customers, NN assigns the next
idling server to its closest waiting customer.
The asymptotic behavior of NN, which we discuss in Section 2.3.2, leads to a
particular form of the expected service time which, in turn, motivates the following
expression for the state-depend rate of our queueing system when its state is q
1
µ(q)
, s¯p√|q − n| ∨ 1 + s¯t, q ≥ 0, (2.2)
for two given positive constants s¯p and s¯t, where s¯p represents the average pickup
time when there is one server available and one passenger request. The form in Eq.
(2.2) captures spatial frictions in the following way. Consider the queueing system.
If Q(t)  n, then |Q(t) − n| is large and many servers are available, and thus,
1/µ(Q(t)) is close to s¯t, the expected en-route time. The pickup time should be
negligible given the high density of free servers in space. Similarly, if Q(t) n, then
many customers are waiting and a match with a low pickup time could be found
given the high density of customers in space. Indeed, we also have that 1/µ(Q(t)) is
close to s¯t in this scenario. The important point is that whenever there is a critical
idle/waiting mass at either side of the market, the physical nature of the system allows
it to process customers efficiently. When Q(t) ≈ n, we expect the match between
server and customer to lead to a significantly higher pickup time. In our model, a
customer’s total expected service time will be close to s¯p + s¯t when Q(t) ≈ n. For
2Among the policies that minimize customers’ expected total system time, NN achieves near
optimal performance (see e.g., [14]) .
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notational simplicity, we assume s¯t = s¯p throughout the next few sections, and denote
this quantity simply by s¯. When we simulate the system in Section 2.6, we allow s¯t
and s¯p to take distinct values.
Performance Metrics. The main objective of this chapter is to understand
the implications of spatial frictions on performance metrics of the service system. In
particular, we analyze these in an asymptotic regime in which the number of servers
and the arrival rate grow large. We analyze the system in heavy traffic and consider
a sequence of M/MQ/n queues indexed by n, with arrival rate λn such that




(1− ρn)nα = β, for some β ∈ R+, α ∈ (0, 1), (2.3)
where ρn equals s¯ · λn/n. Thus, ρn approaches 1 from below at rate 1/nα. Under
these different scalings (as α varies), our goal is to study key performance metrics
associated with the system. We let {Qn(t)}t≥0 denote the number of customers in the
n-system. The dynamics of Qn(t) can be written as follows. Let A = {A(t) : t ≥ 0}
and S = {S(t) : t ≥ 0} be two independent unit rate Poisson processes. The path-






, Qn(0) = Q0. (2.4)
The term Q0 corresponds to the initial state of the system, the second term captures
the cumulative arrivals up to time t, and the third term refers to the cumulative
departures up to t. In the latter, µn(Qn(t)) ·min(n,Qn(t)) corresponds to the service
rate of the system, with µn(Qn(t)) representing the service rate per server at time t
and min(n,Qn(t)) the number of non-idle servers at time t.
We use Qn(∞) to denote a random variable representing the number of customers
in the system in steady-state. One key central metric we are interested in quantifying
is the steady-state limiting delay probability




in order to assess the system performance. As in classical multi-server queues (see,
e.g., [36]), if P∞(W ) = 1, the system is said to be operating in the efficiency-driven
(ED) regime, if P∞(W ) = 0 the system is said to be operating in the quality-driven
(QD) regime, and if P∞(W ) ∈ (0, 1), the system is said to be in the quality- and
efficiency-driven (QED) regime. In the coming sections, we characterize how P∞(W )
changes as the values of α and β change. In turn, we will also analyze implications
on various other metrics such as, e.g., total system cost.
2.3.2 Discussion of the Modeling Assumptions
We now provide an asymptotic grounding for Eq. (2.2), based on the NN dispatching
algorithm that is studied in the vehicle routing literature ([14]). Recall that for this
policy, when there are more servers than customers, the closest idle server is assigned
to a new arrival (see Figure 2.2 (a)). In the case when there are more customers than










Figure 2.2: Nearest neighbor policy (NN). In (a) we have Q(t) < n, in (b) we have
Q(t) > n.
The connection between µ(·) and NN comes from the following argument. Consider
a general system operating under NN. Suppose that at time t there is a total of Q(t)
customers, and that server j was matched to customer i. Depending on the state of
the system, the assignment could have happened in two different ways. If Q(t) < n,
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server j must be the closest idle server to customer i among n − Q(t) idle servers
(see Figure 2.2 (a)). If Q(t) ≥ n, customer i must be the closest waiting customer
to server j among Q(t) − n waiting customers (see Figure 2.2 (b)). In either case
customer i’s pickup time can be computed by comparing the distance of the closest
of |Q(t) − n| ∨ 1 random variables uniformly distributed in C to a single point. We
can then use the following standard result from probability to obtain an asymptotic
approximation for a customer’s expected pickup time under NN.
Lemma 2.1 Let X1, X2, . . . be a sequence of independent uniformly distributed ran-













, as k ↑ ∞.
Conditioning on Q(t) and ignoring any dependencies among the involved random
variables, Lemma 2.1 suggests the following approximation for a customer’s expected
pickup time
E[Pickup|Q(t)] ≈ s¯p√|Q(t)− n| ∨ 1 ,
for some positive s¯p. The first term in Eq. (2.2) incorporates this approximation.
We note that the particular approximation we use in µ(·) discussed above is not
the only simplifying assumption we use in the Markovian system. We also assume
that server travel times, including both pickup and en-route times, are exponentially
distributed. We argue in Section 2.6 using simulation that our approximations are
reasonable, in the sense that the Markovian system approximates well the behavior
of the general system.
First-dispatch. Another dispatching protocol that has received attention in the
literature is first-dispatch (FD). Under FD, an arriving customer is assigned as soon as
possible to the closest idle server. Consider again Figure 2.2. In the situation depicted
on the left panel (a), NN and FD operate according to the same rules. However, in
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the situation represented by the right panel (b) of Figure 2.2, the two dispatch rules
operate quite differently. In this case, the FD dispatching algorithm assigns the next
idling server to the longest waiting customer. As pointed out by [23], the FD dispatch
rule can lead the system to a bad equilibrium they call the Wild Goose Chase in
which servers spend long times picking up customers. Our framework can be used to
analyze the systems’ performance under the FD dispatch policy. Using Lemma 2.1 we





(n− q)+ ∨ 1 + s¯t, q ≥ 0.
Unlike the NN policy, the FD policy does not make use of spatial economies of scale
when the system is heavily loaded with customers (q > n); instead, it serves customers
on a first come first serve basis. This gives rise to the Wild Goose Chase phenomenon.
Under this inefficient dispatching protocol, the number of servers required to escape
ED performance equals the offered load plus a buffer term that is of the same order
of the offered load, as opposed to a buffer of the order of the offered load to the power
of 2/3 under NN. The NN dispatching protocol avoids this bad equilibrium outcome
by exploiting spatial economies of scale even when the system is heavily loaded with
customers.
2.4 Dynamics of a Related Deterministic System
Before we study the stochastic limiting properties of the Markovian system in Section
2.5, we analyze the properties of a deterministic version of it that will provide natural
candidate focal points for the former system and initial insights on its behavior. In
particular, we focus on a natural deterministic counterpart of Eq. (2.4).
Deterministic dynamics. Consider the dynamics of Q˜n(·) described by











du, Q˜n(0) = Q˜0,
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where Q˜0 is a non-negative constant. This dynamical system has a simple interpreta-
tion. A fluid of customers joins the system at rate λn and departs at state-dependent
rate µn(Q˜n(t)) · min(n, Q˜n(t)). This dynamical system is a deterministic version of
the one presented in Eq. (2.4). From the equation above, we can write Q˜n as the
solution of the ordinary differential equation
dQ˜n(t)
dt
= fn(Q˜n(t)), Q˜n(0) = Q˜0, (2.5)
where
fn(q) , λn − µn(q) ·min{n, q}.
Since µn(·) is a Lipschitz continuous function, so is fn(·). Therefore, by the Picard-
Lindelof theorem, the ODE in Eq. (2.5) has a unique solution, which we denote by
Φ(q0, t) for a given Q˜n(0) = q0. In what follows, we study the equilibrium points of
this solution.
Definition 2.1 (Equilibria) We say that a point q∗ is an equilibrium point of the
dynamic system presented in Eq. (2.5) if
Φ(q∗, t) = q∗, for all t ≥ 0.
An equilibrium point q∗ is such that if the systems starts at q∗, then the systems
remains at q∗ for all t ≥ 0. Observe that we can compute an equilibrium by solving
fn(q
∗) = 0. In general, a dynamical system can have multiple equilibria but these
may have different properties. We classify the equilibria according to the following
definition.
Definition 2.2 (Stability of Equilibria) An equilibrium q∗ of Eq. (2.5) is said
to be stable if for any  > 0, there exists δ > 0 such that if |q − q∗| < δ, then
|Φ(q, t) − q∗| <  for all t ≥ 0. Otherwise, q∗ is unstable. If q∗ is stable and there
exists δ > 0 such that if |q − q∗| < δ, then limt→∞Φ(q, t) = q∗, we say that q∗ is
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locally asymptotically stable. If limt→∞Φ(q, t) = q∗ for any q ≥ 0, we say that q∗ is
globally asymptotically stable.
Informally, an equilibrium q∗ is stable if whenever the system is slightly perturbed
from q∗, it remains near q∗. An equilibrium q∗ is unstable if small perturbations of
the system around q∗ take the system away from q∗. If for any starting point q, the
dynamic Φ(q, t) converges to q∗ then q∗ is globally asymptotically stable. If the latter
is true but only in a neighborhood of q∗ then q∗ is locally asymptotically stable. Next
we study the equilibria of the dynamical system from Eq. (2.5).
Equilibria characterization. Recall that the equilibrium points of Eq. (2.5)
can be found by solving fn(q
∗) = 0. The next theorem provides a complete description
of the solutions to this equation for n large.
Theorem 2.1 (Equilibrium Points) Suppose limn→∞(1 − ρn)nα = β and ρn ↑ 1,
and let β∗1 = 3/(4
1/3).
(i) Then, there exists n0 such that for all n ≥ n0, the system from Eq. (2.5) admits




Furthermore, this equilibrium is unique and globally asymptotically stable if α >
1/3 or if α = 1/3 and β < β∗1 .
(ii) Suppose α < 1/3 or α = 1/3 and β > β∗1 . Then, there exists n0 such that for
all n ≥ n0, the system from Eq. (2.5) admits three equilibria given by
qn = n+
ρ2n
(1− ρn)2 , (2.6)
q = n− n · (1− ρn) · r0,n(ρn), (2.7)




















, i ∈ {0, 1}.
Furthermore, qn and q are locally asymptotically stable and q˜n is an unstable
equilibrium.
The result establishes that there are two fundamentally different regimes where
the system from Eq. (2.5) can operate. When the system is heavily loaded, in the
sense that α > 1/3 or α = 1/3 and β < β∗1 , then the queue length converges to a
point qn > n as t grows to ∞, independently of the initial condition. Furthermore
the exact characterization of qn provides additional insights. We have
qn = n+
ρ2n




Hence, in such a system, asymptotically, there are always order n2α customers waiting
in the system to be served.
As the load decreases (α decreases) and when the system is such that α < 1/3 or
α = 1/3 and β > β∗1 , then the behavior of the system is more subtle. There are two
locally stable equilibria and one unstable equilibrium. Now the same equilibrium qn
still exists and is locally stable, but a new locally stable equilibrium emerges, q. It is
possible to show that this new equilibrium is such that3
q ≈ n− c n1−α,
for an appropriate constant c. In other words, in such an equilibrium, there are always
idle servers, and there is order n1−α such idle servers. Hence, there are two locally
stable equilibria, one with all servers busy and customers waiting (qn) and one with
idle servers and no customers waiting (q).
3This can be seeing by analyzing the Taylor expansion of the term r0,n(ρn).
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Proof sketch and intuition. The proof of Theorem 2.1 relies on analyzing
both equilibrium points and their stability properties. To establish the equilibria, we
determine the zero crossings of fn(·). With some slight rewriting,
fn(q) = λn − µn(q) ·min{n, q} = λn











with g1,n(q) = 1 +
1√|n− q| ∨ 1 , g2,n(q) = min(n, q)λns¯ .
The function g1,n(q) is proportional to the amount of work a system with n servers
needs to do per customer when there are q customers in the system. Analogously,
g2,n(q) is proportional to the amount of work the system with n servers is capable of
doing per customer when there are q customers in the system. Hence, determining
the sign of fn(q) amounts to comparing the sizes of g1,n(q) and g2,n(q). When the
former is larger than the latter, we have fn(q) > 0 and the queue size grows. When
the inverse is true, fn(q) < 0, the queue size shrinks. When they are equal, we obtain











Figure 2.3: Equilibria points for system from Eq. (2.5). Plots (a) and (b) correspond
to regimes (i) and (ii) from Theorem 2.1, respectively. The points where the functions
g1,n(q) and g2,n(q) cross correspond to equilibria points.
As for stability, the queue length tends to grow when g1,n(q) > g2,n(q) since the
amount of work the system needs to perform per customer is greater than its ability to
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do work per customer. Similarly, g1,n(q) < g2,n(q) implies the system can handle the
current workload and that the queue size is decreasing. Therefore, the two equilibrium
points in regime (ii) where g1,n(q) > g2,n(q) to their left and g1,n(q) < g2,n(q) to their
right, q and qn, are stable, while q˜n is not.
An important observation is about what drives the differences between the regimes.
From the heavy traffic scaling (see Eq. (2.3)) we have that g2,n(q) ≈ q/(n− β · n1−α)
for all q < n. It follows that for q < n the slope of g2,n(q) is determined by both α
and β. The theorem establishes that when α is large enough the slope of g2,n(q) is
not steep enough to cross g1,n(q) and, therefore, the only possible equilibrium is qn
(See Figure 2.3 (a)). Similarly, if α is small enough then g2,n(q) is steep enough to
cross g1,n(q); thus, the two extra equilibria q and q˜n emerge (See Figure 2.3 (b)). The
transition point occurs when α equals 1/3. In this case, depending on the choice of
β, the two extra equilibria may or may not exist. As β increases, the slope of g2,n(q)
increases until it reaches a point from which on g2,n(q) is steep enough so that the
two equilibria to the left of n materialize.
Interpretation in terms of the queueing system. In terms of the queuing
model, when the number of customers is much larger than n, service times become
shorter. In turn, the system processes customers more efficiently, which brings the
total number of customers down. In addition, when the number of customers is
close to n, service times are not as short as in the previous situation. This implies
that the system is not as effective in processing customer, bringing the total num-
ber of customers up. That is, the queueing system (and also the general system)
has a self-regulating property that is captured by the deterministic system through
the equilibrium qn. When the number of customers is low (when q < q), despite
the fact that each customer experiences a “short” pickup time, there are just not
enough customers in the system so that the arrival rate dominates departure rate,
which increases the number of customers in the system. For a medium number of
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customers (when q ∈ (q, q˜n)), there are enough idle servers so that we are processing
customer efficiently, but also there are enough customers in the system so that ar-
rivals can be dominated by departures. This brings the number of customers in the
system down. For a large number of customers (q ∈ (q˜n, n)), there are not enough
idle servers. Therefore, the service time of customers becomes large and, as a con-
sequence, so does the number of customers in the system. That is, for states below
n, the queueing system also has a self-regulating property that is captured by the
deterministic dynamics through the equilibrium q. Therefore, one might expect q
and qn to play focal roles in the queueing system, which they indeed do when we
analyze the stochastic version of the system in Section 2.5.
2.5 Limiting Regimes
In this section, we first investigate the properties of the Markovian system in steady
state, where the equilibria derived in the previous section for the deterministic system
from Eq. (2.5) will play a central role. We then analyze the system in the asymptotic
regime from Eq. (2.3), parametrized by α and β. In turn, our results lead to a
parametrization of the system’s regimes: QD, ED and QED. We also discuss some
managerial implications of the results.
2.5.1 Steady-State Analysis
Before we provide our main results, observe that for a given scale n, the process
Qn(t) is a birth and death process with birth rate λn and state-dependent death rate
µn(Qn(u)) · min(n,Qn(u)). Letting pin(k) be the steady-state probability that the
n-system is in state k, the detailed balance equations yield
pin(k) · fn(k)
λn
= pin(k)− pin(k − 1), k ≥ 1. (2.9)
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We first characterize the shape of the steady-state distribution pin(·) for systems
with large scale.
Proposition 2.1 (Steady-state Probability Distribution) Suppose that limn→∞(1−
ρn)n
α = β, ρn ↑ 1, and let β∗1 = 3/(41/3). Then the following holds.
(i) If α > 1/3 or if α = 1/3 and β < β∗1 , then for n sufficiently large, the steady
distribution pin(·) is unimodular with a mode at bqnc.
(ii) If α < 1/3 or if α = 1/3 and β > β∗1 , then for n sufficiently large, the steady
distribution pin(·) admits two modes, one at bqc and one at bqnc.
This result leverages Eq. (2.9) and the intuition obtained from Figure 2.3 to link
the equilibria of the deterministic system from Eq. (2.5) with the modes of pin(k).
From Eq. (2.9), we note that the monotonicity of pin(·) can be determined by looking
at the sign of fn(·). In turn, Proposition 2.1 establishes that pin(·) has at most two
modes and that those modes are close to the equilibrium points. There is always one
at bqnc, and, depending on the scaling parameters, there may or may not be another









Figure 2.4: Steady-state probability pin(·). In (a), which corresponds to regime (i)
in Proposition 2.1, the state distribution is unimodal with a peak at bqnc. In (b),
which corresponds to regime (ii) in Proposition 2.1, the state distribution is bimodal
with peaks at
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Whenever α > 1/3, pin(·) is unimodal and it peaks once to the right of n, see
Figure 2.4(a). If α < 1/3, pin(·) is bimodal and it also peaks to the left of n, see
Figure 2.4(b). If α = 1/3 these two cases are possible depending on the parameter
β. This is in line with the intuition we obtained from the deterministic analysis in
Section 2.4.
In steady-state, one expects that the system spends most of the time around the
modes of the distribution. However, when assessing the performance of the system in
terms of probability of having to wait for a server to be assigned, one needs to analyze
the steady-state distribution beyond its modes to evaluate how mass is distributed.
We do so next.
2.5.2 Service Regimes
We start our analysis of service regimes by analyzing the quality-driven (QD) and
effiency-driven (ED) regimes.
2.5.2.1 QD and ED regimes.
We first establish sufficient conditions for the ED and QD regimes to emerge.
Theorem 2.2 (Limiting Regimes) Fix α ∈ (0, 1) and β > 0. Suppose that limn→∞ nα(1−





(i) (ED Regime) if α ∈ (1/3, 1) or if α = 1/3 and β < β∗2 , then
P∞(W ) = 1,
(ii) (QD Regime) if α ∈ (0, 1/3) or if α = 1/3 and β > β∗2 , then
P∞(W ) = 0.
Theorem 2.2 provides a crisp characterization of the domains in which the ED
and QD regimes emerge. If α ∈ (1/3, 1) or if α = 1/3 and β < β∗2 , then recall
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from Proposition 2.1 that the steady-state probability of the number of customers
in the system admits only one mode at bqnc, which is higher than n, the number
of servers. Part (i) of Theorem 2.2 establishes that the mass is concentrated to
the right of n and hence servers are almost always either en route to customers or
transporting customers and almost never idle. In turn, customers, will have to wait
with probability close to 1 before being assigned a server.
If α ∈ (0, 1/3) or if α = 1/3 and β > β∗2 , then the the steady-state probability
of the number of customers in the system admits two modes (cf. Proposition 2.1
part (ii)), one at bqnc which is higher than n and one at bqc which is lower than n.
Part (ii) of Theorem 2.2 establishes that the mass is concentrated to the left of n
and hence there is almost always a fraction of servers that idle and customers almost
never wait before being assigned a server. In other words, the mode to the right of n
plays little role in this parameter regime.
Discussion of Capacity Planning. To further appreciate the result, recall that
since nα(1− ρn)→ β we have
n− λns¯
(λns¯)1−α
→ β, that is, n ≈ λns¯ + β · (λns¯)1−α. (2.10)
The term λns¯ corresponds to the standard offered load of the system as defined for
standard M/M/n multi-server systems. In heavy traffic, this quantity determines
how the capacity of the system should be scaled with the arrival rate of customers.
First, there is a nominal term, which is simply λns¯, that accounts for the expected
amount of work requested by customers. The second term β ·(λns¯)1−α is a buffer term
that accounts for stochastic variations of the system. In a classical M/M/n setting,
when α < 1/2, the system is in the QD regime, when α > 1/2, the system is in the
ED regime, and when α = 1/2 the system is in the QED regime. In contrast, in our
setting when the buffer term is β · (λns¯)1/2, the system is in the ED regime no matter
the choice of β. Since our model captures spatial frictions, this result highlights that
in a setting where servers need to reach customers before the start of effective service,
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the capacity needed to achieve QED performance is fundamentally different than in
a standard setting. Moreover, spatial frictions create the need for more servers than
in a standard setting for the system to operate in the QD regime. Indeed, in our
model the buffer term must be β · (λns¯)m with m ≥ 2/3. The transition between ED
and QD occurs when the buffer term is β · (λns¯)2/3, that is, the QED regime can only
happen with a scaling of 2/3 which is orders of magnitude larger than the traditional
SRS rule of thumb.
Proof sketch of Theorem 2.2. The proof of Theorem 2.2 consists on bounding
above the terms P[Qn(∞) < n] and P[Qn(∞) ≥ n], respectively, and then using
asymptotic relations between the mode probabilities as established in the following
result.






































And there exists β∗2 > β
∗
1 such that g(β
∗
2) = 0 and if β
∗
1 < β < β
∗
2 then g(β) > 0,
whereas if β > β∗2 then g(β) < 0.
Proposition 2.2 shows how the peak of the modes of pin(·) compare to each other
as n grows large. When α > 1/3, for large n, there is only one peak given by bqnc.
From part (i), its steady-state probability satisfies
pin(bqnc) ≈ pin(n) · en
α/β,
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that is, pin(bqnc) is exponentially larger than pin(n). Since pin(·) is increasing to the
left of bqnc (see Proposition 2.1), this suggests that, in the limit, the number of
customers in the system will be above n with high probabilty. In other words, the
system will be in the ED regime.
For the case when α < 1/3, Proposition 2.1 states that pin(·) is bimodal and, there-
fore, there could be mass around both peaks. However, part (ii) of the proposition
establishes that pin(bqc) is exponentially larger than pin(bqnc),




This suggests that when α > 1/3, the tail of pin(·) to the right of n vanishes as n
becomes large. In turn, the number of customers in the system should be below n
with high probability. In other words, while the distribution pin(·), has two modes,
only one mode “matters” and we expect the system to be in the QD regime.
The threshold case is α = 1/3. In this case whether pin(bqnc) dominates pin(bqc)
(or vice-versa) is governed by β. When β < β∗1 , from Proposition 2.1, we know that
bqnc is the only mode and, therefore, pin(bqnc) dominates. If β ∈ (β∗1 , β∗2) then bqc
is also a mode; however, part (iii) of the proposition establishes that pin(bqnc) is
exponentially larger than pin(bqc). That is, in this case bqc transitions into becoming
a mode, but the mass it contributes is not large enough and it vanishes as n increases.
Therefore, for β < β∗2 , the system will be in the ED regime. In contrast, when β > β
∗
2 ,
the roles of pin(bqnc) and pin(bqc) reverse. This indicates that for β > β∗2 , the system
will be in the QD regime.
2.5.2.2 QED regime
Theorem 2.2 implies that the QED regime, in which the asymptotic probability that
customers have to wait for a server to be assigned is such that P∞(W ) ∈ (0, 1), may
only occur if α = 1/3 and β = β∗2 as for all other values, the system is either in the
ED or QD regimes. It is already apparent that the QED regime is much more subtle
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in our Markovian system than in classical M/M/n systems as both the buffer order of
magnitude (determined by α) and the constant in front of the buffer size (determined
by β) need to be pinned down. The transition from QD to ED regimes does not occur
through the constants in front of the buffer order of magnitude, leaving the question
open of whether the QED regime exists at all in our Markovian system and, if so,
how may it be reached. The next result establishes that there exists a QED regime
and provides a characterization of it.
Theorem 2.3 (QED Regime) Let pH ∈ (0, 1). There exists a sequence {γn : n ≥
1} with γn → 0 as n ↑ ∞ and a function pL(pH) ∈ (0, 1), such that if n1/3(1− ρn) =
β∗2 + γn then
pL(pH) ≤ lim inf
n→∞
P[Qn(∞) ≥ n] ≤ lim sup
n→∞
P[Qn(∞) ≥ n] ≤ pH ,
with pL(·) strictly increasing in pH and such that
lim
pH→1
pL(pH) = 1 and lim
pH→0
pL(pH) = 0.
This result establishes a regime such that for n large enough the probability of
waiting to be assigned a server is in (0, 1). In turn, the probability of not waiting
also belongs to (0, 1). That is, the system is in the QED regime. We have not pinned
down an exact expression for these probabilities but, instead, we have provided a
range. As one varies pH ∈ (0, 1), one can achieve the extreme regimes. If pH ≈ 1
then from the theorem we can deduce that P[Qn(∞) ≥ n] ≈ 1; if pH ≈ 0 then we
can deduce that P[Qn(∞) ≥ n] ≈ 0.
Capacity Planning for the QED Regime. From a practical perspective,
Theorem 2.3 provides two important insights. First, it shows that QED performance
is achieved at a different scaling than in traditional multi-server systems. Typically, in
those system a SRS rule can balance the trade-off between waiting times and service
efficiency. In a spatial setting this is no longer enough because servers must reach
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their customers before starting service. Our results suggest that the right scaling is
2/3 instead of 1/2. Second, notice that since n1/3(1− ρn)− γn → β∗2 we have
n− λns¯
(λns¯)1−α
− γn → β∗2 , that is, n ≈ λns¯ + β∗2 · (λns¯)2/3 + γn · (λns¯)2/3. (2.11)
From this equation we observe that, in addition to the traditional buffer term of the
form β · (λns¯)m, our result establishes that an extra lower order term is needed for
QED performance. In particular, in our Markovian system, it is necessary to add the
term γn · (λns¯)2/3. Because γn → 0 this term is of lower order than the second term
in Eq. (2.11). Hence, the QED regime requires a very fine balance involving second
order terms compared to the buffer size in this spatial setting, in stark contrast with
the classical M/M/n setting.
Proof sketch of Theorem 2.3. A necessary condition to achieve the QED
regime is that the peaks of pin(·) be in a constant proportion; otherwise, one would
dominate the other and the system would be in the QD or ED regime. According to











that this, the log(·) term is o(n1/3). In turn, the ratio pin(bqnc)/pin(bqc) does not
necessarily converge to a constant. To have it so, one would have to look at lower
order terms for log(pin(bqnc)/pin(bqc)) and try to disentangle the exact rate at which
n1/3(1 − ρn) has to approach β∗2 so that the log(·) converges to a constant. Instead
of pursuing this, in the next result we show the existence of a sequence converging to
zero, {γcn : n ≥ 1}, such that if n1/3(1 − ρn) approaches β∗2 as β∗2 + γcn, the peaks of
pin(·) will be in a constant proportion.
Proposition 2.3 Fix c ∈ R. Then, there exists a sequence {γcn : n ≥ 1} with γcn → 0









In the proof of the proposition we provide a detailed explanation of how to construct
the sequence {γcn : n ≥ 1}. In turn, the proposition is not just an existence result,
but it also provides the exact sequence that enables us to maintain the peaks in a
constant proportion. It also establishes that, for any constant c ∈ R, if n1/3(1 − ρn)
approaches β∗2 at an appropriate rate then
pin(bqnc) ≈ pin(bqc) · ec.
In particular, as we vary c we can achieve any desired proportion. For example, if
c < 0 then pin(·) might look as depicted in Figure 2.4(b).
Even though there is a way to scale the system such that that the peaks are in
constant proportion, this does not guarantee that the probability of being around
each of them will be positive at the same time. It is possible, for example, that the
dispersion of pin(·) around bqnc diminishes to zero while the proportion with the other
peak remains constant. Therefore, we need to assess how the peaks compare to the
mass around them. The next lemma provides a characterization of this.













This result establishes that the ratio of the mass to the right of n, to the peak in
that region is Θ(n
3
2
α). That is, with respect to pin(bqnc) the mass to the right of n is
not negligible and, in fact, is approximately n
3
2
α larger than pin(bqnc). Similarly, with
respect to pin(bqc), the mass to the left of n is non-trivial and, in fact, is approximately
√
n larger than pin(bqc).
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Observe that in part (i) of the lemma, the order of the ratio depends on α. When
α < 1/3 then this ratio is not as big as the one for pin(bqc) (which is Θ(
√
n)). This
coincides with Theorem 2.2 in that for these values of α the mass to the left of n
dominates the mass to the its right. Similarly, when α > 1/3, the mass to the right
of n dominates. For α = 1/3, both ratios are of the same order. In turn, we have
P[Qn(∞) ≥ n]






Therefore, if the ratio of the peaks is constant, then the total mass to the left and
to the right of n can be both (asymptotically) positive and separated away from
zero. That is, both sides can be “balanced” whenever the peaks are in constant
proportion. We can thus combine the results in Proposition 2.3 and Lemma 2.2 to
find lower and upper bounds for P[Qn(∞) ≥ n]. In the proof of Lemma 2.2 we find
exact expressions to control for the ratios as n increases, which we then leverage to
provide explicit bounds for P[Qn(∞) ≥ n] that can be mapped to probability values,
pH and pL(pH), which satisfy the properties of Theorem 2.3.
2.5.3 Orders of Magnitudes of Queues and Wait Times
The results so far provide an understanding of the different regimes the system can
operate in as a function of its load. Next, we quantify queue sizes and waiting
times in our system as a function the scaling parameter α. The discussion in this
section underlines the differences of a spatial server system with a traditional queueing
system.
Let Ls and W s denote respectively the steady-state expected queue length (ex-
cluding customers in service) and expected wait time. Similarly, let Lc and W c denote
the corresponding quantities in the classical M/M/n system. From standard queueing
theory, we have that
Lc =
ρn
(1− ρn) · C(n, λn/s¯t),
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where C(n, λn/s¯t) satisfies the Erlang’s C formula, and represents the probability of
waiting (see, e.g., [4]). Assuming that nα(1− ρn)→ β we have that
C(n, λn/s¯t)→

1 if α > 1/2,
constant if α = 1/2,
0 if α < 1/2.
In turn, using standard arguments, one can show that for α < 1/2, we have that Lc
is o(1). Meanwhile, for α ≥ 1/2, Lc is Θ(nα). This implies that for α < 1/2, W c is
o(1), while for α ≥ 1/2, W c is Θ(nα−1). In particular, in the Halfin-Whitt regime
(α = 1/2), we have that Lc is Θ(
√
n) and W c is Θ(1/
√
n). Next, we compare these
classic results with the results obtained from our Markovian system.
We first provide a rigorous statement about the order of magnitude of the size of
our Markovian system around the equilibria, in the sense of deriving the subset of
the real line where the queue lengths fluctuations are constrained to, assuming n is
sufficiently large. We use this result to provide approximate expressions for Ls and
W s.
Proposition 2.4 Suppose limn→∞ nα(1− ρn) = β. Then,





− C ≤ Qn(∞)− bqnc√
log(n) · n 32α ≤ C
]
= 1.





− C ≤ Qn(∞)− bqc√
log(n) · √n ≤ C
]
= 1.
Let’s consider first part (i) of the proposition. In this case we can use Eq. (2.6)
to deduce that
Ls ≈ r2 ρ
2
n













· n 32α ·
√
log(n) = Θ(n2α−1).
There are several interesting observations. First, for α = 1/2, the queue size is
approximately Θ(n) and the wait time is approximately Θ(1). Note the contrast to
a classical M/M/n system, where Lc = Θ(
√
n) and W c = Θ(1/
√
n). This makes
precise how much more work we are adding to the system by including pickups. It
also highlights that for α = 1/2, the Markovian system is in the ED regime, with
its long queues. Second, note that α = 1/2 is the largest value for which W s does
not explode. In contrast, in the M/M/n system, for any α ∈ (1/2, 1), the expected
waiting time approaches zero.
If we focus on pickup times, we can gain further intuition about how the QED
regime works in our system. Let P s denote the expected pickup time. Then, from
part (i) of the proposition,
P s ≈ s¯√|Qn(∞)− n| ∨ 1 ≈ Θ(1/nα).
For α = 1/3, pickup times are of order 1/nα and W s is of order n2α−1. This showcases
the interplay between wait times and pickup times. When the load of the system
increases (as measured by α), wait times increase because of the greater number of
customers in the system, while pickup times decrease due to the increased spatial
density of customers. If one attempts to minimize expected customer system times,
we therefore need to balance W s and P s. For the regime where α ≥ 1/3, this occurs
at α = 1/3.
For the regime from part (ii) of the proposition, we have that Ls ≈ 0 and W s ≈ 0.
Moreover, we can use the fact that q ≈ n − Θ(n1−α) to deduce that the expected
number of idle server is Θ(n1−α) and P s ≈ Θ(1/(n 1−α2 )). As we increase the load in
the system (as measured by α), we reduce the number of idle servers. However, at
the same time, pickup times increase due to the decreased spatial density of servers.
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2.5.4 A Social Planner’s Perspective
An alternative approach to determining the proper safety staffing level is to start
from a social planner’s objective, and then find the staffing level that optimizes it.
A natural social planner’s objective is one that incurs a cost per server of building
capacity plus a waiting (and pick-up time) cost per customer. We now show that this
objective function also leads us to the conclusion that a safety staffing that is equal
to the offered load to the power of 2/3 is optimal.
Let us consider a service provider that pays cs per unit of capacity and customers
that incur a waiting cost of cw per unit of waiting. That is, a social planner would
like to select the level of capacity n that solves the following optimization problem
min
n
cs · n+ λ · cw · E[Pn +Wn]. (2.12)
The first term in Eq. (2.12) corresponds to the cost of having n servers in the system.
The second, to the cost experienced by customers while they wait to be assigned a
server, Wn, and to be picked up, Pn.
Notice that from Eq. (2.3) we can write n as λ · s¯+ β(λ · s¯)1−α. Now, depending
on our choice of α we can have one of two cases. When α ≥ 1/3, the average pick up
times are of order Θ((λ · s¯)−α) while average waiting times are of order Θ((λ · s¯)2α−1).
Replacing this in Eq. (2.12) delivers the following expression for the objective
cs · (λ · s¯+ β(λ · s¯)1−α) + cw · ((λ · s¯)1−α + (λ · s¯)2α).
Among all values α > 1/3 the term that dominates in the expression above is the
total waiting times, that is, (λ · s¯)2α. This is increasing in α. Hence, α = 1/3 leads
to lower (asymptotic) costs compared to all values of α > 1/3.
For the case α ≤ 1/3, let piλ be the steady state probability the number of cus-
tomers being below n and let piλ be 1 − piλ. Similar to the case when α > 1/3, we
can rewrite the objective in Eq. (2.12) to obtain
cs · (λ · s¯+β(λ · s¯)1−α) + cw ·
(
{piλ · (λ · s¯)
1+α




When α < 1/3 the term that dominates is of order (λ · s¯)1−α. This term is decreasing
in α. In this case, α = 1/3 leads to lower (asymptotic) costs compared to all values
of α ≤ 1/3.
In conclusion, in a large system, the system total social cost measured by capacity
cost and waiting cost will be minimized by selecting the number of servers n according
to λ · s¯+ β(λ · s¯)2/3, where β should be tuned.
2.6 Numerical Experiments and General
Simulation
In this section, we aim at (i) illustrating the results in the Markovian system (§2.6.1),
and also to (ii) compare the behavior obtained in the Markovian system to that of
the actual physical system that motivated the Markovian system (§2.6.2).
Simulation setup. We consider a square city C = [0, 2]×[0, 2] and assume v = 1,
implying that s¯t · v ≈ 1.0428. The time horizon will be T = 4, 000. We simulate the
general system introduced in Section 3.3 and the Markovian system under several
different conditions, starting from Qn(0) = 0, in order to capture the ED, QD and
QED regimes. We scale the number of servers in the system according to
n = dλs¯t + β · (λs¯t)1−αe. (2.13)
For α ∈ {1/4, 1/2}, we consider β = 2.1. For α = 1/3, we vary β ∈ {2.1, 2.4, 2.7}.
2.6.1 Markovian System
We begin by numerically illustrating our theoretical results for the Markovian system.




s¯p√|q − n| ∨ 1 + s¯t, q ≥ 0, (2.14)
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with s¯p = s¯t = 1.0428, that is, the coefficient in front of the pickup times coincides
with the expected travel time between two points. Recall from §2.3.1 that these two
parameters need not to be the same because s¯p comes from an asymptotic approxi-
mation. In the next section we consider more realistic values for s¯p that we estimate
from simulation.
In Figures 2.5-2.6, we depict sample paths of the the number of customers in
the system minus the number of servers for the various parameters and superimpose
a corresponding histogram (taken from the path between periods 500 and 4,000).
Furthermore, the two modes bqnc and bqc (when they exist) minus n are depicted.
In Figure 2.5(a), α = 0.25 and we depict the system for three different scales.
In line with Theorem 2.2, one observes that the system spends almost all its time
around bqc and as the scale increases, the probability of wait approaches zero. The
system is in the QD regime.
In Figure 2.5(b), α = 0.5 and we depict the system for three different scales. Note
that in this case, there is only one mode, bqnc. In line with Theorem 2.2, one observes
that the system spends almost all its time around bqnc and as the scale increases, the
probability of wait approaches 1. The system is in the ED regime.
In Figure 2.6, α = 1/3 and we depict the system for three values of β. This is
the only setting where, asymptotically and depending on β, the system can oscillate
between the two equilibria and asymptotically, a positive fraction of the customers
(separated from 0 and 1) will wait before being assigned a server. Indeed, we observe
that for small values of β, the system operates most often with Q > n, as in the ED
regime. As β increases (center plot), the fraction of time the system spends in states
such that Q < n increases, in which case, the system is in the QED regime. When β
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(b) α = 0.5
Figure 2.5: Simulation of the Markovian system. We consider β = 2.1 and from left
to right λ ∈ {100, 400, 800}. The bottom x−axis corresponds to the simulation time,
while the top x−axis corresponds to probabilities. In the figure we observe both a
sample path and pin(·). The dashed lines correspond to the modes bqc and bqnc as
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Figure 2.6: Simulation of the Markovian system. We consider α = 1/3 and λ = 800
and from left to right β ∈ {2.1, 2.4, 2.7}. The bottom x−axis corresponds to the
simulation time, while the top x−axis corresponds to probabilities. In the figure we
observe both a sample path and pin(·). The dashed lines correspond to the modes bqc
and bqnc as given by Theorem 2.1.
2.6.2 Comparing the General and Markovian Systems
Next we simulate the general system and compare it the Markovian system. Our
purpose in this section is two-fold. First, we illustrate the system’s behavior under
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the different scalings. In particular, we test whether for α < 1/3 and α > 1/3 the
general system oscillates around the equilibria to the left and right of n, respectively.
For α = 1/3, we also test how by varying β the general system can, as predicted by
the Markovian system, oscillate around both equilibria.
Second, we provide numerical evidence for the quality of the Markovian system
as an approximation to the general system. To ensure an appropriate comparison,
we proceed as follows:
• We fix λ, α and β, and use Eq. (2.13) to obtain the number of servers.
• We simulate the general system for the computed value of n.
• We estimate s¯p, see Eq. (2.14). Then we simulate the Markovian system with
rate given by Eq. (2.14), and compute the theoretical modes/equilibria.
• We compare the system behavior for both the Markovian and general systems.
In Figures 2.7-2.8, we depict sample paths of the queue lengths in the general
system (right column) and compare it to the Markovian system (left column). For
the sake of exposition we fix λ = 800 throughout, but all the simulations are consistent
for large values of λ.
We observe that for low α (α = 0.25, Figure 2.7(a)), the general system queue
admits a behavior very similar to the proposed Markovian approximation. In par-
ticular, the general system also admits a mode exactly around bqc (as predicted by
the theory for the Markovian system) and this behavior is consistent across different
scales.
For high α (α = 0.5, Figure 2.7(b)), the general system queue admits again a
behavior very similar to the proposed Markovian approximation. Again, the general
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(b) α = 0.5, n = 895, s¯p = 1.518, bqnc − n = 399
Figure 2.7: Simulation for Markovian (left) and General (right) systems. We consider
β = 2.1. The bottom x−axis corresponds to the simulation time, while the top x−axis
corresponds to probabilities. In the figure we observe both a sample path and pin(·).
The dashed lines correspond to the modes bqc and bqnc as given by Theorem 2.1.
For the critical value of α (α = 1/3, Figures 2.7(a) and 2.8(b)), the general system
queue admits again a behavior very similar to the proposed Markovian approximation.
For low values of β (Figure 2.8(a)), both systems operate in the ED regime. As β
increases (Figure 2.8(b)), both systems move into the QED regime, as the queue
oscillates between the two equilibria.
Across values of α and β and across scales, this simulation highlights the usefulness
of the Markovian system in capturing some of the key features and predicting some
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(b) α = 1/3, β = 2.7, n = 1074, s¯p = 1.286, bqc − n = −158, bqnc − n = 18
Figure 2.8: Simulation for Markovian (left) and General (right) systems. We consider
α = 1/3. The bottom x−axis corresponds to the simulation time, while the top
x−axis corresponds to probabilities. In the figure we observe both a sample path and




In the present chapter, we have proposed a framework for studying how spatial fric-
tions affect capacity planning. In particular, we propose a reduced-form Markovian
system that captures spatial economies of scale, leading to a crisp characterization of
the trade-offs at play in such environments.
We have established a mapping from load to types of regimes in heavy traffic. In




(1− ρn)nα = β, for some β ∈ R+, α ∈ (0, 1).










Figure 2.9: Regimes for different values of α and β.
α > 1/3 and the QD regime emerges whenever α < 1/3. When α = 1/3, the three
regimes QD, ED and QED can emerge and the latter can only emerge for one critical
value of β, which we label β∗2 . We have further demonstrated through simulations
that the Markovian approximation provides a reliable guideline for the behavior of a
general system.
This chapter opens up various avenues of potential research, from both method-
ological and modeling perspectives. Analyzing the case when customers are impatient
and might abandon the system if not served after some time is a natural extension. On
the one hand, abandonment decreases the workload of the system as fewer customer
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have to be processed; on the other hand, it increases the system’s workload as having
fewer customers implies that spatial economies of scale become less advantageous.
The important question in this case is whether, in order to achieve QED perfor-
mance, abandonment necessitates just a change in β or more fundamental change in
α. Another interesting extension is to study how the results in this study can be
generalized to cases where origin-destination demand patterns generate imbalances
in the system. In this case, the additional workload stemming from pickups might
be even larger. How would this impact capacity sizing? An additional important
practical question is to consider time-varying demand patterns that might require
alternatives to steady-state analysis.
From a methodological perspective, an interesting extension would be to establish
some of form of convergence of the processes in the general system to those in the
Markovian approximation. More generally, there is potential to generalize the main
result of this chapter to any near optimal dispatching protocol by directly studying
the spatial system. A simple back-of-the-envelope calculation serves to enlighten the
latter claim. From [15] we can deduce that the expected number of customers in the
system in steady state is bound below by
n
2




The second term in this expression represents the number of idle server in the system,
n−nρn; while the third term maps to the number of customers waiting or being picked
up. These two terms are opposing forces that push the system to have less and more
customers, respectively. Using the heavy traffic scaling from Eq. (2.3), we can deduce
that the second term scales as Θ(n1−α), while the third term as Θ(n2α). Observe that
these scalings relate to those of the equilibria in Theorem 2.1. Intuitively, quality
and efficiency should balance when the two opposing forces balance each other. This
occurs when 1 − α equals 2α or, equivalently, when α equals 1/3, as our results
prescribe. Note that this derivation does not rely on a specific dispatching protocol,
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but only on one that is optimal or “near optimal” compared to the lower bound.




The Scope of Sequential Screening With Ex-Post
Participation Constraints
3.1 Motivation and Overview of Results
Sequential screening models have been used extensively in economics and revenue
management to study optimal contract design when buyers learn their valuations over
time. In the classic formulation of sequential screening pioneered by [27], a profit-
maximizing seller faces buyers that have initial partial-private information about
their valuation, for example the mean, and privately learn their full valuation after
some time. In the classic setting, buyers are required to participate from an interim
perspective: their expected gains at the time of contracting have to offset their outside
option. A salient example discussed by [27] is the airline industry in which, for
example, travelers purchase tickets in advance, but may only realize their actual
valuation once the date of the trip approaches.
Even though the optimal contracts that arise may offer partial refunds, the initial
advanced price is large enough such that some travelers experience negative ex-post
utility while still being willing to participate interim. This situation arises in other
industries as well, such as hotels, theaters or even railroads where advanced pric-
ing/refunds type contracts are also offered.
In many new markets, however, sellers are constrained to sell products in such
a way that buyers obtain a non-negative net utility once they have realized their
valuation, that is from an ex-post perspective. For example, in online shopping buyers
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may have the chance to return a purchased item after delivery, usually at no or low
cost ([42]). In the online display advertising market typical business constraints
impose that publishers cannot use up-front fees ([9]) and instead run auctions, for
example second-price. Thus, the seller needs to guarantee participation not only
initially – at the interim level – but also after the buyers have completely learned
their valuation – at the ex-post level.
Motivated by these new markets, we study the sequential screening problem as
described by [27] and in order to match our previous narrative we incorporate ex-
post participation constraints. Ex-post participation constraints rule out the optimal
contracts derived by [27] with up-front fees. As pointed out by [42] because different
up-front fees cannot be used to price discriminate the different buyers, it may be
that a static contract, one that does not screen the buyers interim, becomes optimal
under ex-post participation constraints. Building on the work by [42], our objective
is to understand when in fact the optimal selling mechanism is static (buyers are
not screened interim) or sequential (buyers are screened interim) and obtain a full
characterization of such contracts. Our work highlights the significant revenue im-
provements that can be attained by using a sequential contract relative to a static
one, even in the presence of ex-post participation constraints.
Our model considers a seller who is selling one unit of an object at zero marginal
cost to a buyer who has an outside option of zero. The sequence of events unfolds in
two periods. In the first, the buyer privately learns her interim type, for example the
mean of her valuation distribution, and the parties contract—important parts of our
analysis are done for binary interim types of buyers, low and high. The high type
has a distribution of ex-post values that dominates the distribution of the low type
in some stochastic order. The contract specifies allocation and payment functions.
In the second period, the buyer privately learns her valuation, and allocations and
transfers are realized. At this point, the buyer only accepts the contracting terms if
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her realized net utility is weakly larger than her outside option. This model aligns
with our aforementioned examples. In online shopping, the first period corresponds
to the purchasing time. At this time the buyer possesses private information about
her valuation but can only know her valuation with certainty after inspecting the
purchased item. In the second period, the buyer is delivered the item and has the
option to return it, at low or no cost. In the case of display advertising, some
publishers use a sequence of auctions known as “waterfall auctions” that implicitly
impose different priorities over participants.1 Commonly, higher-priority auctions
have higher reserve prices. The first period can be thought of as the time at which
the buyer decides in which auction (priority/reserve) to participate in. The second
period is when the auctions are actually run.
Main contributions. One of our main contributions is to characterize when
a static contract—that is, a contract that does not sequentially screen buyers—is
optimal. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the optimality of the
aforementioned contract, we refer to it as the average profit-to-rent condition. The
characterization we provide is intuitive. At the static contract the seller offers a
single price to both low and high type buyers. This price is too large for low types
and too low for high types relative to what the seller would set if he were to know
the types. To increase his revenue with respect to the static contract, the seller could
try to increase the price for high type buyers, however, this would incentivize them
to imitate the low types. Another option the seller has is to decrease the price for
low type buyers, but this would again incentivize the high types to mimic the low
types. In order to increase revenue and to deter high type buyers from imitating
the low types, the seller can reduce the price for a portion of low types thus serving
more of them and, at the same time, randomize their allocation so that high types
1See, for example, https://adexchanger.com/the-sell-sider/the-programmatic-waterfall-mystery.
A similar dynamic occurs when sellers offer “preferred deals” to advertisers (see, for example, [50]).
99
do not take the low types’ contract. The profit-to-rent condition establishes that
this deviation is not profitable for the seller; hence, the profit-to-rent condition is
necessary for the optimality of the static contract. Notably, we also show that it is
sufficient. Our characterization is a weighted average monotonicity condition of the
virtual valuations around the optimal static threshold that in some settings encodes
information about the similarity of the interim types. For example, in the case of
exponential valuations, the static contract is optimal if and only if the means of the
distributions of the low and high type are appropriately close.
Our second main contribution characterizes the optimal mechanism when the
condition mentioned above does not hold and a static contract is no longer optimal.
We prove that the optimal sequential contract randomizes the low type and gives
a deterministic allocation to the high type. Randomization occurs to prevent the
high type buyer from taking the low type’s contract. More specifically, the optimal
contract is characterized by an allocation probability x ∈ (0, 1), and three thresholds
θ1, θ2, and θH with θ1 ≤ θH ≤ θ2. In this contract, the seller allocates the object to a
low type buyer with probability x whenever her valuation is between θ1 and θ2, and
asks for a payment of θ1 · x. When the valuation of this type is above θ2, the object
is always allocated to her and the seller demands a payment of θ2 − (θ2 − θ1) · x.
The high type buyer gets the object with certainty and only when her valuation is
above θH , at which point the payment she has to make to the seller is θH . These
parameters are set in such a way that the interim incentive compatibility constraints
are satisfied.
A salient feature of this type of contract is that it discriminates the low type in two
dimensions. First, we establish that θ1 is above the optimal threshold a seller would
set if she was selling exclusively to low type buyers. That is, the low type buyer is
being allocated the object less often in the presence of high type buyers. The opposite
holds for high type buyers, they are being allocated the object more often than if they
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were alone. Second, there is a range of values for which the object is sold to the low
type with some probability strictly below one, which further reduces the chances of
a low type to receive the object compared to a case in which there are no high type
buyers. We illustrate these results with the example of the exponential distribution
for which we have explicit solutions. We find that for exponential valuations the
sequential contract can exhibit revenue improvements of up to 16-27% with respect
to the static contract.
Towards the end of the chapter, we consider the case of many interim types. We
generalize the profit-to-rent condition to a setting with an arbitrary number of interim
types. We also discuss directions on how to expand our analysis and results to this
setting, as well as the challenges that arise.
3.2 Related Literature
Our model builds on the sequential screening literature as pioneered by [27], with an
interim participation constraint.2 In contrast, in this chapter we impose an ex-post
participation constraint. The closest paper to ours that studies sequential screening
with ex-post participation constraints is [42]. They establish that the static contract
is optimal under a monotonicity condition regarding the cross-hazard rate functions.
This condition rules out some common distributions for values such as the exponen-
tial distribution. Furthermore, the condition is only sufficient, and therefore, does
not provide a complete characterization of the space of primitives for which the static
contract is optimal. We close this gap by providing a necessary and sufficient condi-
tion under which the static contract is optimal. Our condition leverages the economic
intuition that lies behind a potential profitable deviation from the optimal static con-
tract. Further and importantly, when the condition fails we characterize the optimal
2See [2] for a recent adaptation of the [27] formulation to study advanced purchase contracts in
revenue management settings.
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sequential mechanism and show that randomization of one of the interim types is
required for optimality.3
In terms of approaches, [42] relax both the low to high incentive constraint and
monotonicity constraint and then show that, under their condition, the contract that
maximizes the Lagrangian is deterministic and that as a result the static contract is
optimal. In contrast, we also relax the incentive constraint but maintain the mono-
tonicity constraint. For the relaxed problem, we perform a first-principle analysis, in
the style of [59] and [32] that leads us to identify the right structure of the optimal
contract. In turn, this permits us to characterize the optimal sequential contract
when our condition breaks. In related recent work, [37] considers a setting in which
a seller can design the screening mechanism as well as the information disclosure
mechanism with ex-post participation constraints.
The sequential nature of our model and the presence of ex-post participation con-
straints is related to the work of [7] and [9]. These authors consider a model in which
a seller, constrained by ex-post participation (also motivated by the display adver-
tising market), repeatedly sells objects to a buyer whose valuations are independent
across periods. Both papers provide characterizations for a nearly optimal mecha-
nism. They are different from ours because we consider a single sale and construct
the exactly optimal mechanism in a sequential screening model.
Our optimal mechanism is related to the BIN-TAC auction derived in the context
of online display advertising by [24]. This is a static auction that offers two options to
advertisers: a buy-it-now (BIN) option in which buyers can purchase the impression
at a posted high price, and a take-a-chance (TAC) option in which the highest bidders
are randomly allocated the impression (if no bidder went for the BIN). This auction
3See also [47] and [28] for examples of multi-good environments in which stochastic allocations
can improve over deterministic ones. In a related note, [43] establish that with multiple, as opposed
to a single good, generically, the static contract is not optimal for the sequential screening problem
with ex-post participation constraints.
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is tailored to approximate ironing in the classic static Myerson setting for non-regular
distributions that commonly arise in display advertising settings. This mechanism is
similar in spirit to ours as it randomizes low valuation buyers to separate them from
high valuations ones. However, with one bidder the BIN-TAC auction reduces to a
posted price which corresponds to the static contract in our setting. In contrast to
their static setting, we study a two-period model in which the buyer is sequentially
screened and randomization occurs even with one bidder.
3.3 Model
3.3.1 Payoffs and Private Information
We consider a seller (he) who is selling one unit of an object at zero cost to a buyer
(she) with an outside option of zero value. Both parties are risk-neutral and have
quasilinear utility functions. The sequence of events unfolds in two periods.
In the first period, the buyer privately learns her type and then the parties con-
tract. The type provides information about the distribution of the ex-post values of
the buyer, her true willingness-to-pay for the object. The contract specifies allocation
and payment functions.
In the second period, the buyer privately learns her valuation, and allocations and
transfers are realized. We refer to the type realized in period 1 as the interim type
and the valuation realized in period 2 as the ex-post type.
There are finitely many types, denoted k ∈ {1, . . . , K}, and the prior probability
of type k is given by αk with αk > 0 and
∑K
k=1 αk = 1. In the second period, a buyer
of type k privately learns her valuation θ which we assume to have a continuously
differentiable c.d.f. Fk(·) and pdf fk(·), with full support in Θ ⊆ [0,∞]. We assume
that Θ is a connected interval of the form [0, θmax]. It will be convenient to denote
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the upper c.d.f. by
F k(·) , 1− Fk(·).
All the distributions are common knowledge. We denote the virtual valuation µk(·)
of interim type k by
µk(θ) , θ − 1− Fk(θ)
fk(θ)
, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , K}, ∀θ ∈ Θ.
For the rest of the chapter we make the standard assumption that:
1− Fk(θ)
fk(θ)
, is non-increasing in θ, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , K}. (DHR)
This assumption facilitates our discussions. However, for our formal results we will
need a weaker assumption that we introduce later.
The terms of trade are specified in the first period by the seller. For a payment
t ∈ R and a probability of receiving the object x ∈ [0, 1], a buyer with valuation θ
receives a utility of θ · x− t, while the seller gets paid t.
We assume that the buyer agrees to purchase the object only if she is guaranteed a
non-negative net utility for any possible valuation of the object she might have. That
is, we require θ · x− t to be non-negative for all θ. The seller’s problem is to design
a contract that maximizes his expected payment, satisfying the ex-post participation
constraint together with incentive compatibility.
3.3.2 Mechanism Design Formulation
By means of the revelation principle (see, e.g., [51]) we can focus on incentive com-
patible direct revelation mechanisms, with allocations xk : Θ → [0, 1] and transfers
tk : Θ → R, that depend on the types (k, θ) reported to the mechanism. Then, for
a buyer reporting an interim type k′ and an ex-post type θ′ the mechanism allocates
the object with probability xk′(θ
′) and charges the buyer tk′(θ′).
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We define the ex-post utility of a buyer who reported k in the first period and θ′
in the second period while her true valuation is θ as
uk(θ; θ
′) , θ · xk(θ′)− tk(θ′),
with the understanding that uk(θ) equals uk(θ; θ) . Similarly, we define the interim







{uk′(z; θ′)} · fk(z)dz,
where the maximum is included because double deviations are in principle allowed.
Note, however, that with distributions with common support and under ex-post in-
centive compatibility, the maximum will always be achieved at θ′ equal to z, and we
can restrict attention to single deviations.
There are two kinds of incentive compatibility constraints that must be satisfied
by our mechanism. The first one is the ex-post incentive compatibility or (ICxp)
constraint which requires that for any report in the first period, truth-telling is optimal
in the second period, that is,
uk(θ) ≥ uk(θ; θ′) ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , K},∀θ ∈ Θ. (ICxp)
The second one is the interim incentive compatibility or (ICi) constraint which re-
quires that truth-telling is optimal in the first period, that is,
Ukk ≥ Ukk′ ∀k, k′ ∈ {1, . . . , K}. (ICi)
Also, we require the mechanism to satisfy an ex-post individual rationality constraint
or (IRxp)
uk(θ) ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , K}, ∀θ ∈ Θ. (IRxp)
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tk(z) · fk(z)dz (P)
s.t (ICi), (ICxp), (IRxp)
0 ≤ x ≤ 1 ,
where we use boldfaces to denote vectors. Observe that (IRxp) implies interim in-
dividual rationality. In fact, if we were to relax (P) by considering only interim
individual rationality we would be in the setting of [27] for discrete interim types.
In general, two types of contract can arise as a solution to the seller’s problem
(P) : static and sequential. A static solution to problem (P) corresponds to the case
when the allocations and transfers (xk, tk) do not depend on the interim type k. In
this case we have a unique menu (x, t) that is offered to the buyer and the contract
does not screen among interim types. We use (Ps) to denote the constrained version
of (P) to static contracts, which we refer to as the static program. In contrast, a
sequential solution allows for different menus that depend on the interim type k, and
each type of buyer self-selects into one of the menus. The problem (P), referred as
the sequential program, allows for such solutions.
The main focus of this chapter is two-fold. First, to study when the optimal
solutions to the static and sequential programs, (Ps) and (P), coincide. Second,
when they do not coincide, we aim to characterize the optimal solution to (P).
3.4 A Classic Example of Sequential Screening
We use the motivating example of [27] to illustrate the power of sequential screening
in the presence of an ex-post participation constraint. We show that a sequential
contract outperforms the static contract.
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There are two types of potential buyers, low type and high type. One-third of
potential buyers are low type whose valuation is uniformly distributed in [1, 2], two-
thirds are high type buyers with valuation uniformly distributed in [0, 1]∪ [2, 3]. [27]
think of the low type as a leisure traveler and of the high type as a business traveler
with the same mean but larger variability in her valuation. The seller has a production
cost equal to 1.
The optimal static contract sets the optimal monopoly price, p̂, equal to 2, which
yields a profit of 1/3. The static contract only serves the high types with high realized
valuations. [27] in their setting with an interim participation constraint show that
the seller can significantly increase its profits with sequential screening by offering
a menu of advanced payments/partial refund contracts. They establish that the
optimal contract for their setting offers an advanced payment of 1.5 and no refund to
the leisure traveler, and an advanced payment of 1.75 and 1 of refund to the business
traveler. In this contract a buyer can have a negative realized net utility. For example,
the leisure traveler initially pays 1.5 but her actual valuation can be any value within
[1, 2] and, therefore, half of the time she will obtain negative net utility after learning
her valuation.
Because of the advanced payments these contracts typically will not satisfy an
ex-post participation constraint, which we study next.
Let us consider the following sequential contract as a simple deviation from the
optimal static contract. The seller offers a menu of two quantities and prices, (xL, pL)
and (xH , pH). The second contract is set equal to the optimal static contract, that
is, (xH , pH) = (1, 2). Hence, the selling price for the high type is 2 and high types
that buy receive the full quantity.
Now, we find the optimal quantity and price for the low type buyer. Given the
contract for the high type, the seller’s profit is given by:
1
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where xL ∈ [0, 1] and pL ∈ [1, 2]. We need to ensure that the menus are interim
incentive compatible. The low to high incentive constraint is always satisfied (pH

























The first order condition yields an optimal price equal to
(
5−√3) /2 which, in turn,
delivers a profit of 2/3−1/(2√3). The improvement of the sequential contract versus
the optimal static contract is then 1−√3/2 ≈ 13%.
From this simple exercise we learn an important lesson: even in a simple setting
a sequential contract can have substantial benefits over a static contract. In this
chapter we study more generally when a sequential contract outperforms a static
contract and what drives this revenue improvement.
3.5 Optimality of Static Contract
First, we start by characterizing conditions under which it is optimal not to screen
the interim types. In the main theorem of this section we provide a necessary and
sufficient condition for the static contract to be optimal. We begin with a reformula-
tion of the problem based on standard techniques that use the envelope theorem, and
enables us to solve for the allocation and utilities of the lowest ex-post types instead
of both allocations and transfers. Using the reformulation we characterize the optimal
static contract. In Section 3.5.2, we use the optimal static contract together with a
simple deviation analysis to obtain an intuitive necessary condition for its optimality.
In Section 3.5.3, we show that this condition is both necessary and sufficient.
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3.5.1 Problem Reformulation and Static Solution
We obtain a more amenable characterization of the constraints by eliminating the
transfers from the them as in the classical Myersonian analysis.
Lemma 3.1 (Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Implementation)
The mechanism (x, t) satisfies (ICi),(ICxp) and (IRxp) if and only if
1. xk(·) is a non-decreasing function for all k in {1, . . . , K} and
uk(θ) = uk(0) +
∫ θ
0
xk(z)dz, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , K}, ∀θ ∈ Θ. (3.1)




xk(z)F k(z)dz ≥ uk′(0) +
∫
Θ
xk′(z)F k(z)dz for all k, k
′ in {1, . . . , K}.
All proofs are provided in the Appendix. The first condition in the lemma is the
standard envelope condition and it comes from the ex-post incentive compatibility
constraint. The second condition is derived from the ex-post individual rationality
constraint and the fact that uk(θ) is non-decreasing. The third condition is the
envelope formula inserted into the interim incentive compatibility constraint.
Lemma 3.1 enables us to obtain a more compact formulation for the seller’s prob-
lem. Specifically, we can use equation (3.1) and integration by parts to write down the
objective of (P) in terms of the allocation rule x and the indirect utilities {uk(0)}Kk=1
of the lowest ex-post types. To this end, we denote each uk(0) as a new variable by













s.t xk(θ) non-decreasing, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , K}




xk(z)F k(z)dz ≥ uk′ +
∫
Θ
xk′(z)F k(z)dz, ∀k, k′ ∈ {1, . . . , K},
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Note that in (P) the variables are the allocation rule x and the vector of the indirect
utilities of the lowest ex-post types u. Once we solve for these variables the transfers
are determined by equation (3.1).
As we mentioned before, a solution to (P) that screens the interim types is a
sequential contract. In contrast, a static solution to (P) pools the interim types.
Formally, we say that a solution to (P) or contract is static when xk(·) ≡ x(·) and
uk ≡ u for all k in {1, . . . , K}.
We earlier defined the virtual valuation µk(·) of interim type k. Given (DHR)
the virtual valuation for each type k has exactly one zero which we denote by θ̂k.
Without loss of generality we assume for the remainder of the chapter that we can
order the interim types:
θ̂1 ≤ · · · ≤ θ̂K .
It turns out that solving (P) over the space of static contracts is a simpler problem.
The (ICxa) constraints disappear from the problem because in this case there is
effectively only one interim type. Also, it is clear that any optimal solution sets













where a simple calculation shows that the term in parenthesis is equal to the virtual
value function of the mixture distribution times the density function of the mixture.
Hence, this problem corresponds to the classic optimal mechanism design problem
applied to the mixture distribution over types.
From this formulation we see that the relevant quantity that shapes the alloca-
tion x(·) is µ¯(θ) , ∑Kk=1 αkµk(θ)fk(θ). In general, because there is only one buyer,
independent of any regularity assumptions imposed over µ¯(θ), one can show that an
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optimal way to choose a non-decreasing allocation x(·) that maximizes∫
Θ
x(z)µ¯(z)dz, (3.2)
is a threshold allocation, that is, a single posted price (see, e.g., [52] or [57]). We
summarize this in the following lemma.
Lemma 3.2 (Threshold Allocation)
A solution to (Ps) is a threshold allocation characterized by θ̂ in [θ̂1, θ̂K ] that maxi-
mizes (3.2).
3.5.2 A Necessary Condition
In the rest of this Section and the next Section 3.6 we provide our results for the
setting with binary interim types. We denote the low type by L and the high type by
H. In Section 3.7 we return to the general setting with finitely many interim types.
The static optimal solution is characterized by a threshold allocation θ̂. In this
section, we leverage this characterization, and perform an analysis in the style of [21],
to deduce an intuitive necessary condition for the optimality of the static contract.
As we will show later in Section 3.5.3 this condition turns out to be not only necessary
but also sufficient.
For ease of exposition, we assume that the high type dominates the low type in





, ∀θ ∈ Θ. (3.3)
We note that we do not need this assumption for the formal arguments.
Suppose now that a static contract is optimal, that is, setting a single posted price
equal to θ̂ for both types solves (P). Consider Figure 3.1, where we have plotted the
virtual value function weighted by the density function for each type.4 If the types
4We needly represent the virtual valuation weighted by fk(·). This does not change the signs in







Figure 3.1: Weighted virtual valuations for low type (dotted line) and high type
(dashed line) buyer around θ̂. The shaded areas correspond to the virtual revenue
that the seller leaves on the table when using a static contract with respect to the
case in which the interim types are public information.
were public, the seller would optimally set posted prices equal to θ̂L and θ̂H for types
L and H, respectively. In this way, the seller would serve buyers if and only if they
have positive virtual values. In contrast, when selecting a single posted price θ̂, there
is surplus that the seller is not extracting; the shaded area shows the regions of the
virtual valuations for each type that the static contract is not capturing. For the high
type, the static contract serves too many buyers, some of them with negative virtual
values; hence, the seller would be better off by offering a higher price. For the low
type, the static contract serves too few buyers, leaving positive virtual value buyers
unserved; hence, the seller would prefer to choose a lower price. A challenge, though,
is that the seller faces incentive compatibility constraints that restrict this type of
possible deviations/improvements:
1. Selling to fewer high types implies increasing the price for high types; but then
the high types have an incentive to accept the low type contract and such a
deviation is not feasible.












Figure 3.2: Weighted virtual valuations for low type (dotted line) and high type
(dashed line) buyer around θ̂. The shaded areas correspond to the virtual revenue
that the seller leaves on the table when using a static contract with respect to the
case in which the interim types are public information. We show deviation from the
static contract for the low type (solid line). If A−B ≥ 0 the deviation is profitable.
However, to prevent the high types from taking the low type contract the seller
must decrease the quantity offered to the low types (or equivalently, randomize
their allocation).
This second improvement is feasible by choosing a quantity (probability) 0 < xL <
1 to all low types inside an interval [θ1, θ2] with θ1 ≤ θ̂ ≤ θ2, see Figure 3.2.
Formally these allocations correspond to the following menu:
xL(θ) =

0 if θ < θ1,
xL if θ1 ≤ θ ≤ θ2,
1 if θ2 < θ;
xH(θ) =

0 if θ < θ̂,
1 if θ̂ ≤ θ;
(3.4)
with uL = uH = 0. We refer to this deviation as an interior variation or improvement.
The interior improvement is feasible only if it satisfies both incentive compatibility
constraints. Inserting the menu (3.4) into the incentive constraints in (P) we obtain












and for the high type:
∫ θmax
θ̂



















which contains both incentive compatibility constraints. The monotone hazard rate
condition (3.3) guarantees that xL as in given by (3.5) always exists. The interior
variation is thus feasible and we can select xL so as to maximize the seller’s revenue.








and since µL(θ) ≥ 0 in [θ1, θ2] (c.f Figure 3.2) the right hand side inequality in (3.5)
must be tight.
With the interior variation, the seller serves more low-value buyers in [θ1, θ̂] at the
level of xL. This comes at the expense of offering a lower quantity, a loss of 1−xL to
buyers with values in [θ̂, θ2]. In Figure 3.2 the area A corresponds to the additional
revenue the seller can make due to the variation because he is serving more low type
buyers, and region B is the efficiency loss due to the incentive constraints.
If the static contract is optimal then this variation cannot be profitable. In terms
of Figure 3.2 this means the areas must satisfy A ≤ B. Hence, if the static contract
is optimal then
A = xL ·
∫ θ̂
θ1




In turn, since the optimal choice of xL always equals the right hand side of (3.5), we













To better understand this inequality consider a monopolist who faces a consumer with
valuation distributed according to Fk(·). Observe that at some price θb the expected
profit Πk(θb) the monopolist makes and the expected consumer’s informational rents
Ik(θb) are given by
Πk(θb) , θb·(1− Fk(θb)) =
∫ θmax
θb




If the monopolist considers lowering the price from θb to θa then the change in profit
is Πk(θa) − Πk(θb). The lower price positively impacts the information rents which
increase by Ik(θa) − Ik(θb). The ratio (Πk(θa) − Πk(θb))/(Ik(θa) − Ik(θb)) then is
a measure of the average impact in profits per unit of consumer rents the seller
experiences due to the price variation. In condition (3.6) we have a cross version of
this ratio. In the numerator we take k = L and in the denominator k = H. In light
of this observation condition (3.6) suggests the following definition.
Definition 3.1 (Average Profit-to-Rent Ratio)
The average profit-to-rent ratio is defined by:
Rjk(θa, θb) ,
Πj(θa)− Πj(θb)
Ik(θa)− Ik(θb) , ∀j, k ∈ {L,H}, 0 ≤ θa ≤ θb ≤ θmax.
The average profit-to-rent ratios measure changes in the seller’s profit normalized
by the information rents he gives away to the consumer due to a price deviation. The
ratio Rjk compares the impact on profit for type j with the increase in the information
rent for type k. This cross ratio arises as the incentive compatibility constraint for
type k implies that a modification in the contract for type j affects type k as well.
This was clear from our discussion regarding the internal variation above. There, a
price θ1 (smaller than θ̂ ) for the type L creates a profit improvement for the seller
measured by the numerator of R. Since the seller has to make sure that type H does
not take the type L contract (by reducing quantity), this price decrease generates a
loss to the seller quantified by the denominator of R.
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Back to (3.6) we notice that the numerator in either ratio refers to the revenue
that the seller is making from the low type over some interval, and the denominator
refers to the information rent of the high type over the same interval. Now, since the
choice of θ1, θ2 was arbitrary, we obtain the following necessary condition by taking




RLH(θ1, θ̂) ≤ min
θ̂≤θ2
RLH(θ̂, θ2), (3.7)
The above condition establishes that if the static contract is optimal then any
extra revenue the seller can garner from low type buyers is offset by the efficiency
loss due to the incentive compatibility constraints: A−B ≤ 0 for any possible choice
of θ1 and θ2.
3.5.3 A Necessary and Sufficient Condition
We now establish that condition (3.7) is in fact a necessary and sufficient condition
for the optimal static solution to coincide with the optimal solution to (P). Before we
provide the main theorem, we introduce some notation for the quantities of interest
that will help us to further refine our intuition. While we maintain the binary type
framework here; we note that all definitions naturally extend to finitely many types
as we will see in Section 6.
The local version of the average profit-to-rent ratio, when θa < θ̂ < θb are close
to θ̂, gives raise to the profit-to-rent ratio.
Definition 3.2 (Profit-to-Rent Ratio)
The profit-to-rent ratio between type j and k is defined by:
rjk(θ) , µj(θ)fj(θ)
1− Fk(θ) , ∀j, k ∈ {L,H},∀θ ∈ Θ.
116
The ratio rjk(θb) is obtained by limθa↑θb R
jk(θa, θb). Observe that condition (DHR)
is stronger than and implies that rkk(θ) is non-decreasing for each k ∈ {L,H}. The
latter is the condition we use for our formal results.
Now, we are ready to state and discuss the main result of this section.
Theorem 3.1 (Optimality of Static Contract)
Suppose rkk(θ) is non-decreasing for each k ∈ {L,H}. The static contract is optimal
if and only if
max
θ≤θ̂
RLH(θ, θ̂) ≤ min
θ̂≤θ
RLH(θ̂, θ). (APR)
This results completes the necessity condition given in Section 3.5.2 by showing
that it is also sufficient. We showed in Section 3.5.2 that condition (APR) established
that the specific deviation that increases the sales to the lower type with a lower
quantity is not profitable relative to the static contract.
Theorem 3.1 now establishes that in fact this is not only a necessary but in
fact a sufficient condition. The sufficiency condition is noteworthy as it arises from
“simple” deviations, namely, those that assign the low type an interior allocation in
a small interval around the static optimal price. In particular, we do not need to
be concerned either with more elaborate deviations which offers the low type several
options in his menu, nor do we need to trace simultaneous changes to the offers to
the high type. The present theorem confirms that this type of interior improvement
for the low type is sufficient to study changes in the seller’s revenue. In fact, we
will establish in Section 3.6 that the family of allocations suggested by the interior
variation completely describes the optimal sequential mechanism as well.
To prove the sufficiency in Theorem 3.1 we rely a on dualization-type of argument.
For the necessity, we assume that condition (APR) is not satisfied and show that in
that case there is a profitable deviation as given by the following proposition.
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Proposition 3.1 (Revenue Improvement)
Suppose rLL(θ) is non-decreasing. Assume condition (APR) does not hold. Then
there exists θ1, θ2 such that θ1 < θ̂ < θ2 and R
LH(θ1, θ̂) > R
LH(θ̂, θ2), for which the








yields a strict improvement in (P) over the static contract.
In the proof of Proposition 3.1 we can see that as soon as condition (APR) breaks
two things happen. First, a non-static contract becomes feasible as it does not violate
the incentive compatibility constraints. Note that the proposition is similar to the
discussion in Section 3.5.2; however, it is more general because it does not assume
hazard rate order to guarantee feasibility. The mere fact that (APR) breaks implies
the feasibility of the new allocation. Second, the same contract obtains a larger
expected revenue than the static one. So, from this we see that (APR) is preventing
both the feasibility and optimality of a sequential contract.
3.5.4 The Exponential Example
Before we move to the study of the optimal sequential contract it might be helpful to
build some more intuition for the results. We shall consider the case of exponentially
distributed values. The main result of this section establishes that the static contract
is optimal if and only if the mean of the interim types are sufficiently close.
We consider the exponential density functions
fk(θ) = λke
−λkθ, k = {L,H} θ ≥ 0.
We assume λL > λH , so L and H stand for low and high type respectively. Note that
H has a higher mean (1/λH) than L (1/λL) and that H dominates L in the sense of
the hazard rate stochastic order and in first order stochastic dominance. In addition,
for the interim probabilities we have αL + αH = 1 with αL, αH > 0.
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We begin by studying the optimal solution to the static formulation. The optimal
static contract is given by a threshold allocation. Thus, in the exponential case the




(αLµL(z)fL(z) + αHµH(z)fH(z))dz = αLθe
−λLθ + αHθe−λHθ.
In order to find the optimal threshold we just need to maximize the expression above.




−λLθ + αH(θ − 1
λH
)λHe
−λHθ = 0, (3.8)
that is, the optimal threshold is a zero of the mixture virtual valuation. Notice that
equation (3.8) cannot be explicitly solved; however, we can (as we do in the forth-
coming results) provide comparative statics. Interestingly, in Proposition 3.3 below,
we show that we can obtain explicit expressions for the thresholds characterizing the
optimal sequential contract. The following lemma provides some initial properties of
the optimal static contract.
Lemma 3.3












Next, we state a necessary and sufficient condition for the static contract to be
optimal.
Proposition 3.2 (Necessity and Sufficiency for the Exponential Model)
The static contract is optimal if and only if




The result follows from Theorem 3.1, but it requires some effort to determine the
max and min in (APR) in closed form. We note that in the right hand side, θ̂, is
a solution to equation (3.8) and, therefore, it also depends on the parameters λL
and λH . Subsequent corollaries provide sharper characterizations that only depend
on model primitives. We highlight that (3.9) corresponds to a particular case of
condition (APR).
Proposition 3.2 provides an intuitive characterization for when the seller is better-
off screening the interim types than not. In terms of equation (3.9), when λL and
λH are sufficiently close, then equation (3.9) should hold, in which case the static
contract is optimal. Conversely, when λL and λH are sufficiently apart from each
other, the static contract may not be optimal.
Intuitively, when the interim types are similar any contract that screens the types
would be close in terms of expected revenue to the static contract because for each
type it could get at most what it would get by setting thresholds 1/λL and 1/λH




]. However, when screening, the seller has to pay an
extra cost to prevent the types from mimicking each other and, since the contracts’
revenue will be similar, it is likely that this cost offsets the earnings from screening.
On the other hand, when interim types are sufficiently apart in their mean valuation
then the seller can tailor the contract to each type and in this way extract more from
them than in the static contract.
Corollary 3.1 Assume λL ∈ (λH , 2λH ], then for any αL ∈ [0, 1] the static contract
is optimal.
This result establishes that when the distributions of the low and high type buyers
are sufficiently close to each other then no matter in which proportion the types are,
the static contract is always optimal.
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Corollary 3.2 Assume λL > 2λH , then there exists α¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that for all
αL ∈ (0, α¯) the sequential contract is strictly optimal and for all αL ∈ [α¯, 1] the static
contract is optimal.
Corollary 3.2 asserts that when the mean of the low and high type buyers are
sufficiently different then both contracts can be optimal. If the proportion of low
type is low enough (but not zero) then the seller is better-off screening the types.
On the other hand, if there is a very large proportion of low type buyers then the
static contract is optimal. This follows because as αL increases, one can show that θ̂
decreases, and at some point condition (3.9) holds. This discussion suggests our final
corollary.
Corollary 3.3 For λH and αH fixed, there exists λ¯L larger than 2λH such that for
all λL ∈ [λ¯L,∞) the sequential contract is strictly optimal.
3.5.5 Discussion




are non-increasing when j equals k. A related condition is about the cross-hazard
rate functions,
hjk(θ) are non-increasing in θ, ∀j, k ∈ {L,H}. (R)
To the best of our knowledge condition (R) was first introduced in the context of
sequential screening by [42]. In that paper the authors show that under condition
(R) the optimal solution to (P) and to (Ps) coincide, that is, the static contract
is optimal. In fact, they show this result for multiple interim types. We discuss
our generalization of condition (APR) to multiple types in Section 3.7. However,
121











Outside this set the static contract
Figure 3.3: Optimality of the static contract for (DHR) distributions, with K = 2
and a single buyer.
condition (R) is rather restrictive and is not satisfied by some common distributions.
For example, the condition is not satisfied by any pair of exponential distributions,




, j, k = L,H.
If, without loss of generality, we consider λL > λH then h
LH(θ) is an increasing
function and, therefore, it violates conditions (R). However, notice (DHR) is satisfied
because the simple hazard rate functions are constant and equal to 1/λk.
We can also compare Theorem 3.1 with Lemma 12 in [41]. In that Lemma they
assume hHH(θ) > hLL(θ), which implies θ̂L < θ̂H , and establish that a necessary
condition for the static contract to be optimal is to have the profit- to-rent ratio
rLH(θ) being increasing at θ̂. Our result also contains this lemma, because if rLH(·)
was decreasing at θ̂ we can always find θ1 < θ̂ and θ2 > θ̂ such that
RLH(θ1, θ̂) > R
LH(θ̂, θ2),
so (APR) does not hold and, therefore, the static contract would not be optimal.
Figure 3.3 illustrates how our condition (APR) closes the gap between the ones by
Kra¨hmer and Strausz.
We can compare condition (R) and (APR). Note that condition (R) implies the
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≥ rLH(θ̂), ∀θ ≥ θ̂.
Hence, the result by [42] that if condition (R) holds then the static contract is optimal
follows as a corollary of Theorem 3.1. We highlight that while condition (R) implies
the profit- to-rent ratios are increasing, our condition (APR) only implies a type
of monotonicity over an appropriate weighted average of the profit-to-rent ratios.
This is sensible as we are dealing with interim expected seller’s revenues and interim
incentive compatibility constraints.
In terms of methodology, our approach differs from that of [42]. Their approach
consists of relaxing the low to high interim IC constraint and then – by using their
condition (R) – they relax the monotonicity constraint and prove that the solution
must be a threshold schedule for each type. From there, they show that the threshold
for both types must be equal and, therefore, the static contract is optimal.
In our approach we do not use a relaxation of the general formulation nor do we
impose conditions on the primitives besides that rkk(θ) are non-decreasing. For the
sufficiency we construct a Lagrangian relaxation with multipliers for the incentive
compatibility constraints, but we do not relax the monotonicity constraints. The
multipliers relate to the profit-to-rent ratios at the static threshold θ̂; they measure
the change in the objective per unit of change in the constraints. Then by leveraging
a result from [57] that the optimal contract must involve a threshold allocation we
prove that under (APR) the solution to the relaxation is the static contract.
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3.6 Sequential Contract
We now proceed to provide the complete characterization of the optimal sequential
contract when the necessary and sufficient condition associated with the static con-
tract fails. As hinted in Section 3.5.2 and by Proposition 3.1 the optimal sequential
contract gives a deterministic allocation to the high type and, for mid-range values,
it randomizes the low type buyer (or equivalently reduces the quantity allocated).
3.6.1 The Structure of the Sequential Contract













s.t xk(θ) non-decreasing, ∀k ∈ {L,H}








The difference between (PR) and the original problem (P) is the omission of the
incentive constraint for the low type to report truthfully. Importantly, we do not relax
the monotonicity constraint. We obtain a characterization of the optimal solution to
(PR) as stated by the following theorem.
Theorem 3.2 (Relaxed Solution)
Suppose rkk(θ) is non-decreasing for each k ∈ {L,H}. Consider problem (PR), the
optimal solution has allocations
x?L(θ) =

0 if θ < θ1,
xL if θ1 ≤ θ ≤ θ2,
1 if θ2 < θ;
x?H(θ) =

0 if θ < θH ,
1 if θH ≤ θ.
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Note that if θ1 = θH we recover the static contract. Importantly, the optimal
contract of (PR) has the same structure as the profitable deviation to the static
contract presented in Proposition 3.1. The only difference is that in the former the
threshold for the high type may not necessarily equal to θ̂ as in the latter. With this
generalization one can show that the proposed profitable deviation is indeed optimal
for (PR). The associated transfers are given by:
t?L(θ) =

0 if θ < θ1,
θ1 · xL if θ1 ≤ θ ≤ θ2,
θ2 − (θ2 − θ1) · xL if θ2 < θ;
t?H(θ) =

0 if θ < θH ,
θH if θH ≤ θ.
Our optimality proof adapts arguments by [32] to our setting. We use an im-
provement argument to show that the optimal contract of (PR) only requires a simple
threshold allocation without randomization for the high type. Finally, we use another
improvement argument to show that the low type allocation only requires a single
interval of randomization.
More specifically, consider a low type allocation that randomizes between an in-
terval [θa, θb]. Recall the argument in Section 3.5.3 where we found a revenue im-
provement while keeping feasibility, in particular, while maintaining the high to low
IC constraint. Using a similar reasoning, we can show that feasibly improving upon















= RLH(θ˜, θb). (3.10)
In general this condition is not satisfied, because the profit-to-rent ratio rLH(·) does
not need to be a non-decreasing function. Therefore, we cannot find a feasible im-
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provement over the random allocation contract, and hence, we cannot restrict at-
tention to deterministic contracts for the low type. In contrast, a similar argument
for the high type yields the expression RHH(θa, θ˜) ≤ RHH(θ˜, θb), which always holds
when rHH(·) is non-decreasing. Hence, we can restrict attention to a deterministic
threshold contract for the high type.
In addition, the low type allocation only requires a single interval of randomiza-
tion. To see this, suppose for example that x?L(θ) equals xa in (θa, θ˜) and xb in (θ˜, θb)
with 0 < xa < xb < 1 , and also assume (3.10) does not hold. Then, it is possible to
show that we can increase xa and decrease xb (maintaining feasibility) and obtain an
improvement to the objective function. We can do this until xa and xb collapse into
a single value.
The discussion above highlights again the importance of the average profit-to-
rent ratios in our analysis, as they quantify revenue improvements while maintaining
incentive compatibility. Now, the next result characterizes the optimal sequential
contract and it also provides conditions that allow to compute the optimal thresholds.
Theorem 3.3 (Optimal Sequential Contract)
Suppose rkk(θ) is non-decreasing for each k ∈ {L,H}. The optimal sequential contract
coincides with the optimal solution of (PR) as given by Theorem 3.2.
In Theorem 3.2 we provided the characterization of the optimal solution to (PR).
In the proof of Theorem 3.3 we argue that the optimal solution to (PR) is feasible
for (P) and thus optimal. In turn, we obtain a full characterization of the optimal
sequential contract up to three parameters.
In terms of solving for the optimal sequential contract, Theorems 3.2 and 3.3
imply that we can ignore the IC constraints and do a search over three parameters
to maximize seller’s revenues over the proposed contract structure, θ1, θ2 and θH . In
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the proof of Theorem of 3.3 we show that the optimality conditions for the thresholds
θ1 ≤ θH ≤ θ2 are:
1. RLH(θ1, θ2) ≤ minθ2≤θ RLH(θ2, θ);
2. maxθ≤θ2 R
LH(θ, θ2) ≤ RLH(θ1, θ2);
3. αL ·RLH(θ1, θ2) + αHrHH(θH) = 0.
Conditions (1) and (2) put together are similar to (APR) where θ2 plays the role
of θ̂. Similarly to the case of the static contract, one can show that any allocation
that randomizes beyond θ2 is never profitable. In turn, randomization should only
occur for valuations below θ2. Condition (2) by itself also implies that among all the
intervals that can be randomized, the interval (θ1, θ2) is the most profitable. To see
this let us compare the seller’s revenue when it randomizes the low type buyer over
some interval (θ, θ2) and (θ1, θ2) (and it gives a deterministic allocation to the high















Hence, doing a revenue comparison, we conclude that randomizing the low type buyer


















equivalently, RLH(θ, θ2) ≤ RLH(θ1, θ2) for arbitrary θ ≤ θ2 which is exactly condition
(2). Finally, condition (3) is simple a first order optimality condition on θH .
It is interesting to note that in the optimal solution the low type buyers are
allocated the object over a larger interval (θ1 ≤ θH) but they are randomized. This
is done as a way to prevent the buyers from mimicking each other. Specifically, we
must have θ1 ≤ θH ; otherwise, the low type buyers would have an incentive to pretend
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being the high type since that would get them allocated the object more often and
at a lower price. Similarly, θH ≤ θ2 otherwise high type buyers would choose the low
type contract for a better allocation and a lower price.
It is worth noting that the sequential contract makes the low type worse-off and
the high type better-off with respect to the contract the seller would offer if he could
perfectly screen each type. For the low type, that contract would set a threshold equal
to θ̂L and would always allocate the object when her value is above the threshold.
However, the sequential contract allocates the object to the low type whenever her
valuation is above θ1 ≥ θ̂L with positive probability. So the low type is worse-off in
two dimensions, it is allocated the object less often and with less probability. On
the other hand, the high type buyer gets allocated the object more often and with
certainty since θH ≤ θ̂H .
3.6.2 The Exponential Example Continued
In Section 3.5.4 we studied the properties and structure of the optimal static contract
for exponential valuations. In particular, we applied our necessary and sufficient
condition to this family of distributions and obtained an intuitive characterization.
Proposition 3.3
Assume condition (3.9) does not hold, then the optimal allocation is
x?L(θ) =

0 if θ < θ1,
x if θ1 ≤ θ;
and x?H(θ) =

0 if θ < θH ,
1 if θH ≤ θ;
The thresholds are given by:
θ1 =
1






λL − λH ,















This result follows from Theorem 3.3 and the characterization of the three free
parameters that follow. We note that in the exponential case we only have two
intervals for the low type’s allocation as we can show that θ2 =∞.
We now illustrate our findings with numerical results where we vary the difference
in the mean between the low and the high type. Specifically, we fix αL to be 0.7 and
λH to be 0.5, that is, the high type has mean 2. Since we are assuming λL > λH , we
consider λL = λH + δ with δ > 0. Figure 3.4 shows how the different thresholds vary
as δ increases or, equivalently, as the mean of the low type decreases to zero. As we
can see, there is a value of δ (δ =0.93) to the left of which the static contract is optimal
and to its right the sequential contract is optimal. This aligns with Proposition 3.2
because as δ increases, (λL − λH) increases, and therefore, we expect it to be larger
than 1/θ̂ (see Corollary 3.2 and Corollary 3.3). At a more intuitive level as δ increases
both distribution become more and more different from each other with one of them
having a larger average value than the other. Thus, there is gain in screening the
types.









Figure 3.4: Optimal thresholds for static and sequential contracts when setting λL =
λH + δ, with αL = 0.7 and λH = 0.5.
In terms of thresholds, for the static contract we observe that θ̂ is decreasing
at the beginning and then it increases getting closer to 1/λH = 2. This happens
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because as we increase δ we are making 1/λL smaller; however, at some point this
value is too small and, therefore, the probability of allocating the object to a low type,
P (value low type > θ̂) = e−λLθ̂, is going to be so low that the seller will be better
off by choosing a threshold tailored for the high type, that is, close to 1/λH = 2.
For the sequential thresholds, the one for the low type is decreasing while the one
for the high type is increasing. This makes sense because in the sequential case the
seller can adjust the threshold for each type; hence, as δ increases the distributions
become more and more different and, therefore, is optimal to set thresholds closer
and closer to the threshold a seller would set if he knew the types in advance, that is,
1/λL and 1/λH . Also, note that from equation (3.11) we see that x is a decreasing
function of δ because as the mean of the low type goes to zero we are less and less
constrained to offer a high probability of allocation; however, in the limit x(δ) ≈ e−1,
hence even though the low type buyers will have values concentrated at zero we still
need to reduce their quantity so that high types do not take their low price contract.
We can also compare the different mechanism in terms of revenue. Note that with
the contracts from Proposition 3.3, the optimal revenue for the sequential contract
Πseq can be shown to be equal to:
Πseq = αL · x · θ1 · e−λLθ1 + αH · θH · e−λHθH .
Then, we can plot the different revenues as we vary δ. Figure 3.5 (left panel and thick
line in right panel) depicts the results. For values of δ above 0.93 the sequential con-
tract dominates the static. Further the sequential contract can achieve a significant
improvement over the static contract, getting as high as 16.5%. Note that when δ
grows large the improvement of the sequential over the static decreases because both
contracts set the thresholds to maximize what they can extract from the high type










which equals the optimal revenue a seller could make if he was only selling to the high
type buyer. The right panel in Figure 3.5 shows the revenue improvement for different
instances as we vary αL. Consistent with Corollary 3.3, given αH and λH , there exists
λL large enough such that the sequential contract is strictly better than the static
one. The figure also shows that the larger αL the larger has to be the difference
between the types for the sequential and static contracts to differ. When αL is large
θ̂ is tailored for low types and so (3.9) holds for more values of λL. However, screening
occurs when the mean of the low type is sufficiently small (δ large) in which case,
due to the low values and high fraction of the low type, the revenue improvement can


















αL = 0.9100× (Π
seq−Πstatic)
Πstatic
Figure 3.5: Left: Optimal expected revenue for static and sequential. Right: Per-
centage improvement of the sequential over the static contract. In both figures we
set set λL = λH + δ with λH = 0.5. In the left figure we set αL = 0.7 while in the
right figure αL takes values in {0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9}.
3.6.3 Menu Implementation
Next, we discuss how the optimal sequential contract can be implemented in practice.
By means of the taxation principle we can verify that the following menu of contracts
is an indirect implementation of our optimal mechanism:
• contract H: there is a single posted price of pH = θH ;
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• contract L: the buyer can choose between two items:
(a) buy at a price of pL = θ1 · xL and be allocated with probability xL.
(b) buy at a price of pL = θ2− (θ2− θ1) · xL and be allocated with probability
1.
The prices in the above menu of contracts are set using the values in Theorems
3.2 and 3.3. This implementation offers a posted price to the high type buyer, and
gives to the low type buyer two options. In option (a) the low type buyer can pay
a low price but it can potentially not acquire the item or equivalently, get a reduced
quantity; in (b), the low type buyer pays a high price and always gets the object.
An appealing feature of the implementation is that if we think of allocations as
quantities, then we can order the per unit prices. In contract L, the per unit prices
are θ1 and θ1 · xL + θ2 · (1 − xL) for (a) and (b), respectively. Hence, the per unit
price in (a) is less than or equal to the one in (b). That is, the low type in (a)
receives less of the good but at a discounted price compare to the low type in (b).
For contract H, the per unit price is θH and, since θ1 is less than or equal to θH ,
the low type in (a) receives less of the good at a discounted price compared to the
high type buyer. Comparing the per unit prices of the low type in (b) and the high
type is less straightforward. Even-though θH is between θ1 and θ2 we are not able
to compare it to θ1 · xL + θ2 · (1 − xL). However, intuitively, even if the high type
puts a large mass in values larger than θ2 we expect the per unit price of the high
type to be below the one of the low type in (b) because, otherwise, the high type
buyer would have an incentive to take contract L. Equivalently, the high type or
the low type in (b) have to pay a premium for the additional quantity. We can also
refer back to the exponential case of Section 3.5. From Proposition 3.3, the premium
the high type has to pay is given by θH − θ1 = log(1/xL)/λH and, therefore, the
larger the quantity the lower is the premium. Finally, note that this implementation
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accommodates the case in which the static contract is optimal. In that case, we have
xL = 1 and θ1 = θH = θ2 thus both contracts are the same.
3.7 Multiple Types
Until now, we have studied the optimality of the static contract and the optimal
sequential mechanism for two types of interim buyers. In this section, we consider an
arbitrary number of interim types {1, . . . , K} and investigate some properties of the
solution to (P). In particular, we provide a generalized version of condition (APR).
Then, we provide numerical evidence and highlight the challenges associated with the
characterization of the optimal sequential mechanism when K > 2.
3.7.1 A Necessary and Sufficient Condition
Our generalized necessary and sufficient condition relies on a characterization of the
changes in the objective around the static solution when considering allocation devi-
ations. With this purpose, consider the following set:
A ,
{
(λij)i,j∈{1,··· ,K}2 ≥ 0 :
∑
j 6=k










λjk, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , K}
}
.
The set A contains the multipliers associated with the IC constraints that encode the
change in the objective as we deviate from the static allocation. Roughly speaking,
when the static contract is optimal, allocation perturbations in the contract of each
type should equal the dualized costs associated to such perturbations in the IC con-
straints. In other words, the derivative of the Lagrangian with respect to allocations
around the static solution equals zero. This is captured by the set of equalities in the
definition of A. In addition, the set of inequalities ensures that the optimal ex-post
utilities of the lowest valuation buyers are zero. Note that multipliers being in the set
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A are necessary for optimality. The next result provides a necessary and sufficient
condition.
Theorem 3.4 (Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Finitely Many Types)
The set A is non-empty. Furthermore, if there exists a feasible solution to (P) which
strictly satisfies all the IC constraints then the static contract is optimal if and only





























for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}.
The strict feasibility to (P) corresponds to a standard Slater condition. Condition
(APRM) is obtained by studying the Lagrangian when the static contract is optimal
and disentangling the key conditions it must satisfy. To obtain a better understanding
of this condition it is helpful to see how it generalizes the necessary and sufficient
condition provided in Theorem 3.1 for two types. The general condition of Theorem














































for the high type, where λ12 and λ21 belong to A. We next argue that condition
(APR) holds if and only if there exist λ12, λ21 ∈ A such that conditions (3.12) and
(3.13) hold. Suppose (APR) holds. Since we expect the low to high IC constraint not
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to be binding we take λ12 equal to zero. Because λ must belong to A this necessarily
implies that λ21 is equal to α1r
12(θ̂). For this choice of multipliers inequality (3.13)
follows directly from rkk being increasing. At the same time, the choice of multipliers
together with (APR) imply that both the max and the min in (3.12) are equal to
zero. To see this consider the maximum in (3.12) and take θ = θ̂, since λ21 equal to
α1r
12(θ̂) the expression inside the brackets is zero. Hence, the maximum in (3.12) is
bounded below by zero. It is also bounded above by zero,






≤ 0⇔ R12(θ, θ̂) ≤ r12(θ̂), ∀θ ≤ θ̂.
When (APR) holds the right hand side inequality above always holds. A similar ar-
gument applies to the min. Therefore, the condition provided in Theorem 3.1 implies
APRM for the binary case. The converse implication follows from a contradiction
argument which for the sake of brevity we omit.
The two type case is amenable to this simplification because one can readily
solve for the multipliers: λ12 equal to zero is a natural choice (the low to high IC
constraints can be relaxed c.f Section 3.6), and λ21 equal to α1r
12(θ̂) then follows
from the definition of A. Unfortunately, when K > 2 the space of deviations is richer
and so is the possible selection of multipliers; in turn this precludes such a clear
characterization as in the two type case.
We stress that by judiciously choosing the multipliers it is straightforward to verify
that as in the two type case, condition (R) of [42] implies our condition (APRM) also
in the case of multiple types, and thus the optimality of the static contract.
By contrast, a complete characterization of the sequential contract seems substan-
tially more complex with finitely many types. Next, in the context of exponentially
distributed ex-post types, we briefly describe partial results and highlight the chal-
lenges associated with multiple types that already appear in the numerical analysis.
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3.7.2 The Exponential Example Continued
Despite the challenges that we discuss below, we are able to provide the following
characterization
Proposition 3.4 For exponential valuations the optimal allocations have at most
one randomized interval.
Proposition 3.4 establishes that for exponentially distributed valuation the opti-
mal contract is simple in the sense that each interim type’s allocation is randomized
at most in one interval. The proof consists on noticing that the monotonicity con-
straints form a cone, and then using duality and complementary slackness. It is worth
mentioning that the proof method applies more generally but the structure of the con-
tract in general depends on the values of the dual variables values corresponding to
the IC constraints. In the exponential case, the argument can be simplified to show
that the simple structure in the result arises independent of these variables’ values.
The characterization in Proposition 3.4 only establishes the structure of the opti-
mal allocations but it does not provide information on the number of contracts that
the optimal solutions will ultimately feature. For example, if K = 4 Proposition 3.4
does not say whether the optimal solution will pool the interim types creating either
one, two, three or four different contracts. In general, the full range of contracts from
static to fully sequential (K different contracts ) is possible.
To further explore the structure of optimal contracts we provide numerical results.
In Figure 3.6 we show the optimal allocations when K = 4 and all interim types
have exponentially distributed valuations. A first observation is that for different
proportions αk of interim types the optimal contract can feature different levels of
separation. Panel (a) in the figure corresponds to an optimal static contract (no
separation), and panel (d) in the figure corresponds to an optimal sequential contract
















1 2 3 4
Allocation
0 0.5 1
Figure 3.6: Optimal allocations for K = 4, types have exponential distribution with
means (2.2, 5.0, 12, 50) respectively (for numerical simplicity, we use truncated ver-
sions of these distributions in the interval [0,60]). In each panel the vertical axis corre-
sponds to buyers’ valuations and the horizontal axis corresponds to the interim type.
Each bar represents the allocation for each type, lighter grey indicates lower proba-
bility of allocation while darker grey indicates higher probability of allocation. White
represents no allocation and black full allocation. From panel (a) to (d) the fractions,
αk, for each type are: (0.7, 0.2, 0.05, 0.05), (0.4, 0.1, 0.4, 0.1), (0.3, 0.2, 0.4, 0.1) and
(0.25, 0.25, 0.1, 0.4), respectively.
observation note that out of the four instances depicted in Figure 3.6 only one, (d),
has four contracts in the optimal solution. Finding the minimal number of contracts
that give a good approximation to the optimal multiple type sequential contract is a
question outside the scope of this chapter but that may be of interest to study in the
future.
Observe that across the instances in Figure 3.6 each optimal contract has at most
one interval of valuation for which randomization occurs (c.f Proposition 3.4). This
simple structure of the optimal contract appears however not to be robust to other
specifications of the value distributions. When we consider the case of normally dis-
tributed valuations (using truncated normal random variables), the optimal contract
might exhibit several different intervals of randomization for a given type. In general,
richer contract features may arise when we combine exponential, normal, uniform or
other distributions. As a consequence, generally speaking, it is challenging to analyt-
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ically characterize the optimal solution. The challenge here is that classic relaxation
approaches used in the mechanism design literature do not apply in our setting.
For example, relaxing all the upward incentive constraints and leaving only the local
downward incentive constraints does not work because in general global downward in-
centive constraints bind. Moreover, binding constraints are highly sensitive to model
primitives. Improving our understanding of this setting may be an interesting avenue
for future research.
3.8 Conclusion
We considered the scope of sequential screening in the presence of ex-post participa-
tion constraints. The ex-post participation constraints limit the ability of the seller
to extract surplus. As the buyer has to be willing to participate in the contractual ar-
rangement following every realization of his valuation, the surplus has to be extracted
ex-post rather than at the interim level.
Despite these restrictions sequential screening generally allows the seller to in-
crease his revenue beyond the statically optimal revenue. The gains from sequential
screening become more pronounced to the extent that the interim types differ in their
willingness to pay. A natural implementation of the optimal mechanism simply offers
the buyer the choice among different menus in the first stage. The choice of menu in
the first period merely restricts the possible choices in the second period. In partic-
ular, it is not necessary to ask the buyer for any transfer before the final transaction
occurs. Moreover, the buyer only has to make a transfer if she receives the object.
In contrast to the static solution where the optimal policy is always to sell the
largest possible quantity, the sequential screening policy offers intermediate quanti-
ties. This departure from the bang-bang policy in a linear utility setting arises due to
the presence of the ex-post participation constraint in conjunction with the incentive
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compatibility constraints.
There are several natural directions to extend the present work. Our stronger
results were for the case of binary interim types while allowing for a continuum of
valuations for each type. We also presented an extension of Theorem 3.1 to multiple
types as well as a characterization and numerical results for exponential valuations.
We would like to further explore the characterization of the optimal sequential con-
tract to multiple types and general valuation distributions. An interesting question
here concerns the number of randomization intervals per type and whether the num-
ber of intermediate allocations increases with the number of interim types. Also, is
there a fixed number of intermediate allocations that yield a good approximation to
the optimal solution for an arbitrary number of interim types? Similarly, is there a
fixed number of contracts that yield a good approximation to the optimal solution
for an arbitrary number of interim types?
We might also be interested in analyzing how the number of competing buyers
may affect the nature of the optimal mechanism. This has important practical con-
sequences particularly in industries that use market mechanisms like auctions, such
as display advertising alluded at the beginning of the chapter. We note that this ex-
tension is not direct, because with multiple buyers we lose the threshold structure of
the optimal static allocation when the mixture distribution is not regular and ironing
may be required. However, we conjecture that in this case an approximately optimal
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Surge Pricing and Its Spatial Supply Response
A.1 Proofs for Section 1.4
Proof of Lemma 1.1. Consider any z, y ∈ C. Then, for essentially any w ∈ B,
we have
VB(y) ≥ U(w)− ‖w − y‖ = U(w)− ‖z − w‖+ ‖z − w‖ − ‖w − y‖
≥ U(w)− ‖z − w‖ − ‖z − y‖,
where the second inequality follows from the triangular inequality. This implies, by
the definition of the essential supremum, that
VB(y) + ‖z − y‖ ≥ VB(z).
Next, we would like to subtract VB(y) from both sides of the previous inequality. This
operation can be done only if VB(y) is finite for any y in C, but this is guaranteed
by Lemma A.1 (stated and proved right after this proof). Hence, we obtain VB(z)−
VB(y) ≤ ‖z − y‖. Since we can interchange the roles of z and y, we have proved that
|VB(z)− VB(y)| ≤ ‖z − y‖, for all z, y ∈ C.

Lemma A.1 Consider a measurable set B ⊆ C such that Γ(B) > 0, let p be a
measurable mapping p : B → R+, and let τ ∈ F(µ). Then, VB(x| p, τ) ∈
[−H,α · V ]
for all x ∈ C, where H = maxx,y∈C ‖x − y‖. Furthermore, V (x| p, τ) ≥ 0 for all
x ∈ supp(Γ).
Proof of Lemma A.1. Fix x ∈ C, we show that VB(x| p, τ) ∈
[−H,α · V ].
For the lower bound, note that for any y ∈ B, we have U(y) − ‖y − x‖ ≥ −H.
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Since Γ(B) > 0, the definition of essential supremum implies that VB(x| p, τ) ≥ −H.
Similarly, for the upper bound, note that for any y ∈ B, α · V ≥ U(y)− ‖y − x‖ and
hence the definition of essential supremum yields VB(x| p, τ) ≤ α · V .
Finally, we show that V (x| p, τ) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ supp(Γ). Since x ∈ supp(Γ) we
have that Γ(B(x, δ)) > 0 for all δ > 0, where B(x, δ) is an open ball of radius δ. For
any y ∈ B(x, δ) we have U(y)−‖y−x‖ > −δ, and since Γ(B(x, δ)) > 0 we deduce that
VB(x,δ)(x| p, τ) > −δ for all δ > 0. In turn, we have V (x| p, τ) ≥ VB(x,δ)(x| p, τ) > −δ
for all δ > 0 and, therefore, V (x| p, τ) ≥ 0.

Proof of Proposition 1.1. We show how to reformulate the platform’s objec-
tive as in the statement of the proposition. The key step is to establish that
U (x, p(x), sτ (x)) = V (x| p, τ) τ2 − a.e. x ∈ C, (A.1)
namely, whenever there is post-relocation supply at a given location in equilibrium,
the drivers originating at such a location can achieve maximum utility by staying
at that location. We state and prove this result in Lemma A.2 (stated and proved
following this proof). Note that this result holds τ2 − a.e so if we want to inter-
change U (x, p(x), sτ (x)) with V (x| p, τ) we have to do it under the measure τ2. We













































where (a) holds because whenever λ(y) = 0 or sτ (y) = 0, the minimum term in the
integral becomes zero; (b) follows from the fact that U(y, p(y), sτ (y))1{sτ (y)>0} is a
measurable function with values in [0, α ·V ] and from recalling that sτ = dτ2/dΓ; and
(c) is a consequence of Eq. (A.1) since we are integrating over the measure τ2. In
turn, focusing on the platform’s objective function, this yields













where (a) holds because V (y)1{sτ (y)>0} is measurable with values in [0, α · V ] and we
recall again that sτ = dτ2/dΓ. This completes the proof.

Lemma A.2 (Equilibrium Utilities) For any price mapping p and corresponding
equilibrium τ , let B ⊆ C such that Γ(B) > 0, then
U (y, p(y), sτ (y)) = VB(y| p, τ) = V (y| p, τ) τ2 − a.e. y ∈ B.
Furthermore,
U (y, p(y), sτ (y)) ≤ VB(y| p, τ) Γ− a.e. y ∈ B.
Proof of Lemma A.2. We prove that
U (y, p(y), sτ (y)) = VB(y| p, τ) τ2 − a.e. y ∈ B.
The proof for V (y| p, τ) instead of VB(y| p, τ) follows the same steps and is, thus,
omitted. Let A ⊆ B be a set defined by
A , {y ∈ B : U(y) = VB(y)}. (A.2)
We want to prove τ2(A
c) = 0, where the complement is taken with respect to B.
Consider the sets
A− , {y ∈ B : U(y) < VB(y)}, A+ , {y ∈ B : U(y) > VB(y)}.
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We will establish that τ2(A
−) = 0 and τ2(A+) = 0. We begin with A− and note that
τ2(A
−) = τ(C × A−)
(a)
= τ({(x, y) ∈ C × A− : U(y)− ‖y − x‖ = V (x))
(b)
≤ τ({(x, y) ∈ C × A− : U(y) ≥ V (y))
(c)
≤ τ({(x, y) ∈ C × A− : U(y) ≥ VB(y))
(d)
≤ τ({(x, y) ∈ C × B : VB(y) > U(y) ≥ VB(y))
= 0,
where (a) follows from the equilibrium definition, and (b) from the fact that V (x) +
‖x−y‖ ≥ V (y) (see Lemma 1.1). In (c) we have used V (y) ≥ VB(y), while (d) follows
from y ∈ A− and A− ⊆ B.
To show that τ2(A
+) = 0, it suffices to show that show Γ(A+) = 0 (this will also
show the last statement of the lemma). For any n ∈ N define the set A+n , {y ∈




n . It is enough to show that
Γ(A+n ) = 0 for all n ∈ N. We proceed by contradiction. Suppose there exists n ∈ N
such that Γ(A+n ) > 0. Let  > 0 be such that  <
1
2n
, and consider a finite partition
{Ii }K()i=1 of C, where for any x, y ∈ Ii we have ‖x− y‖ ≤ . Observe that








Γ(A+n ∩ Ii ),
therefore, there exists i ∈ {1, . . . , K()} such that Γ(A+n ∩ Ii ) > 0. Take x ∈ Ii , then
for any y ∈ A+n ∩ Ii
U(y) ≥ VB(y) + 1
n
≥ VB(x)−‖y− x‖+ 1
n
> VB(x)−‖y− x‖+ 2 ≥ VB(x) + ‖y− x‖,
where the second inequality comes from the Lipschitz property (see Lemma 1.1). The
last two inequalities hold because of our choice of  and x, y ∈ Ii . We conclude that
A+n ∩ Ii ⊆ {y ∈ B : Π(x, y) > VB(x)}.
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This would therefore imply that Γ({y ∈ B : Π(x, y) > VB(x)}) > 0. However, this
contradicts the definition of VB(x). Hence we must have Γ(A+n ) = 0 for all n ∈ N,
and in turn Γ(A+) = 0.

Proof of Lemma 1.2. For ease of notation let us use xa to denote Xa(z| p, τ).
We also denote A(z|p, τ) by A(z).
Closure: Let the sequence {xn}n∈N ⊂ A(z) be such that xn → x. We show that
x ∈ A(z), that is,
lim
δ↓0
VB(z,δ)(x) = V (x). (A.3)




n) = V (xn), ∀n ∈ N. (A.4)
Note that Eq. (A.4) implies that Γ(B(z, δ)) > 0 for all δ > 0; otherwise, VB(z,δ)(·)
would be −∞ and so the limit would not be well defined. We next establish Eq.
(A.3) from first principles. Fix  > 0. Since xn converges to x we can find n0 ∈ N
such that for all n ≥ n0 we have ‖xn− x‖ ≤ 3 . In particular, from Eq. (A.4) applied
to n0 we deduce that
∃δ0 > 0, such that ∀δ ≤ δ0, 
3
+ VB(z,δ)(x
n0) ≥ V (xn0). (A.5)





n0)− VB(z,δ)(x) ≤ ‖xn0 − x‖ ≤ 
3
and V (xn0)− V (x) ≥ −‖xn0 − x‖ ≥ − 
3
.
In turn, using Eq. (A.5), we have that for all δ ≤ δ0,
V (x)−  ≤ V (xn0)− 2
3
≤ VB(z,δ)(x) ≤ V (x).
Since  was arbitrary, we deduce that Eq. (A.3) holds, and therefore, x ∈ A(z).
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Interval: We show that Aa(z) = [z, xa]. The definition of xa immediately implies
that Aa(z) ⊆ [z, xa], so we only need to prove the reverse inclusion. First, since we
can always construct a sequence {xn}n∈N ⊂ A(z), with xn → xa, the closure property
implies that xa ∈ A(z). Second, we make use of Lemma A.3 (stated and proved right
after this proof). Consider x ∈ [z, xa] then Lemma A.3 implies that z ∈ IR(x| p, τ)
or, equivalently, x ∈ Aa(z).
Union: Since for every a ∈ Rz we have Aa(z) ⊂ A(z), the same is true for the
union. In the opposite direction, if we take x ∈ A(z) then there exists a ∈ Rz such
that x ∈ [z, xθ] = Aa(z).

Lemma A.3 For any price mapping p and corresponding equilibrium τ , if y ∈
IR(x| p, τ) then y ∈ IR(z| p, τ) for all z ∈ [x ∧ y, x ∨ y].
Proof of Lemma A.3. Let y ∈ IR(x| p, τ). If x = y there is nothing to prove.
Without loss of generality, suppose x < y. Since y ∈ IR(x| p, τ) we have that
limδ↓0 VB(y,δ)(x) = V (x). Observe that this implies that Γ(B(y, δ)) > 0 for all δ > 0;
if this is not true, VB(y,δ)(x) = −∞ and the limit would not be well defined. Next,
fix z ∈ [x, y], we want to prove that y ∈ IR(z| p, τ), i.e., limδ↓0 VB(y,δ)(z) = V (z) or
equivalently we need to show that
∀ > 0, ∃δ0 > 0 such that ∀δ ≤ δ0, VB(y,δ)(z) +  ≥ V (z). (A.6)
Consider  > 0 and δ1 > 0 such that x /∈ B(y, δ1) (x < y), and note that since
y ∈ IR(x| p, τ) we can find δ0 > 0 such that
V (x) ≤ VB(y,δ)(x) + 
3
, ∀δ ≤ δ0.
Consider δ ≤ min{δ1, δ0, 6}, then the previous inequality implies
U(w)− ‖w − x‖ ≤ VB(y,δ)(x) + 
3
, Γ− a.e. w in C. (A.7)
Note that since z ∈ [x, y], for any y′ ∈ B(y, δ) we have





{‖y′ − x‖ − ‖y′ − z‖} ≥ −2δ + ‖z − x‖.
This and Lemma A.4 (which we state and prove after the present proof) deliver
VB(y,δ)(z) ≥ VB(y,δ)(x)− 
3
− 2δ + ‖z − x‖.




+ 2δ − ‖z − x‖ ≥ U(w)− ‖w − x‖ − 
3
, Γ− a.e. w in C.




+ 2δ ≥ U(w)− ‖w − x‖+ ‖z − x‖
= U(w)− ‖w − z‖+ ‖w − z‖ − ‖w − x‖+ ‖z − x‖
≥ U(w)− ‖w − z‖ − ‖z − x‖+ ‖z − x‖
= U(w)− ‖w − z‖,
implying that VB(y,δ)(z) +
2
3
+ 2δ ≥ V (z). Since 2δ ≤ 
3
we conclude that VB(y,δ)(z) +
 ≥ V (z).

Lemma A.4 Let , δ > 0 and x, y, z ∈ C. If Γ(B(y, δ)) > 0 then
VB(y,δ)(z) ≥ VB(y,δ)(x)− + min
y′∈B(y,δ)
{‖y′ − x‖ − ‖y′ − z‖},
Proof of Lemma A.4. Define the following set
R ,
{
y′ ∈ B(y, δ) : Π(x, y′) ≥ VB(y,δ)(x)− 
}
.
Note that Γ(R) > 0. If not, we could find a lower essential upper bound in B(y, δ).
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Let y′ ∈ R
Π(z, y′) = U(y′)− ‖y′ − z‖ − ‖y′ − x‖+ ‖y′ − x‖
= Π(x, y′)− ‖y′ − z‖+ ‖y′ − x‖
≥ VB(y,δ)(x)− − ‖y′ − z‖+ ‖y′ − x‖
≥ VB(y,δ)(x)− + min
y′∈B(y,δ)
{‖y′ − x‖ − ‖y′ − z‖}.
Since Γ(R) > 0 we must have that
VB(y,δ)(z) ≥ Π(z, y′) Γ− a.e y′ ∈ R.
Putting the last two inequalities together yields the desired result.

Proof of Lemma 1.3. Consider x ∈ A(z), that is, z ∈ IR(x| p, τ). We next
establish that V (x) = V (z)− ‖z − x‖. First, by the Lipschitz property of V we have
V (z) ≤ V (x) + ‖z− x‖. So we only need to prove the opposite inequality. Fix  > 0.
Since z ∈ IR(x) we can find δ1() > 0 such that

2
+ VB(z,δ)(x) ≥ V (x), ∀δ ≤ δ1(), (A.8)
and VB(z,δ)(·) takes finite values. Define the set
Rx,δ, , {y′ ∈ B(z, δ) : U(y′)− ‖y′ − x‖ > V (x)− } .
Suppose there exists δ ≤ δ1() such that Γ(Rx,δ,) = 0. This would imply that
V (x) −  ≥ VB(z,δ)(x), which together with Eq. (A.8) yields a contradiction. Hence
for all δ ≤ δ1(), Γ(Rx,δ,) > 0.
Fix δ ≤ δ1(). Next we verify that VRx,δ,(z) ≥ V (x)−  + ‖z − x‖ − 2δ. For any
y′ ∈ Rx,δ,
U(y′)− ‖y′ − z‖ = U(y′)− ‖y′ − x‖+ ‖y′ − x‖ − ‖y′ − z‖
≥ V (x)− + ‖y′ − x‖ − ‖y′ − z‖
≥ V (x)− + ‖z − x‖ − 2δ,
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were the last inequality follows from the triangular inequality. From the definition
of the essential supremum we deduce that VRx,δ,(z) ≥ V (x) −  + ‖z − x‖ − 2δ.
Because V (z) ≥ VRx,δ,(z) we must have V (z) ≥ V (x) + ‖z−x‖− − 2δ. We selected
δ ≤ δ1(), and  arbitrarily. So we can let δ ↓ 0 and then  ↓ 0 to obtain that
V (z) ≥ V (x) + ‖z − x‖. This concludes the proof.

Proof of Proposition 1.2. Consider the segment [x, y] and define the set
L , {y′ ∈ C : ∃t ≥ 0 such that y′ = x+ t · (y − x)},
that is L is the set of point along the ray that starts at x and contains the segment
[x, y]. Since y ∈ L and y ∈ IR(x| p, τ) the following quantity is well defined
z , sup{y′ ∈ L : y′ ∈ IR(x| p, τ)}.
We prove that z is a sink location such that x, y ∈ A(z| p, τ). First, we show that
z ∈ IR(x|p, τ). Consider a sequence {zn} ⊂ L such that zn ∈ IR(x|p, τ) and zn → z.
Fix  > 0, δˆ > 0 and choose n such that ‖zn − z‖ < δˆ/2. Since zn ∈ IR(x|p, τ) then
there exists δ0(n, ) > 0 such that for all δ ≤ δ0(n, ) we have VB(zn,δ)(x) ≥ V (x)−. In
particular, for any δ ≤ min{δ0(n, ), δˆ/2} we have B(zn, δ) ⊆ B(z, δˆ) and, therefore,
VB(z,δˆ)(x) ≥ VB(zn,δ)(x) ≥ V (x)− .
Since the choice of  and δˆ was arbitrary we conclude that limδˆ↓0 VB(z,δˆ)(x) = V (x).
That is, z ∈ IR(x| p, τ) which also shows that A(z) 6= ∅.
Next, to show that z is a sink location we argue that we cannot have z ∈ A(z′)
for some z′ 6= z. If we did then z′ ∈ IR(z| p, τ) for some z′ 6= z. First suppose that
z′ ∈ L. If z′ > z this would contradict the definition of z as being maximal. If z′ < z
then by Lemma 1.3 the function V (·) would be decreasing in (z′, z), and by the same
lemma it would be increasing in (x, z). This is a contradiction.
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Second, suppose that z′ /∈ L. That is the vectors z′−x and z−x are not collinear.
Fix  > 0, since z′ ∈ IR(z| p, τ) we can find δ() > 0 such that VB(z′,δ)(z) ≥ V (z)− 
for all δ ≤ δ(). Moreover, from z′ 6= z and the no collinearity property we have that
‖x− z′‖+ γ ≤ ‖x− z‖+ ‖z− z′‖ for some γ > 0 sufficiently small. Hence, if we take
δ ≤ min{δ(), γ/3} we deduce that
VB(z′,δ)(x) ≥ U(w)− ‖w − x‖
= U(w)− ‖w − z‖+ ‖w − z‖ − ‖w − x‖
(a)
≥ U(w)− ‖w − z‖+ ‖w − z‖ − ‖w − z′‖ − ‖z′ − x‖
(b)
≥ U(w)− ‖w − z‖+ ‖w − z‖ − γ
3
− ‖x− z‖ − ‖z − z′‖+ γ
(c)
≥ U(w)− ‖w − z‖ − ‖x− z‖+ γ
3
Γ− a.e w ∈ B(z′, δ),
where in (a) we use the triangular inequality, in (b) we use that ‖w − z′‖ ≤ γ/3 and
that ‖x − z′‖ + γ ≤ ‖x − z‖ + ‖z − z′‖, and in (c) we use that ‖w − z′‖ ≤ γ/3 and
the triangular inequality. Therefore, VB(z′,δ)(x) + ‖x − z‖ − γ3 ≥ VB(z′,δ)(z). In turn,
this yields VB(z′,δ)(x) + ‖x− z‖− γ3 ≥ V (z)− . Since V (x) ≥ VB(z′,δ)(x) and because
x ∈ A(z) this implies that V (x) = V (z) − ‖x − z‖ (see Lemma 1.3) we deduce that
V (x) + ‖x − z‖ − γ
3
≥ V (x) + ‖x − z‖ − . Taking  > 0 small enough yields a
contradiction. We conclude that z is a sink location. Moreover, because x ∈ A(z)
(z ∈ IR(x| p, τ)) and x < y ≤ z (recall these three points are collinear) Lemma A.3
guarantees that y ∈ A(z).

Proof of Proposition 1.3. With some abuse of notation let




This result is based on the following properties:
a) For all (x, y) ∈ A(z| p, τ)c × A(z| p, τ), y /∈ IR(x| p, τ).
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, y /∈ IR(x|p, τ).
Before we provide a formal proof of these properties, we use them to show the state-
ment of the proposition. We will also make use of Lemma A.5 which we prove and
state after the present proof.
We begin with the first part of (i), that is, we show that τ(A(z|p, τ)c×A(z|p, τ)) =
0. If this is not true then by Lemma A.5 we can find (x, y) ∈ A(z|p, τ)c×A(z|p, τ) such
that y ∈ IR(x| p, τ). We obtain a contradiction with property a) above. Therefore
it must be the case that τ(A(z| p, τ)c × A(z| p, τ)) = 0.
Next, we show the second part of (i), namely, τ((Ao(z|p, τ)∪{z})×
(
A(z|p, τ)c∪
L(z| p, τ) \ {z}
)
) = 0. If this is not true then by Lemma A.5 we can find (x, y) ∈
(Ao(z| p, τ)∪ {z})×
(
A(z| p, τ)c ∪L(z| p, τ) \ {z}
)
such that y ∈ IR(x| p, τ) but this
contradicts property b) above. Therefore it must be the case that τ((Ao(z| p, τ) ∪
{z})×
(
A(z| p, τ)c ∪ L(z| p, τ) \ {z}
)
) = 0.










Suppose by contradiction that this is not true then by Lemma A.5 we can find (x, y) ∈⋃
a∈R1(z,Xa(z| p, τ)] ×
⋃
a∈R2(z,Xa(z| p, τ)] such that y ∈ IR(x| p, τ). This implies
that x ∈ A(y| p, τ). Moreover, since z is a sink location we have x ∈ A(z| p, τ) and
y ∈ A(z| p, τ). We use Lemma 1.3 to infer that
V (x) = V (y)− ‖y − x‖, V (x) = V (z)− ‖z − x‖, and V (y) = V (z)− ‖z − y‖.
In turn, we can use the first to equalities to obtain V (y) = V (z) + ‖y− x‖−‖z− x‖.
Plugging this into the last equality yields ‖z−x‖ = ‖y−x‖+‖z−y‖; however, because
R1 ∩ R2 = ∅ we have that x ∈ (z,Xa1(z| p, τ)] and y ∈ (z,Xa2(z| p, τ)] with a1 6= a2.
In other words, x and y belong to different rays around z. In turn, the latter equality









Next we verify properties a) and b). We start with a). We argue by contradiction.
Suppose there exists x ∈ A(z| p, τ)c and y ∈ A(z| p, τ) such that y ∈ IR(x| p, τ).
Let a index the ray that contains the vector (x − z). Recall that by Lemma 1.2
we have that Aa(z| p, τ) = [z,Xa(z| p, τ)]. Since x ∈ A(z| p, τ)c we must have that
x /∈ [z,Xa(z| p, τ)]. In particular ‖x − z‖ > |Xa(z| p, τ) − z|. Hence if we show that
z ∈ IR(x| p, τ) we would contradict the maximality of Xa(z| p, τ). Fix  > 0, then
from z ∈ IR(y| p, τ) we can always find δ0 > 0 such that for all δ ≤ δ0
+ VB(z,δ)(y) ≥ V (y). (A.9)
By the Lipschitz property VB(z,δ)(x) + ‖y − x‖ ≥ VB(z,δ)(y). Hence, from Eq. (A.9)
we can deduce that VB(z,δ)(x) + ‖y − x‖ ≥ V (y) − . Also, because y ∈ IR(x| p, τ)
or, equivalently, x ∈ A(y| p, τ) Lemma 1.3 yields V (x) = V (y) − ‖y − x‖. Hence,
VB(z,δ)(x) ≥ V (x)− , that is, z ∈ IR(x| p, τ).





We look into two cases: x 6= z and x = z. In both cases we proceed by contradiction
assuming that y ∈ IR(x| p, τ). Let us start with x 6= z. Let a index the ray that
contains the vector (x − z). Recall that by Lemma 1.2 we have that Aa(z| p, τ) =
[z,Xa(z|p, τ)]. Since, x ∈ Ao(z|p, τ) and x 6= z we must have that x ∈ (z,Xa(z|p, τ)).
Lemma 1.3 delivers
V (x) = V (y)− ‖y − x‖ and V (Xa(z| p, τ)) = V (x)− ‖x−Xa(z| p, τ)‖,
that is,
V (y)− V (Xa(z| p, τ)) = ‖y − x‖+ ‖x−Xa(z| p, τ)‖. (A.10)
If y = Xa(z| p, τ) the previous equality implies x = Xa(z| p, τ), but since x ∈
(z,Xa(z| p, τ)) this is not possible. If y 6= Xa(z| p, τ) then since y ∈
(
A(z| p, τ)c ∪
L(z| p, τ) \ {z}
)
we must have that y /∈ (z,Xa(z| p, τ)). Also, y cannot be equal to
some point x + t(z − x) for some t > 1 because that would contradict the fact that
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z is a sink location. Therefore, Eq. (A.10) together with the triangular inequality
deliver V (y) − V (Xa(z| p, τ)) > |y − Xa(z| p, τ)|, but this contradicts the Lipschitz
property of V (·).
To conclude, consider the case x = z. In this case we would have z ∈ A(y| p, τ)
but this contradicts the fact that z is a sink location.

Lemma A.5 Let L1,L2 ⊂ C. If τ(L1 × L2) > 0 then there exists (x, y) ∈ L1 × L2
such that y ∈ IR(x|p, τ).
Proof of Lemma A.5. Suppose τ(L1 × L2) > 0. We first argue that there
exists a pair (x, y) ∈ L1 × L2 such that for all δ > 0
τ(B(x, δ)×B(y, δ)) > 0. (A.11)
If this is not true then for any (x, y) ∈ L1 × L2 we can find δx,y > 0 such that Eq.
(A.11) does not hold when we replace δ with δx,y, that is, τ(B(x, δx,y)×B(y, δx,y)) = 0
for all (x, y) ∈ L1 × L2. The collection I defined by
I = {B(x, δx,y)×B(y, δx,y)}(x,y)∈L1×L2
is an open cover of L1 × L2. Moreover the set L1 × L2 is separable because C × C is
separable. This implies that we can find a countable sub-cover of L1 ×L2 in I, that
is, there exists {B(xn, δxn,yn)×B(yn, δxn,yn)}n∈N such that




The existence of the sub-cover is guaranteed by the Lindelo¨f property of separable
metric spaces, see e.g., [63] Theorem 69, p. 116. Since τ is a measure we have











a contradiction. Therefore, for some (x, y) ∈ L1×L2, Eq. (A.11) holds for any δ > 0.
We next show that y ∈ IR(x), that is,
∀ > 0,∃δ0 > 0 such that ∀δ < δ0 + VB(y,δ)(x) ≥ V (x).
Let  > 0 and let δ0 =

2
. Consider δ < δ0, from Eq. (A.11) and the equilibrium
definition we have
0 < τ(B(x, δ)×B(y, δ))
= τ
({










since τ2  Γ this implies that Γ(Rx,y,δ) > 0. Now we argue that Rx,y,δ ⊂ {y′ ∈
B(y, δ) : Π(x, y′) ≥ V (x) − }. Indeed, let y′ ∈ Rx,y,δ then there exists x′ ∈ B(x, δ)
for which
U(y′) = V (x′) + ‖y′ − x′‖
≥ V (x)− ‖x′ − x‖+ ‖y′ − x′‖
= V (x)− ‖x′ − x‖+ ‖y′ − x′‖ − ‖y′ − x‖+ ‖y′ − x‖
≥ V (x)− ‖x′ − x‖ − ‖x′ − x‖+ ‖y′ − x‖,
where in the first inequality we used the Lipchitz property of V (see Lemma 1.1),
and in the second we use triangular inequality. Since ‖x′− x‖ ≤ δ0 = 2 we have that
U(y′) ≥ V (x) −  + ‖y′ − x‖, that is, Rx,y,δ ⊂ {y′ ∈ B(y, δ) : Π(x, y′) ≥ V (x) − }.
Therefore, Γ({y′ ∈ B(y, δ) : Π(x, y′) ≥ V (x)−}) > 0, which implies that VB(y,δ)(x) ≥
V (x)− .

Proof of Proposition 1.4. For ease of notation we useXa to denoteXa(z|p, τ).
We show that τˆ belongs to FC(µ) and that it is an equilibrium in C. First we argue
that τˆ ∈ FC(µ). Since τˆ is the sum of two non-negative measures we have that
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τˆ ∈M(C ×C). In order see why τˆ1 coincides with µ, let B be a measurable subset of
C then
τˆ1(B) = τˆ(B × C)
= τ((B ∩ (Ac ∪ L))×Ac) + τ˜((B ∩ A)×A)
(a)
= τ((B ∩ (Ac ∪ L))×Ac) + µ˜(B ∩ A)
= τ((B ∩ (Ac ∪ L))×Ac) + τ((B ∩ A)×A)
(b)
= τ((B ∩ Ac)×Ac) + τ((B ∩ L)×Ac) + τ((B ∩ A)×A)
(c)
= τ((B ∩ Ac)× C) + τ((B ∩ A)× C)
= µ(B),
where (a) comes from the fact that τ˜ belongs to FA(µ˜). In (b) we use the fact that A
is a closed set. Equality (c) comes from Proposition 1.3 part (i). That is, τˆ1 coincides
with µ. Now, we show that τˆ2  Γ. Let B be as before and suppose Γ(B) = 0 then
τˆ2(B) = τˆ(C ×B) = τ((Ac ∪ L)× (B ∩ Ac)) + τ˜(A× (B ∩ A))
≤ τ2(B ∩ Ac) + τ˜2(B ∩ A)
= 0,
where the last equality holds because τ2  Γ and τ˜2  Γ|A. Now we show that τˆ is
an equilibrium. We need to verify that τˆ(Eˆ) equals µ(C), where
Eˆ ,
{




x, ·, pˆ(·), sτˆ (·)
)}
.




sτ (x) if x ∈ Ac
sτ˜ (x) if x ∈ A.
Let B be a measurable subset of Ac then
τˆ2(B) = τ((C ×B) ∩ ((Ac ∪ L)×Ac)) = τ((Ac ∪ L)×B) (a)= τ(C ×B) = τ2(B),
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where (a) comes from Proposition 1.3 part (i). Therefore, sτˆ (x) equals sτ (x) Γ −
a.e. x in Ac. Similarly, for B a measurable subset of A we have
τˆ2(B) = τ˜(A×B) = τ˜2(B),
where the second equality holds because from Proposition 1.3 we have τ(Ac×A) = 0,
and also because τ˜ is an equilibrium in A.
Second, we show that V (x| pˆ, τˆ) equals VA(x| p˜, τ˜) for all x ∈ A. Let x ∈ A, by
definition
V (x| pˆ, τˆ) ≥ Π(x, y, pˆ(y), sτˆ (y)), Γ− a.e. y in C.
In particular, from our choice of pˆ and sτˆ in A we have
V (x| pˆ, τˆ) ≥ Π(x, y, p˜(y), sτ˜ (y)), Γ− a.e. y in A,
implying that V (x| pˆ, τˆ) ≥ VA(x| p˜, τ˜). Therefore, we only need to show V (x| pˆ, τˆ) ≤
VA(x| p˜, τ˜). To prove this we have to verify that VA(x| p˜, τ˜) is a Γ− a.e upper bound
of Π(x, y, pˆ(y), sτˆ (y)) for y ∈ C. From the definition of VA(x| p˜, τ˜) this upper bound
is true in A, so we just need to check
VA(x| p˜, τ˜) ≥ Π(x, y, p(y), sτ (y)), Γ− a.e. y in Ac. (A.12)
For the sake of contradiction suppose this is not true. Then,
Γ(y ∈ Ac : Π(x, y, p(y), sτ (y)) > VA(x| p˜, τ˜)) > 0
For any y ∈ Ac consider the segment [x, y]. Since x ∈ A there must exists xy ∈
[x, y]∩ ∂A. From the Lipschitz property (see Lemma 1.1) we have that VA(x| p˜, τ˜) ≥
VA(xy| p˜, τ˜) − ‖xy − x‖, and since VA(·| p˜, τ˜) coincides with V (·| p, τ) in ∂A we can
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infer that VA(x| p˜, τ˜) ≥ V (xy| p, τ)− ‖xy − x‖. Then,
0 < Γ(y ∈ Ac : Π(x, y, p(y), sτ (y)) > VA(x| p˜, τ˜))
≤ Γ(y ∈ Ac : Π(x, y, p(y), sτ (y)) > V (xy| p, τ)− ‖xy − x‖)
= Γ(y ∈ Ac : U(y, p(y), sτ (y))− ‖x− y‖ > V (xy| p, τ)− ‖xy − x‖)
(a)
= Γ(y ∈ Ac : U(y, p(y), sτ (y)) > V (xy| p, τ) + ‖xy − y‖)
(b)
≤ Γ(y ∈ Ac : U(y, p(y), sτ (y)) > V (y| p, τ))
(c)
= 0,
a contradiction. In (a) we use that x, y and xy are collinear points. In (b) we use the
the Lipschitz property, and (c) follows from Lemma A.2. Thus Eq. (A.12) holds. In
conclusion, V (x| pˆ, τˆ) equals VA(x| p˜, τ˜) for all x ∈ A.
We next show that V (x| pˆ, τˆ) equals V (x| p, τ) for all x ∈ Ac. We proceed by
contradiction. Let x ∈ Ac and suppose that V (x| pˆ, τˆ) 6= V (x| p, τ). If V (x| pˆ, τˆ) >
V (x| p, τ) then we must have that
0 < Γ(y ∈ C : Π(x, pˆ(y), sτˆ (y), y) > V (x| p, τ))
= Γ(y ∈ A : Π(x, p˜(y), sτ˜ (y), y) > V (x| p, τ))
+ Γ(y ∈ Ac : Π(x, p(y), sτ (y), y) > V (x| p, τ))
(a)
= Γ(y ∈ A : U(p˜(y), sτ˜ (y), y)− ‖x− y‖ > V (x| p, τ))
(b)
≤ Γ(y ∈ A : U(p˜(y), sτ˜ (y), y)− ‖x− y‖ > VA(xy| p˜, τ˜)− ‖xy − x‖)
(c)
= Γ(y ∈ A : U(p˜(y), sτ˜ (y), y) > VA(xy| p˜, τ˜) + ‖xy − y‖)
(d)
≤ Γ(y ∈ A : U(p˜(y), sτ˜ (y), y) > VA(y| p˜, τ˜))
(e)
= 0,
where (a) follows from that the definition of V (x| p, τ) implies that the second term
in the previous line is zero. Similarly to what we did before, in (b) we take xy ∈
[x, y]∩ ∂A and then apply the Lipschitz property together with the assumption that
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VA(xy| p˜, τ˜) = V (xy| p, τ). In (c) we made use of the collinearity of x, y and xy, and
in (d) we applied once again the Lipschitz property. The last line (e) follows from
Lemma A.2.
Now suppose that V (x| pˆ, τˆ) < V (x| p, τ) then
0 < Γ(y ∈ C : Π(x, p(y), sτ (y), y) > V (x| pˆ, τˆ))
= Γ(y ∈ A : Π(x, p(y), sτ (y), y) > V (x| pˆ, τˆ))
+ Γ(y ∈ Ac : Π(x, p(y), sτ (y), y) > V (x| pˆ, τˆ))
(a)
= Γ(y ∈ A : U(p(y), sτ (y), y)− ‖x− y‖ > V (x| pˆ, τˆ))
(b)
≤ Γ(y ∈ A : U(p(y), sτ (y), y)− ‖x− y‖ > VA(xy| p˜, τ˜)− ‖xy − x‖)
(c)
= Γ(y ∈ A : U(p(y), sτ (y), y) > V (xy| p, τ) + ‖xy − y‖)
(d)
≤ Γ(y ∈ A : U(p(y), sτ (y), y) > V (y| p, τ))
(e)
= 0,
where (a) follows from that the definition of V (x| pˆ, τˆ) implies that the second term
in the previous line is zero. Similarly to what we did before, in (b) we take xy ∈
[x, y] ∩ ∂A and then apply the Lipschitz property together with what we proved
before, VA(xy| p˜, τ˜) = V (xy| pˆ, τˆ) (xy ∈ A because this set is closed). In (c) we made
use of the collinearity of x, y and xy, and that VA(xy| p˜, τ˜) = V (xy| p, τ). In (d) we
applied once again the Lipschitz property. The last line (e) follows from Lemma A.2.
Therefore, V (x| pˆ, τˆ) equals V (x| p, τ) in Ac.
Lastly, we verify that τˆ(Eˆ) equals µ(C). Define the sets
E1 ,
{




(x, y) ∈ A×A : Π(x, y, pˆ(y), sτˆ (y)) = V (x| pˆ, τˆ)
}
then τˆ(Eˆ) = τ(E1) + τ˜(E2). We can replace the definition of pˆ and what we have
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proved about sτˆ and V (x| pˆ, τˆ) in the expressions above to obtain
τ(E1) = τ
({





(x, y) ∈ A×A : Π(x, y, p˜(y), sτ˜ (y)) = VA(x| p˜, τ˜)
})
= µ˜(A),
where the second line comes from the fact that τ˜ is an equilibrium in A. Let E be
defined analogously to Eˆ but with (pˆ, τˆ) replaced by (p, τ), then
τˆ(Eˆ) = τ(E1) + µ˜(A)
(a)
= τ(E1) + τ(A×A)
(b)





where in (a) we use the definition of µ˜. In (b) and (d) we use the fact that τ only
puts mass in E , and in (c) we use Proposition 1.3 part (i).

A.2 Proofs for Section 1.5
Proof of Lemma 1.4. Suppose λ(x) > 0 and recall that the price achieving
the maximum in the definition of Rlocx (s) is ρ
loc
x (s) = max{ρbalx (s), ρux}. Let su be
equal to λ(x) · F x(ρux), that is, ρbalx (su) = ρux (here we are using that q 7→ q · F y(q)
is continuous and unimodular in q). Then, since ρbalx (·) is decreasing we have that
ρlocx (s) = ρ
bal
x (s) for all 0 < s ≤ su and, therefore,
Rlocx (s)
s
= ρbalx (s) = F
−1(1− s
λ(x)
), for all 0 < s ≤ su.
Since F is strictly increasing, the quotient above is strictly decreasing for s ∈ (0, su].
Moreover, since F−1(1) = V , the point just made also includes s = 0. Now, for s > su
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λ(x) · F x(ρux)
s
,
which is strictly decreasing. In any case, we conclude that ψx(·) is strictly decreasing
when λ(x) > 0.

Proof of Proposition 1.5. Define the set B , {x ∈ Cλ : V (x) > ψx(sτ (x))}.
We want to show that Γ(B) = 0. First we argue that B ⊆ {x ∈ C : U(x) 6= V (x)},
indeed, let x ∈ B then
V (x) > ψx(s
τ (x)) ≥ U
(
x, p(x), sτ (x)
)
,
that is, V (x) > U(x) as desired. By Lemma A.2 we know that τ2({x ∈ C : U(x) 6=
V (x)}) = 0 and, therefore, τ2(B) = 0. This yields,
0 = τ2(B) =
∫
B
sτ (x) dΓ(x). (A.13)
If Γ(B) = 0 then we are done. Suppose Γ(B) > 0, from equation (A.13) we can
conclude that sτ (x) = 0, Γ − a.e. x ∈ B. Since in B we have λ(x) > 0 this implies
that Γ− a.e in B we have that ψx(sτ (x)) equals α ·V . Because α ·V is the maximum
value that V (·) can attain (see Lemma A.1), we conclude that
α · V ≥ V (x) > ψx(sτ (x)) = α · V Γ− a.e. x ∈ B.
But since we are assuming that Γ(B) > 0, this yields a contradiction. 
Proof of Theorem 1.1. The proof of this theorem consists of several parts. In
the first part we specialize the upper bound derived in Proposition 1.5 to account for
the case when λ(x) = 0. Next, we pose an optimization problem which is a relaxation
of platform’s optimization problem restricted to the attraction region A(z). Then
we introduce some notation. Given this, the relaxation has a similar structure to
a continuous bounded knapsack problem, and we characterize the structure of the
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optimal solution as stated in the statement of the theorem. Next we construct a
local price-equilibrium pair (pˆ, τˆ) in A(z) that implements the relaxation’s solution.
We conclude by applying the pasting result of Proposition 1.4 to globally extend our
price-equilibrium pair (pˆ, τˆ) in C as in the statement of the theorem. In summary the
parts of the proof are: Upper bound specialization, Relaxation, Notation, Knapsack,
Implementation and Conclusion. We enumerate all these parts from 1 to 6, and
present them in boldface to make the presentation clearer.
Part 1: Upper bound specialization. For ease of notation we use Xa and
A(z) to denote Xa(z|p, τ), and A(z|p, τ), respectively. Recall z ∈ C is a sink location,
so the following is well defined
Xsuppa , inf{x ∈ [z,Xa] ∩ supp(Γ)}.








We define the function
Hx(V ) ,

ψ−1x (V ) if λ(x) > 0;
0 if λ(x) = 0, x ∈ Asupp(z)o;
dµ
dΓ
(x) if λ(x) = 0, x ∈ Lsupp(z);
0 if x ∈ A(z) \ Asupp(z)o.
(A.14)
In this part of the proof we will show that
sτ (x) ≤ Hx(V (x| p, τ)), Γ− a.e. x in A(z). (A.15)
In order to prove Eq. (A.15) first note that from Proposition 1.5 we have
sτ (x) ≤ Hx(V (x| p, τ)), Γ− a.e. x in A(z) ∩ Cλ,
so we only need to show that the set
B , {x ∈ A(z) : λ(x) = 0, sτ (x) > Hx(V (x| p, τ))},
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satisfies Γ(B) = 0. From the definition of Xsuppa we have that Γ(A(z)\Asupp(z)) equals
zero (beyond these Xsuppa the city measure does not put mass). Hence, showing that
Γ(B) equals zero is equivalent to showing that Γ(B1 ∪B2) equals zero, where
B1 , {x ∈ Asupp(z)o : λ(x) = 0, sτ (x) > 0},
B2 , {x ∈ Lsupp(z) : λ(x) = 0, sτ (x) > dµ
dΓ
(x)}.
For the sake of contradiction assume that Γ(B1) > 0 then τ2(B1) =
∫
B1
sτ dΓ > 0.
This, together with Lemma A.2, yields that τ2(B1 ∩ {x : U(x) = V (x)}) > 0, which
in turn implies the existence of x ∈ B1 ∩ {x : U(x) = V (x)}. Such an x satisfies
that x ∈ Asupp(z)o and V (x) = 0 and, therefore, V (x′) < 0 for some x′ ∈ Lsupp(z)
(recall that by Lemma 1.3, V (·) is linear on any ray [z,Xa] around z). However, any
x′ in Lsupp(z) belongs to supp(Γ) and, hence, Lemma A.1 guarantees that V (x′) ≥ 0,
yielding a contradiction. Thus, Γ(B1) = 0.
If Γ(B2) > 0 then by the definition of B2 we must have that τ2(B2) > µ(B2). We
will also argue that µ(B2) ≥ τ2(B2) to obtain a contradiction. Indeed,
µ(B2) ≥ τ(B2 ×B2)
= τ2(B2)− τ(C \B2 ×B2)
= τ2(B2)− τ(A(z) \B2 ×B2)
(a)
= τ2(B2)− τ(Asupp(z) \B2 ×B2)
(b)
= τ2(B2)− τ(Lsupp(z) \B2 ×B2)
= τ2(B2),
where (a) comes from τ(Asupp(z)o × Lsupp(z)) = 0 (recall that by Lemma 1.3, V (·) is
linear and decrease on any ray [z,Xa] around z). And (b) holds because τ does not
send mass across rays, so the mass can only me sent to from in the pairs (Xsuppa , X
supp
a );
but this pairs do not belong to Lsupp(z) \ B2 × B2. In conclusion, Γ(B) = 0 and Eq.
(A.15) is proven.
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Part 2: Relaxation. We consider the attraction region A(z). In it, the upper
bound we just proved in Eq. (A.15) must be satisfied. Moreover, due to our flow
separation result in Proposition 1.3 part (i) we have τ2(A(z)) = τ(A(z) × A(z)).
Also, since flow is not transported across rays (see Proposition 1.3 part (ii)), the
total supply in the ray (z,Xa] cannot be larger than its initial supply. Therefore, in





V (x) · s(x) dΓ(x) (PKP (z))
s.t s(x) ≤ Hx(V (x| p, τ)), Γ− a.e. x in A(z) (CB)∫
A(z)





sτ (x) dΓa(x), Γ
p − a.e. a ∈ Rz. (FRa)
Observe that sτ (which defines τ2) is a feasible solution for (PKP (z)). The supply
density sτˆ (as in the statement of the present theorem) will be shown to be an optimal
solution for this relaxation.
Part 3: Notation.
1. Next we rename the quantities on the RHS of equations (FC) and (FRa).





τc = τ(A(z)× {z}).





SH(·) is the measure with density Hx(V (x)) (see Eq. (A.14)) with respect to
the Γ measure. Moving forward we will use sH(x) to denote its density.
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Part 4: Knapsack. We show that any optimal solution to (PKP (z)) is as sτˆ in
the statement of the theorem. There are two cases.
Case 1. First suppose that 0 < τtotal ≤ SH({z}) (so that there is an atom at z).




which is feasible, and optimal because for any feasible s we have∫
A(z)
V (x) · s(x)dΓ(x) ≤ V (z) ·
∫
A(z)
s(x) dΓ(x) = V (z) · τtotal,
which is equal to the objective function at s?. So in this case the optimal solution
coincides with the description of sτˆ as in the statement of the theorem.
Case 2. Now let us assume that τtotal > S
H({z}). We start by showing that
in this case we have s?(z) = sH(z). If z is not a point with positive Γ- mass then
setting s?(z) in this way is without loss of generality. If the point z has positive mass
then we argue by contradiction that s?(z) must be choose in this way. Let s? be an









+sH(z) · Γ({z}). (A.16)
Let  ∈ (0, 1) be such that (τtotal−  ·K)/Γ({z}) = sH(z), this is well defined because
we are assuming τtotal > S
H({z}). Next define a new solution s¯ by
s¯(x) =

sH(z) if x = z,
 · s?(x) if x 6= z.
Note that s¯ is feasible: it satisfies (FRa) for all a ∈ Rz and (CB), and for (FC) we
have ∫
A(z)
s¯dΓ =  ·K + sH(z) · Γ({z}) = τtotal.
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Furthermore, s¯ yields an strictly larger objective than s?,∫
A(z)
V (x) · s?(x) dΓ(x) =
∫
A(z)\{z}




V (x) · s?(x) dΓ(x)
+ (1− ) ·
∫
A(z)\{z}
V (x) · s?(x) dΓ(x)





V (x) · s¯(x) dΓ(x) + (1− ) · V (z) ·K









V (x) · s¯(x) dΓ(x),
where (a) comes from Eq. (A.16), and (b) holds because (τtotal−·K)/Γ({z}) = sH(z).
Hence, whenever τtotal > S
H({z}), we can assume that s?(z) = sH(z). We assume
this for the reminder of the proof.
Let s?(z) be an optimal solution. We show how to build sˆ with the properties






















Observe that for r = Xa the integral in the definition of ra is larger or equal than qa.









Let’s define a new solution sˆ by
sˆ(x) ,

s?(z) = sH(z) if x = z








Γa({x}) if x ∈ Lr(z),
and sˆ(x) = 0 otherwise. We show that sˆ weakly revenue dominates s? and that
is feasible. Let us do first the revenue dominance. Note that the objective in {z}
of both solutions coincide; thus, we only need to compare the objective in the set
Q , A(z) \ {z}. Note that Ar(z) \ {z} ⊂ Q, then∫
Q
V (x) · s?(x) dΓ(x) =
∫
Ar(z)\{z}
V (x) · s?(x) dΓ(x) +
∫
Q\(Ar(z)\{z})




V (x) · sˆ(x) dΓ(x) +
∫
Ar(z)\{z}




V (x) · s?(x)1{s?≤sH} dΓ(x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
I
,



































V (x)(sH − s?)(x)1{s?≤sH} dΓa(x)









V (x) · s?(x) dΓ(x) ≤
∫
Ar(z)\{z}
V (x) · sˆ(x) dΓ(x).
Since the right hand side above equals the objective under sˆ in Ar(z) we conclude
that sˆ is an optimal solution.
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For the feasibility of sˆ, by construction and the definition of ra we have that sˆ
satisfies (CB). Furthermore, because s? satisfies (FRa) and since sˆ only redistributes
the mass of s? across rays but no between rays that originate in z, sˆ also satisfies
(FRa). In order to verify (FC) note that∫
A(z)














sH(z)1{s?≤sH} dΓa(x) + sˆ(ra)Γa({ra})
]
dΓp(a)




















In conclusion, the solution sˆ constructed is as defined in the statement of the theorem.
Next, we use this solution to define prices and flows. We use Sˆ to denote the measure
induced by sˆ. Observe that Sˆ has support in Ar(z).
Part 5: Implementation. We construct a price-equilibrium pair (pˆ, τˆ) in A(z)
with τˆ ∈ FA(z)(µ˜) and
µ˜(B) , τ((B ∩ A(z))× A(z)), B ⊆ C measurable.
• Prices. Define pˆ : A(z)→ [0, V ] by
pˆ(x) =

ρlocx (sˆ(x)) if x ∈ Ar(z) \ Lr(z);
pa if x = ra, a ∈ Rz;
V otherwise,
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where pa is such that U(ra, pa, sˆ(ra)) = V (ra| p, τ) · 1{λ(ra)>0} for a ∈ Rz. By the
way we constructed sˆ(ra), it is bounded by Hra(V (ra)) and, therefore, the value pa
is always well defined (Γ-a.e).
• Flows: We define τˆ as a transport plan between µ˜ and Sˆ. We start by defining
the flow that τˆ sends to z and then the flow along rays.






















We define the quantities
∆a , µ˜a((z,Xa])− Sˆa((z,Xa]),
note that because of (FRa), ∆a ≥ 0, Γp − a.e a in Rz. Further define
ha , z + inf{δ ≥ 0 : µ˜a((z, z + δ]) ≥ ∆a}.
For any set B ⊆ A(z) we define the mass going to the center from ray a ∈ Rz by
the measures
µca(B) , µ˜a(B ∩ (z, ha)) + 1{ha∈B∩(z,Xa]} · (∆a − µ˜a(z, ha)),
observe that by the definition ha, the atoms above have non-negative mass, Γ
p−a.e
a in Rz . LetQz , {z}×{z}. For any measurable setR ⊆ A(z)×A(z), the measure
that sends flow to the origin is defined by





where pi1 is the mapping that to each pair (x, y) assigns the first component x.
Using Lemma A.6 (which we state and prove after the present proof) we can verify
that τ c ∈M(A(z)× A(z)).
Flow along rays. For any ray a ∈ Rz define the flow γ˜a along that ray to be the




‖x− y‖ dγa(x, y)
s.t γa ∈ Π(µ˜ra, Sˆa),
where
µ˜ra(B) , µ˜a(B ∩ (ha, Xa]) + 1{ha∈B∩(z,Xa]} · (µ˜a(z, ha]−∆a),
where Π(µ˜ra, Sˆa) is the set of transport plans between µ˜
r




{(x, y) ∈ (z,Xa]× (z,Xa] : y > x}
)
= 0, Γp − a.e. a ∈ Rz. (A.17)
We provide a proof Eq. (A.17) after Part 6.
We will argue that τˆ defined by




yields an equilibrium, that is, for the set
E˜ ,
{
(x, y) ∈ A(z)× A(z) : U(y, pˆ(y), sτˆ (y))− |y − x| = VA(z)(x| pˆ, τˆ)
}
,
we have that τˆ(E˜) equals µ˜(A(z)). Note that with this definition of τˆ there is
not flow being transported across rays but only within rays. Before verifying the
equilibrium condition we check that τˆ ∈ FA(z)(µ˜). Clearly τˆ is a non-negative
measure in A(z) × A(z) because is the sum of non-negative measures. Now we
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check that τˆ1 = µ˜. Consider a measurable set B ⊆ A(z) then
τ˜1(B) = τ˜(B × A(z))















µ˜a(B ∩ (z, ha)) + 1{ha∈B∩(z,Xa]} · (∆a − µ˜a(z, ha))








and from the definition of µ˜ we also have τˆ1  Γ. For the second marginal of τˆ we
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have












































= τ(Qz)1{z∈B} + 1{z∈B}
[

















Since Sˆ is such that Sˆ  Γ, we conclude that τˆ ∈ FA(z)(µ˜). Also, sτˆ coincides with
sˆ Γ almost everywhere. Before we move to verify that τˆ is an equilibrium, we next
compute VA(z)(x| pˆ, τˆ) and U(y, pˆ(y), sτˆ (y)).
• Equilibrium utilities: We show that VA(z)(x| pˆ, τˆ) equals V (z| p, τ)− |z − x| for
all x ∈ A(z). First, from the definition of pˆ and the value of sτˆ we have that
Γ− a.e. y in A(z)
U(y, pˆ(y), sτˆ (y)) =

(V (z| p, τ)− |z − y|) · 1{λ(y)>0} if y ∈ Ar(z),
0 if y ∈ A(z) \ Ar(z).
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Second, for any x ∈ A(z) we argue that V (x| p, τ) = V (z| p, τ) − |z − x| ≥
VA(z)(x| pˆ, τˆ). It is enough to show that
Γ(y ∈ A(z) : U(y, pˆ(y), sτˆ (y))− |y − x| > V (x| p, τ)) = 0.
Suppose this is not true. Lemma A.1 implies that V (y|p, τ) is non-negative Γ−a.e.
Also V (y| p, τ) equals V (z| p, τ)− |z − y| for any y ∈ A(z). Hence it must be true
that V (y| p, τ) is larger or equal than U(y, pˆ(y), sτˆ (y)) Γ−a.e (see the value of this
expression above). Thus our current assumption implies
Γ(y ∈ A(z) : V (y| p, τ)− |y − x| > V (x| p, τ)) > 0,
but this contradicts the Lipschitz property of V (·| p, τ).
Third, we show that the upper bound we just proved is tight, that is, for all  > 0
Γ(y ∈ A(z) : U(y, pˆ(y), sτˆ (y))− |y − x| > V (x| p, τ)− ) > 0. (A.18)






1{λ(x)>0}dΓa(x)dΓp(a) > 0, ∀δ > 0. (A.19)
Next, define r¯ as the essential supremum of {‖ra−z‖} with respect to the measure
Γp
r¯ , inf{c ∈ R : Γp
(
a ∈ Rz : ‖ra − z‖ > c
)
= 0}.
Let us analyze two cases. First, assume that r¯ > 0. In this case there exists δ0 > 0
such that r¯ > δ0 and the set Qδ0 = {a ∈ Rz : ‖ra − z‖ > δ0} has Γp positive






1{λ(x)>0}dΓa(x)dΓp(a) > 0, (A.20)
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but this implies that
0 < Γ(y ∈ B(z, δ) ∩ Ar(z) : λ(y) > 0)
= Γ(y ∈ B(z, δ) ∩ Ar(z) : λ(y) > 0, 2δ + ‖z − x‖ ≥ ‖y − x‖+ ‖y − z‖)
≤ Γ(y ∈ B(z, δ) ∩ Ar(z) : λ(y) > 0, + ‖z − x‖ > ‖y − x‖+ ‖y − z‖)
≤ Γ(y ∈ Ar(z) : λ(y) > 0, + ‖z − x‖ > ‖y − x‖+ ‖y − z‖)
= Γ(y ∈ Ar(z) : λ(y) > 0, U(y, pˆ(y), sτˆ (y))− ‖y − x‖ > V (x)− )
≤ Γ(y ∈ A(z) : U(y, pˆ(y), sτˆ (y))− ‖y − x‖ > V (x)− ),
this shows that Eq. (A.18) holds. For the other case suppose that assume that
r¯ = 0. This implies that ra = z for Γ
p almost all a ∈ Rz. Then, we must have









sτˆ (x) · dΓa(x)dΓp(a)
= sτˆ (z) · Γ({z})
Thus both sτˆ (z) and Γ({z}) are strictly positive. If λ(z) > 0 then the same
series of inequalities that we used for the previous case applies to this case, and
so the desired Eq. (A.18) holds. If λ(z) = 0 then since by feasibility we have
0 < sτˆ (z) ≤ Hz(V (z| p, τ)), it must be the case that z belongs to Lsupp(z). WLOG
suppose that z = Xsuppa for some a ∈ Rz then by the previous inequality we have
that 0 < sτˆ (Xsuppa ) ≤ dµdΓ(Xsuppa ). In turn, this implies that µ({Xsuppa }) > 0. This
means that z has and initial mass of supply. Since z is a sink location, it does not
belong to the indifference region of any other location and, therefore, by Lemma
A.5 it does not send flow to any other location. Hence, τ2({z}) > 0 and by Lemma
A.2 we deduce that U(z, p(z), sτ (z)) = V (z| p, τ). Since, λ(z) = 0 this implies that
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V (z| p, τ) = 0. To conclude, note
Γ(y ∈ A(z) : Π(x, y, pˆ(y), sτˆ (y)) > V (x| p, τ)− ) ≥ Γ(y ∈ {z} : −|y − x|
> −|z − x| − )
= Γ({z})
> 0,
hence Eq. (A.18) holds.
• Equilibrium condition: Consider the equilibrium set
E˜ ,
{
(x, y) ∈ A(z)× A(z) : U(y, pˆ(y), sτˆ (y))− |y − x| = VA(z)(x| pˆ, τˆ)
}
,
we need to verify that τˆ(E˜) equals µ˜(A(z)). First, for τˆ(E˜) we have
τˆ(E˜) (a)= τˆ
({




(x, y) ∈ A(z)× Ar(z) : λ(y) = 0, −|y − x| = V (x| p, τ)
})
In (a) we use what we have just proved about VA(z)(x| pˆ, τˆ), that U(y, pˆ(y), sτˆ (y)) =

















(x, y) ∈ (z,Xa]× (z, ra] : λ(y) = 0, −|y − x| = V (x| p, τ)
})
dΓp(a)


























Sˆa({ra})1{λ(ra)=0, V (ra)=0}1{ra 6=z}dΓp(a) + Sˆ({z}) · 1{V (z)=0,λ(z)=0}
= Sˆ((∂Ar ∪ {z}) ∩ {y : λ(y) = 0, V (y| p, τ) = 0})
where (a) comes from the fact that γ˜a only puts mass in (z,Xa] × (z,Xa]. The
equality in (b) follows from the congestion bound in Eq. (A.15) which makes sˆ(y)
equal to zero when λ(y) = 0 and y ∈ (z, ra), and also the fact that γ˜a only sends
flows towards z and not in the opposite direction, that is, γ˜a((z, ra) × {ra}) = 0
(see Eq. (A.17)). The last equality, (c), uses the latter fact once again.
Consider the sets












For the first term we have
τˆ(E˜c) = τˆ2({y ∈ {z} : λ(y) > 0}) = τˆ2({z}) · 1{λ(z)>0}.
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For the second term we have that for any ray a, γ˜a(E˜a) equals Sˆa((z, ra] ∩ {y :
λ(y) > 0}). This is true because the plan γ˜a only sends mass to (z, ra](this is the
support of Sˆa) and it does not send mass in the opposite direction of z, see Eq.
(A.17). Therefore,
τˆ(E˜) = τˆ2({z}) · 1{λ(z)>0} +
∫
Rz
Sˆa((z, ra] ∩ {y : λ(y) > 0})dΓp(a) + Z
= Sˆ({y ∈ Ar(z) : λ(y) > 0}) + Sˆ((Lr(z) ∪ {z}) ∩ {y : λ(y) = 0, V (y| p, τ) = 0})
Now, recall that µ˜(A(z)) = Sˆ(Ar(z)) and
Sˆ(Ar(z)) = Sˆ(Ar(z) ∩ {y : λ(y) > 0}) + Sˆ(Ar(z) ∩ {y : λ(y) = 0})
(a)




Sˆa(Ar(z) ∩ {y : λ(y) = 0})dΓp(a)
(b)





= Sˆ({y ∈ Ar(z) : λ(y) > 0}) + Sˆ((∂Ar ∪ {z}) ∩ {y : λ(y) = 0})
For the second term in (a) we use the disintegration of Sˆ, and in (b) we use the
congestion bound in Eq. (A.15). Hence, if we show that
Sˆ((Lr(z)∪{z})∩{y : λ(y) = 0, V (y|p, τ) = 0}) = Sˆ((Lr(z)∪{z})∩{y : λ(y) = 0}),













Assume that Sˆ(Q2) > 0 then
τ2(∪Xsuppa ∈Q2(z,Xsuppa )) ≤ Sˆ(∪Xsuppa ∈Q2(z,Xsuppa ))
< Sˆ(∪Xsuppa ∈Q2(z,Xsuppa )) + Sˆ(Q2)
= Sˆ(∪Xsuppa ∈Q2(z,Xsuppa ])
≤ τ2(∪Xsuppa ∈Q2(z,Xsuppa ])
where the first inequality comes from the congestion bound in Eq. (A.15) and
the definition of Q2, the second from Sˆ(Q2) > 0 and the last from the feasibility
of sˆ. Hence τ2(Q2) > 0 and, therefore, Lemma A.2 implies that in Q2 we have
U(y, p(y), sτ (y)) = V (y| p, τ). Since, λ(y) = 0 for y ∈ Q2 we conclude that in this
case we cannot have Sˆ(Q2) > 0. This completes the proof.
Part 6: Conclusion. We conclude by applying Proposition 1.4. The price-
equilibrium pair (pˆ, τˆ) satisfies the hypothesis in Proposition 1.4, so we can create a
global price-equilibrium pair which we still denote by (pˆ, τˆ) in C. This new solution
has the same objective that (p, τ) in A(z)c, but it dominates the platform revenue in
A(z). Therefore, (pˆ, τˆ) revenue dominates (p, τ).
Proof of Eq. (A.17): We show that
γ˜a
(
{(x, y) ∈ (z,Xa]× (z,Xa] : y > x}
)
= 0, Γp − a.e. a ∈ Rz.
First we show that both measures µ˜ra and Sˆa satisfy:
µ˜ra((z, ba]) ≤ Sˆa((z, ca]) ∀ba, ca ∈ (z,Xa], ba ≤ ca, Γp − a.e. a ∈ Rz, (A.21)
where ba and ca lie in the ray indexed by a ∈ Rz. To see why this is true let us proceed
by contradiction. Let us denote by Q de set where Eq. (A.21) is not satisfied, we
have that Γp(Q) > 0. Note that for any a ∈ Q we can find ba and ca for which the
inequality in Eq. (A.21) is not satisfied, so let us thus fix such collection of ba and ca.
Moreover, from the definition of µ˜ra we deduce that for any a ∈ Q we have ha ≤ ba
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(µ˜a((z, ba])−∆a)dΓp(a)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(∗∗)
,



















the last inequality holds because
Now we analyze (∗∗). Denote by Qr the set of rays a ∈ Rz such that ra > ba and
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the first equality comes from the definition of µ˜a and then integrating this disinte-
gration of measures. The second and fourth equality come from Proposition 1.3 part









































































since Γp(Q) > 0 the previous inequality yields a contradiction. We conclude that Eq.
(A.21) holds.
To finalize the proof of Eq. (A.17). Consider the set where Eq. (A.21) holds (the




{(x, y) ∈ (z,Xa]× (z,Xa] : y > x}
)
> 0.
From the proof of Lemma A.5 we deduce that there exists (x, y) ∈ (z,Xa] × (z,Xa]
such that y > x and γ˜a((z, x+ δ]× (y − δ,Xa)) > 0, where δ > 0 can be taken small
enough such that x+ δ < y − δ. Then,
Sˆa((z, x+ δ]) ≥ µ˜ra((z, x+ δ])
= γ˜a((z, x+ δ]× (z,Xa])
= γ˜a((z, x+ δ]× (z, x+ δ]) + γ˜a((z, x+ δ]× (x+ δ,Xa])
> γ˜a((z, x+ δ]× (z, x+ δ])
= Sˆa((z, x+ δ])− γ˜a((x+ δ,Xa]× (z, x+ δ]),
Thus,
γ˜a((x+ δ,Xa]× (z, x+ δ]) > 0, and we also have γ˜a((z, x+ δ]× (y − δ,Xa)) > 0,
but this is not possible because γ˜a is an optimal transport and, therefore, it is concen-
trated on a c-cyclically monotone set where c(x, y) = ‖x−y‖, see [66]. This concludes
the proof of Eq. (A.17).

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Lemma A.6 Let ν be a non-negative measure in C, and pi1 a mapping be such that
pi1(x, y) = x. Consider any measurable subset K of C and some z ∈ C then the
mappings ν(pi1( · ∩ D) ∩K) and ν(pi1( · ∩ (K × {z}))), defined on the Borel sets of
C × C, belong to M(C × C).
Proof of Lemma A.6. For any Borel set L ⊂ C × C define
τa(L) , ν(pi1(L ∩ D) ∩K) and τb(L) , ν(pi1(L ∩ (K × {z}))).
We show that τa, τb ∈M(C ×C). Note that because ν ∈M(C) for i ∈ {a, b} we have
that τi(∅) = 0, and for any Borel set L ⊆ C × C that τi(L) ∈ [0,∞). To verify σ−










Note that from the definition of D and the fact the set K×{z} has second component
equal to 0, both collections {pi1(Ln ∩ D)}n∈N and {pi1(Ln ∩ (K × {z}))}n∈N form a















Ln ∩ D) ∩K) + ν(pi1(
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n∈N




pi1(Ln ∩ D) ∩K) + ν(
⋃
n∈N




ν(pi1(Ln ∩ D) ∩K) +
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n∈N












A.3 Proofs for Section 1.6
A.3.1 Preliminars
We use m ∈M(C) denotes the Lebesgue measure in C. We use D to denote the subset
of C×C with equal first and second components, that is, D = {(x, y) ∈ C×C : x = y}.
For any measurable set B ⊆ C and a price-equilibrium pair (p, τ) we denote the
platform’s revenue in B under (p, τ) by RevB(p, τ). In case that B is C we simply
use Rev(p, τ).
Proof of Proposition 1.6. Let (p, τ) be any feasible price-equilibrium pair by
Lemma A.7 (which state and prove after this proof) we have V (x|p, τ) ≤ ψ1, Γ almost
everywhere in Cλ = C \ {0}. This yields the following upper bound for the platform’s
objective ∫
Cλ
V (x| p, τ) · sτ (x) dx ≤ ψ1 ·
∫
Cλ
sτ (x) dx ≤ ψ1 · µ1 ·m(C).
The maximum revenue the platform can achieve in this case is bounded above by
γ ·ψ1 ·µ1 ·m(C). Next, we show that the solution given in the statement of the lemma
is feasible and achieves the upper bound.
Flow feasibility. We show that τ ∈ F(µ). A complete definition of the
measure τ is τ(L) = µ(pi1(L∩D). From the definition of τ it is clear that τ ∈M(C).
Furthermore, τ1 coincides with µ and so does τ2. Since µ is the Lebesgue measure
times a constant and Γ is the Lebesgue measure plus an atom, we have τ1, τ2  Γ.
From this we can deduce that m− a.e in Cλ, sτ (x) equals µ1.
Equilibrium utilities. We show that V (x| p, τ) equals ψ1. Note that
U(y, p(y), sτ (y)) = ψ1, Γ− a.e. y in Cλ.
Fix x ∈ C, we have that
Γ({y ∈ C : U(y, p(y), sτ (y))− |y − x| > ψ1}) = 1{0−|0−x|>ψ1}
+ Γ({y ∈ C \ {0} : −|y − x| > 0}) = 0.
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Moreover, for any  > 0
Γ({y ∈ C : U(y, p(y), sτ (y))− |y − x| > ψ1 − }) ≥ Γ({y ∈ Cλ : −|y − x| > }) > 0,
where the last inequality comes from the fact that Γ corresponds to the Lebesgue
measure (plus an atom). That is, V (x| p, τ) equals ψ1.
Equilibrium condition. Consider the equilibrium set
E ,
{










(x, y) ∈ C × Cλ : −|y−x| = 0
})
= µ(C).
We have proven that the solution is the statement is feasible, and because of the
values of V (·|p, τ) and sτ (·) we conclude that this solution achieves the upper bound.

Lemma A.7 Let p be any price mapping and τ a corresponding equilibrium flow.
Then for any measurable set B ⊆ Cλ such that 0 /∈ B and τ(B × Bc) = 0 we have
V (x|p, τ) ≤ ψ1, Γ− a.e. x in B.
Furthermore, in the pre-shock environment we can replace B with Cλ in the inequality
above.
Proof of Lemma A.7. Define the set
L , {x ∈ B : V (x|p, τ) ≤ ψ1}.
We would like to show that Γ(Lc) = 0 where the complement is taken with respect
to B. Suppose this is not the case, and note that
µ1 ·m(Lc) = µ(Lc) = τ(Lc × C) = τ(Lc × B) + τ(Lc × Bc),
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since Lc ⊆ B and τ(B × Bc) = 0, the second term in the expression above is zero.
This yields,
µ1 ·m(Lc) = τ(Lc × B)
= τ(Lc × B ∩ Lc) + τ(Lc × B ∩ L)
= τ(Lc × Lc) + τ(Lc × L)
There are two cases. First, if τ(Lc × L) > 0 then by Lemma A.5 there exists a pair
(x, y) ∈ Lc × L such that y ∈ IR(x|p, τ). Therefore, by Lemma 1.3 we have
V (y|p, τ) = V (x|p, τ) + |x− y|.
However, since (x, y) ∈ Lc × L
V (y|p, τ) ≤ ψ1 and V (x|p, τ) > ψ1.
Using the previous equation we can deduce that ψ1 > ψ1, which is not possible. The
second case is τ(Lc × L) = 0. Note that
τ2(Lc) = τ(C × Lc) ≥ τ(Lc × Lc) = µ1 ·m(Lc).







ψ−1x (V (x| p, τ))dΓ(x) < µ1 · Γ(Lc),
where the first inequality comes from Proposition 1.5, and the second from the fact
that ψx(·) is a strictly decreasing function, the definition of Lc and Γ(Lc) > 0. Note
that this inequality holds in both of the cases in the statement of the lemma. In both
cases we have 0 /∈ B so Γ(Lc) equals m(Lc), yielding
µ1 ·m(Lc) ≤ τ2(Lc) < µ1 · Γ(Lc) = µ1 ·m(Lc).

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A.3.2 Proofs for Section 1.6.2
Proof of Proposition 1.7. The proof of this proposition consists of several
steps. In the first step we establish that the origin is an attraction region, characterize
some properties of it and compute the value of the equilibrium utility function outside
the attraction region. After this step, the drivers utility function will be pinned down
in the entire city as a function of its value in the origin, V (0| p, τ). The second step
supplies us with a full characterization, up to V (0|p, τ), of the post-relocation supply
τ2 in the entire city. Finally, in step three we show how to solve for the optimal value
of V (0| p, τ) and, therefore, we pin down both V (·| p, τ) and τ2. We further show how
to find the optimal p(0) and the corresponding optimal flow τ .
Step 1: We show that we can restrict attention to solutions (p, τ) such that
Xl < 0 < Xr, Xr = V (0) − ψ1 and Xl = −Xr. Furthermore, such solutions have
V (x| p, τ) = ψ1 for all x ∈ C \ [Xl, Xr].
Proof of Step 1: Let (p, τ) be a feasible solution. First, we show that at any
optimal solution we must have Xl < 0 < Xr. By Lemma A.8 (which we state and
prove after the proof of the present proposition) we have that if either of the sets
{x ∈ (0, H] : 0 ∈ IR(x|p, τ)} or {x ∈ [−H, 0) : 0 ∈ IR(x|p, τ)} is empty then the
revenue the platform makes satisfies
1
γ
·Rev(p, τ) ≤ ψ1 · µ1 · 2 ·H.




·Rev(p˜, τ˜) > ψ1 · µ1 · 2 ·H, (A.22)
where p˜ equals ρ1 in C\{0} and p(0) is appropriately chosen. This will imply that any
optimal solution must satisfy {x ∈ (0, H] : 0 ∈ IR(x|p, τ)} 6= ∅ and {x ∈ [−H, 0) :
0 ∈ IR(x|p, τ)} 6= ∅ and, therefore, Xl < 0 < Xr. This also implies that the optimal
revenue in this case is strictly larger than the one in the pre-shock environment.
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Our solution will send flow in [−h, h] to the origin, where h > 0 is to be deter-
mined. Inside this interval, all the flow in the subinterval [−h¯(h), h¯(h)] goes to the
origin where 0 ≤ h¯(h) ≤ h. The rest of the flow in [−h, h] partially stays at its
original position and partially goes to the origin. We now show how to determine
h¯(h) and h. For any given h > 0 we define
h¯(h) , (ψ1 + h− α · ρ1)+,
note that when ψ1 equals α · ρ1 we have that h¯(h) equals h, and we will send all the
flow in [−h, h] to the origin. However, when ψ1 < α · ρ1 not all the flow will be sent
to the origin. Define
µ1(x) , α · ρ1 · λ1F (ρ1)




≤ 1, x ∈ [−h, h] \ [−h¯(h), h¯(h)].
The idea is that for every location x ∈ K(h) , [−h, h] \ [−h¯(h), h¯(h)] we will leave
a density µ1(x) of flow there and send µ1 − µ1(x) (note that this difference is non-
negative) to the origin. In order to make this possible, we need to chose h appropri-
ately. Observe that the total supply we will send to the origin is
ST (h) = 2h¯(h)µ1 + 2
∫ h
h¯(h)
(µ1 − µ1(x)) dm(x),
where limh→0 ST (h) = 0. Hence, since ψ1 < α ·V , we can always find h > 0 such that




















if x = 0
ρ1 if x ∈ C \ {0},
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and flows for any measurable set L ⊆ C × C defined by
τ˜(L) = µ(pi1(L ∩ D) ∩ [−h, h]c) + µ(pi1(L ∩ [−h¯(h), h¯(h)]× {0}))
+G0(pi1(L ∩K(h)× {0})) +G1(pi1(L ∩ D) ∩K(h)),








We argue that (p˜, τ˜) is a feasible solution that complies with Eq. (A.22). From
Lemma A.6 we have that τ˜ ∈M(C ×C), also note that for any measurable set B ⊆ C
the first marginal of τ˜ satisfies
τ˜1(B) = µ(B∩ [−h, h]c)+µ(B∩ [−h¯(h), h¯(h)])+G0(B∩K(h))+G1(B∩K(h)) = µ(B).
The post-relocation supply measure is
τ˜2(B) = µ(B ∩ [−h, h]c) + ST (h) · 1{0∈B} +G1(B ∩K(h)),
clearly τ˜2  Γ. Therefore, τ˜ ∈ F(µ). Next, we need to show that τ˜ is a supply




ST (h) if x = 0
0 if x ∈ [−h¯(h), h¯(h)] \ {0}
µ1(x) if x ∈ K(h)
µ1 if x ∈ [−h, h]c.
Indeed,∫
L




















ψ1 + h if y = 0;
α · ρ1 if y ∈ [−h¯(h), h¯(h)] \ {0};
α · ρ1 · λ1F (ρ1)µ1(x) if y ∈ K(h);
ψ1 if y ∈ [−h, h]c.
Let a(x) be defined by
a(x) ,

ψ1 + h− |x| if x ∈ [−h, h],
ψ1 if x ∈ [−h, h]c.
We argue that V (·|p˜, τ˜) ≡ a(·). Fix x ∈ C, it is not hard to verify that
Γ(y ∈ C : U˜(y)− |y − x| > a(x)) = 0,
and, thus, a(x) ≥ V (x| p˜, τ˜). Suppose that x ∈ [−h, h] and a(x) > V (x| p˜, τ˜) then,
because Γ({0}) > 0, we have that
ψ1 + h− |x| = a(x) > V (x| p˜, τ˜) ≥ Π(x, 0) = ψ1 + h− |0− x|,
a contradiction. Thus, for x ∈ [−h, h] we have a(x) = V (x|p˜, τ˜). For any other x we
can use a similar argument to conclude that a(x) = V (x|p˜, τ˜).
Now we are ready to verify the equilibrium condition. Observe that
E =
{
(x, y) ∈ C × C : Π(x, y) = V (x|p˜, τ˜)
)}
= ([−h, h]× {0}) ∪ ([−h, h]c × [−h, h]c ∩ D) ∪ (K(h)×K(h) ∩ D),
then
τ˜(E) = µ(pi1(E ∩ D) ∩ [−h, h]c) + µ(pi1(E ∩ [−h¯(h), h¯(h)]× {0}))
+G1(pi1(E ∩ D) ∩K(h)) +G0(pi1(E ∩K(h)× {0}))
= µ([−h, h]c) + µ([−h¯(h), h¯(h)]) +G1(K(h)) +G0(K(h))
= µ(C).
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This proves that τ˜ is an equilibrium. Next we need to show (p˜, τ˜) satisfies Eq. (A.22).




V (x) · dτ˜2
dΓ
(x)dΓ(x)
= (ψ1 + h) · ST (h) + 2
∫ h
h¯(h)
(ψ1 + h− x)µ1(x) dm(x) + ψ1 · µ1 · 2(H − h)
≥ h · ST (h) + ψ1
(





+ ψ1 · µ1 · 2(H − h)










+ ψ1 · µ1 · 2(H − h)
= h · ST (h) + ψ1 · µ1 · 2 ·H.
Since h ·ST (h) > 0, Eq. (A.22) obtains. This proves that Xl < 0 < Xr in any optimal
solution.
The next step of the proof of Step 1 consists on arguing that given V (0), Xr =
V (0) − ψ1 and Xl = −(V (0) − ψ1). Consider a feasible solution (p, τ) where p(·)
equals ρ1 everywhere but at the origin, and Xl < 0 < Xr. From Proposition 1.3 and
the fact that µ({Xr}) = 0 we have that
τ([Xr, H]× [Xr, H]c) ≤ µ({Xr}) + τ((Xr, H]× [Xr, H]c) = 0.
Then by Lemma A.7 we have that V (x) ≤ ψ1, Γ− a.e. x in [Xr, H]. This, together
with the continuity of V (·) imply that V (x) ≤ ψ1 for all x ∈ [Xr, H].
Suppose first that Xr < V (0)− ψ1 then
V (Xr| p, τ) = V (0)−Xr > ψ1,
but this violates the continuity of V to the right of Xr. Thus Xr ≥ V (0)−ψ1. On the
other hand, supposeXr > V (0)−ψ1 then we must have that ψ1 > V (x|p, τ) = V (0)−x
for all x ∈ (V (0)− ψ1, Xr]. Observe that
µ([V (0)− ψ1, Xr]) ≥ τ2([V (0)− ψ1, Xr]) =
∫
[V (0)−ψ1,Xr]
sτ (x) dΓ(x). (A.24)
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Define the set
K , {y ∈ [V (0)− ψ1, Xr] : sτ (y) ≤ µ1},
it must be that Γ(K) = 0; otherwise, from the definition of V (Xr| p, τ) we have
V (0)−Xr = V (Xr) ≥ U(y, ρ1, sτ (y))− |y −Xr|, Γ− a.e. y in K
≥ U(y, ρ1, µ1)− |y −Xr|, Γ− a.e. y in K
= ψ1 − (Xr − y), Γ− a.e. y in K,
and Γ(K) > 0 implies that V (0) − y ≥ ψ1 for some y ∈ (V (0) − ψ1, Xr]. However,
we know that ψ1 > V (0) − y for y ∈ (V (0) − ψ1, Xr] and, therefore, we must have
Γ(K) = 0. Using this in Eq. (A.24) yields
µ([V (0)− ψ1, Xr]) > µ1 · Γ([V (0)− ψ1, Xr]) = µ([V (0)− ψ1, Xr]),
which is not possible. Hence, Xr = V (0)−ψ1 and the same arguments applies to Xl,
yielding Xl = −(V (0)− ψ1).
In order to conclude the proof for Step 1 we show that we can restrict attention
to solutions (p, τ) such that V (x| p, τ) equals ψ1 for all x ∈ [Xl, Xr]c. In turn, this
will show that sτ (x) equals µ1, Γ − a.e. x in [Xl, Xr]c. We base the proof of the
latter statements in Lemma A.9 (which we state and prove after the proof of the
present result), this lemma enables us to separate the city into two regions [Xl, Xr]
and [Xl, Xr]
c. For each region we can modify the prices and equilibria, and then paste
them together to obtain a new solution that is an equilibrium for the entire city.
Consider a feasible solution (p, τ) such that Xl < 0 < Xr, Xr = V (0) − ψ1 and
Xl = −Xr. Since τ([Xl, Xr]× [Xl, Xr]c) = 0 and 0 /∈ [Xl, Xr]c, Lemma A.7 delivers
1
γ
·Rev(p, τ) ≤ 1
γ
·Rev[Xl,Xr](p, τ) + 2 · µ1 · ψ1 · (H −Xr). (A.25)
We show that we can always modify (p, τ) so that the previous upper bound is achieve.
Let B = [Xl, Xr], since τ(B × Bc) = 0 and τ(Bc × B) = 0, Lemma A.9 ensures that
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(p, τ)|B is a price equilibrium pair in B. Such equilibrium satisfies VB(x) = ψ1 for
x ∈ ∂B.
Now, we choose prices pB
c
(x) equal to ρ1 for all x ∈ Bc and a flow τBc defines by
for any measurable set L1 × L2 ⊆ Bc × Bc
τB
c
(L1 × L2) = µ(L1 ∩ L2).





) forms a price-equilibrium pair in Bc. This solution satisfy that
VBc(x) = ψ1 for x ∈ Bc, and that sτB
c
(x) equals µ1, Γ− a.e. x in Bc.
Lemma A.9 enables us to paste the solutions (p, τ)|B and (pBc , τBc), and generate
a new solution in the entire city. Such solution preserve the prices and flows in both
B and Bc and, therefore, the upper bound in Eq. (A.25) is achieved. In conclusion,
we can restrict attention to solutions (p, τ) such that V (x| p, τ) equals ψ1 for all
x ∈ [Xl, Xr]c, and that sτ (x) equals µ1, Γ− a.e. x in [Xl, Xr]c.
Step 2: We characterize sτ (·) (this completely characterizes τ2). Let
X0r = (V (0)− α · ρ1))+ and X0l = −X0r ,
and
µ1(y) , α · ρ1 · λ1 · F (ρ1)






In this step we show that (Γ− a.e)
sτ (y) =

ST if y = 0
0 if y ∈ [X0l , X0r ] \ {0}
µ1(y) if y ∈ [Xl, Xr] \ [X0l , X0r ]
µ1 if y ∈ [Xl, Xr]c.
Proof of Step 2: Note that at the end of the previous step we showed the result
for y ∈ [Xl, Xr]c. So first we show
sτ (y) = 0, Γ− a.e. x in [X0l , X0r ] \ {0}.
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Define the set K1 , {y ∈ [X0l , X0r ] \ {0} : sτ (y) > 0}. We argue that Γ(K1) = 0. If




sτ (x) dΓ(x) > 0.






= V (x| p, τ) τ2 − a.e. x ∈ K1, (A.26)
but for x ∈ K1 ⊆ [X0l , X0r ] \ {0} we have V (x| p, τ) = V (0) − |x| and V (0) − |x| ≥
α · ρ1. Then Eq. (A.26) implies the existence of x ∈ (X0l , X0r ) \ {0} such that





≤ α · ρ1, yielding a contradiction. Next we show that
sτ (y) = µ1(y), Γ− a.e. y in [Xl, Xr] \ [X0l , X0r ].






= V (x) = V (0)− |x|, Γ− a.e. x in [Xl, Xr] \ [X0l , X0r ], (A.27)
but for any x ∈ [Xl, Xr]\[X0l , X0r ] the definition of X0l and X0r imply that V (0)−|x| <






λ1 · F (ρ1)/sτ (x) < 1, Γ− a.e. x in [Xl, Xr] \ [X0l , X0r ].






sτ (x) = α · ρ1 · F (ρ1)





as needed. Next we compute sτ (0),
sτ (0) · Γ({0}) =
∫
{0}
sτ (x) dΓ = τ2({0})
= τ(C × {0})
= τ([Xl, Xr]× {0})
= τ([X0l , X
0
r ]× {0})︸ ︷︷ ︸
(1)




for (1) we have
τ([X0l , X
0
r ]× {0}) = µ([X0l , X0r ])− τ([X0l , X0r ]× C \ {0})
= 2µ1 ·X0r − τ([X0l , X0r ]× [X0l , X0r ] \ {0})
(a)
= 2µ1 ·X0r ,
in (a) we use sτ (x) = 0, Γ− a.e. x in [X0l , X0r ] \ {0}. For (2) we have
τ([Xl, Xr] \ [X0l , X0r ]× {0}) = µ([Xl, Xr] \ [X0l , X0r ])
− τ([Xl, Xr] \ [X0l , X0r ]× [Xl, Xr] \ {0})
= 2µ1 · (Xr −X0r )
− τ([Xl, Xr] \ [X0l , X0r ]× [X0l , X0r ] \ {0})
− τ([Xl, Xr] \ [X0l , X0r ]× [Xl, Xr] \ [X0l , X0r ])
= 2µ1 · (Xr −X0r )− 0− τ2([Xl, Xr] \ [X0l , X0r ])




from this we conclude that
sτ (0) = 2 · µ1 ·X0r + 2
∫ Xr
X0r
(µ1 − µ1(x)) dx.
Step 3: Now we can provide a full solution for the optimization problem. Recall
that we are only optimizing over p(0) or, equivalently, over V (0). By our congestion
bound (see Proposition 1.5), any solution has to satisfy V (0|p, τ) ≤ ψ0(sτ (0)). More-
over, Step 2 characterizes the supply-demand ratio at every location as a function




V (0) · ST + 2 · ψ1 · µ1 · (H −X0r ) (Ploc−reac)






(µ1 − µ1(x))dx, ψ1 < V (0) ≤ ψ0(ST ).
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We show that the optimal V ?(0) in (Ploc−reac) is the unique solution to
V ?(0) = ψ0(ST (V
?(0))).
The optimal solution to the platform’s problem set price at the origin p?(0) =
ρloc0 (ST (V
?(0))) such that p?(0) ≥ ρ1, and flows for any measurable set B ⊂ C × C
given by
τ(B) = µ(pi1(B ∩ D) ∩ [Xl, Xr]c) + µ(pi1(B ∩ [X0l , X0r ]× {0}))
+G1(pi1(B ∩ D) ∩ [Xl, Xr] \ [X0l , X0r ]) +G0(pi1(B ∩ [Xl, Xr] \ [X0l , X0r ]× {0})),








Proof of Step 3: The proof consists of two parts. First, we show that V ?(0) as
stated above is an optimal solution for (Ploc−reac). To do this we prove that ST (V (0))
is increasing for V (0) > ψ1, with ST (ψ1) = 0. This implies that ψ0(ST (V (0))) is
decreasing and, therefore, it crosses with V (0) at only one point. Then, we show
the objective function increases with V (0). These two facts imply the optimality of
V ?(0). Second, we show that (p, τ) with p(0) = p?(0) (and equal to ρ1 for x 6= 0)
and and τ as stated above, are a feasible price-equilibrium pair that achieve the same
revenue than the optimal solution of (Ploc−reac). Since this problem is a relaxation
to our original optimization problem we have optimality.
We begin with the first part. Note that
ST (V (0)) = 2µ1 · (V (0)− ψ1) + 2ψ1 · µ1 · log
( ψ1
V (0)− (V (0)− αρ1)+
)
.
From this it follows that ST (ψ1) = 0. If V (0) ≥ αρ1 then ST (V (0)) is clearly in-
creasing. If V (0) ∈ (ψ1, αρ1) then the derivative of ST (V (0)) with respect to V (0)
equals








which is nonnegative if and only if V (0) ≥ ψ1. Since this is in our domain, we conclude
that ST (·) is increasing in (ψ1, αρ1) and, therefore, is increasing for all V (0) > ψ1.
Next, we show the objective is increasing in V (0), the objective function is
V (0) · ST (V (0)) + 2 · ψ1 · µ1 · (H − (V (0)− αρ1)+),
when V (0) ≥ α · ρ1, the objective becomes




+ 2 · ψ1 · µ1 · (H − V (0) + αρ1).







, but from V (0) ≥ α·ρ1
and that the logarithm is a concave function the latter inequality is always true.
Similarly, for V (0) ∈ (ψ1, α · ρ1) the objective’s derivative is non-negative if and only
if 2V (0)
ψ1





, which, since V (0) > ψ1, is always true. Observe that in
both cases the inequalities for the sign of the objective’s derivative is strict except
when V (0) = ψ1. Thus, the objective is strictly increasing in the domain.
For the second part we need to show that (p, τ) with p(0) = p?(0) (and equal to ρ1
for x 6= 0) and and τ , implement the solution of (Ploc−reac). To do this we first need
to argue that this solution is feasible. It can be easily seen that this flow yields the
exact same flows as in Step 2, only this time we replace V ?(0) in all the quantities
that depend on V (0). Given the value of sτ and the fact that under p?(0) we have
U(0, p(0), sτ (0)) = V (0| p, τ) = V ?(0), we can do the same as we did in Step 1(to
show that τ˜ is an equilibrium) and show that τ is an equilibrium. Since we have
pinned the value of V (0| p, τ) (and thus the value of V (| p, τ) in the entire city) and
the value of sτ (·), it is easy to see (using Proposition 1.1) that 1
γ
·Rev(p, τ) coincides
with the optimal value of (Ploc−reac). Therefore, (p, τ) is the optimal solution.
To conclude we argue that p?(0) ≥ ρ1. There are two cases. If µ1 ≤ λ1 · F (ρ1)
then ψ1 equals α ·ρ1. Since V ?(0) > ψ and V ?(0) = ψ0(ST (V ?(0))) we have have that
α · ρ1 = ψ1 < V ?(0) = ψ0(ST (V ?(0))) ≤ α · ρloc0 (ST (V ?(0))) = α · p?(0),
201
that is, ρ1 < p
?(0). The second case is µ1 > λ1 · F (ρ1). Here ρ1 equals ρu and, since
ρloc0 (ST (V
?(0))) equals max{ρbal0 , ρu}, we have that ρ1 ≤ p?(0).

Lemma A.8 Let (p, τ) be a feasible price-equilibrium pair for either the local price
response environment (Section 1.6.2) or the global price response environment (Sec-
tion 1.6.3). If either {x ∈ (0, H] : 0 ∈ IR(x|p, τ)} = ∅ or {x ∈ [−H, 0) : 0 ∈
IR(x|p, τ)} = ∅, then the platform’s objective satisfies
γ ·Rev(p, τ) ≤ ψ1 · µ1 · 2 ·H.
Proof of Lemma A.8. WLOG let us just assume that {x ∈ (0, H] : 0 ∈
IR(x|p, τ)} = ∅. That is, for all x ∈ (0, H] we have 0 /∈ IR(x|p, τ). In turn,
this implies that τ((0, H]× [−H, 0]) = 0 and, therefore, by Lemma A.7 we conclude
that
V (x|p, τ) ≤ ψ1 Γ− a.e. in (0, H],
which, from the continuity of V (·|p, τ), implies that V (x|p, τ) ≤ ψ1 for all x ∈ [0, H].
Now, we show that the same bound holds for x ∈ [−H, 0). If τ([−H, 0)× B) = 0 for
any B ⊂ [0, H], we can use Lemma A.7 to obtain the upper bound. On the other
hand, if there exists B ⊂ [0, H] such that τ([−H, 0)×B) > 0 then by Lemma A.5 we
know there exists a pair (x, y) ∈ [−H, 0)×B for which y ∈ IR(x| p, τ). Thus, we can
define
x = inf{z ∈ [−H, 0) : y ∈ IR(z| p, τ)},
and by Proposition 1.3, y ∈ IR(x| p, τ). Also, from Lemma 1.3 we have
V (z|p, τ) = V (x|p, τ) + z − x, ∀ z ∈ [x, y].
This implies V (z|p, τ) ≤ V (y|p, τ) for all z ∈ [x, y], and because y ∈ B ⊂ [0, H] we
have V (y|p, τ) ≤ ψ1, yielding V (z|p, τ) ≤ ψ1 for all z ∈ [x, y]. Furthermore, from
Lemma A.5 and the definition of x we can conclude that τ([−H, x] × (x,H]) = 0
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which together with Lemma A.7 and the continuity of V imply that V (x|p, τ) ≤ ψ1
for all x ∈ [−H, x]. Completing the argument for the upper bound.






V (x)sτ (x) dΓ(x) ≤ ψ1 ·
∫
C
sτ (x) dΓ(x) = ψ1 · µ1 · 2 ·H.

Lemma A.9 (Equilibria Separation and Pasting) Consider a set B ⊂ C such that
both B and Bc are intervals or union of intervals with Γ(∂B) = 0.
1. (Separation) Let (p, τ) be a price-equilibrium in C, if τ(B×Bc) = 0 and τ(Bc×B) =
0 then (p|B, τ |B×B) and (p|Bc , τ |Bc×Bc) are price-equilibrium pairs in B and Bc, re-
spectively. Moreover, V (·|p|B, τ |B×B) equals V (·|p|Bc , τ |Bc×Bc) in ∂B, V (·|p|B, τ |B×B)
coincides with V (·| p, τ)|B and the same holds for Bc.





and Bc such that τB ∈ FB(µ|B) and τBc ∈ FBc(µ|Bc), respectively. If V (·| pB, τB)
equals V (·| pBc , τBc) in ∂B then the flow τ defined by for any measurable set L ⊆
C × C
τ(L) = τB(L ∩ B × B) + τBc(L ∩ Bc × Bc),
belongs to F(µ) and is an equilibrium in C for a price p equal to pB in B and equal to
pB
c
in Bc. Moreover, V (x|p, τ) = V (x| pB, τB) in B and V (x|p, τ) = V (x| pBc , τBc)
in Bc.
Proof of Lemma A.9. Separation. Suppose that τ(B × Bc) = 0 and τ(Bc ×
B) = 0. Let τB = τ |B×B and pB = p|B, we show that (pB, τB) is a price-equilibrium
pair. The proof for (p|Bc , τ |Bc×Bc) is analogous and, thus, omitted. We need to prove
that τB ∈ FB(µB), where µB coincides with µ|B, and that the set
E|B ,
{












satisfies τB(E|B) = µ|B(B).
First we verify that τB ∈ FB(µB). Since τB is the restriction of τ to B × B it
clearly belongs to M(B × B). Also, for any L1 measurable subset of B we have that
τB1 (L1) equals
τB(L1 × B) = τ((L1 × B) ∩ (B × B)) = τ(L1 × B) = τ(L1 × C) = τ1(L1) = µ(L1).
Thus, τB1 = µ|B. Now we need to prove that τB2  Γ|B. Observe that for any L2
measurable subset of B we have that τB2 (L2) equals
τB(B × L2) = τ((B × L2) ∩ (B × B)) = τ(B × L2) = τ(C × L2) = τ2(L2),
that is, τB2 = τ2|B. Therefore, since τ2  Γ, we have that τB2  Γ|B. In turn, τB ∈ FB.
Now we show τB(E|B) = µ|B(B). It suffices to prove that τB(E|cB) = 0 where the
complement is taken with respect to B × B, we do this by contradiction. Assume
that τB(E|cB) > 0, this implies that 0 < τB(E|cB) = τ(E|cB), and we must have that
τ2(B) > 0, indeed
0 < τ(E|cB) ≤ τ(C × B) = τ2(B).
Next, observe that for any L2 measurable subset of B
τB2 (L2) = τ2(L2) =
∫
L2






dΓ|B (x) = s
τ (x), Γ− a.e. x in B. (A.28)
This implies that
V (x|pB, τB) = ess sup
B













Consider the set G , {y ∈ B : dτB2
dΓ|B (y) = s
τ (y)}. Then, by Eq. (A.28) we have
τ(E|cB ∩ (B × Gc)) ≤ τ(C × Gc) = τ2(Gc) = 0,
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where the complement is take with respect to B. Therefore, 0 < τ(E|cB) = τ(E|cB ∩
(B × G)) and we can conclude that
τ
(
{(x, y) ∈ B × B : Π(x, y, p(y), dτ2
dΓ




Define the sets R− and R+ by
R− = {(x, y) ∈ B × B : Π(x, y, p(y), dτ2
dΓ
(y)) > VB(x|p, τ)}
R+ = {(x, y) ∈ B × B : Π(x, y, p(y), dτ2
dΓ
(y)) < VB(x|p, τ)},
and note that R = R−∪R+. To obtain a contradiction we argue that τ(R−∪R+) = 0.
Consider first the set R+, and note that τ(R+) = τ(R+ ∩ E). However, any (x, y) ∈




(y)) < VB(x|p, τ) and Π(x, y, (p(y), dτ2
dΓ
(y)) = V (x|p, τ),
but V (x) ≥ VB(x) implies that R+ ∩ E = ∅ and, therefore, τ(R+) = 0.
Consider R−. Define A , {y ∈ B : U(y) = VB(y|p, τ)}, then by Lemma A.2 we
have τ(R−) = τ(R− ∩ (B × A)). Take any (x, y) ∈ R− ∩ (B × A) then VB(y|p, τ) −
|y− x| > VB(x|p, τ), which, because of the Lipchitz property (see Lemma 1.1), is not
possible. Thus, R− ∩ (B×A)) = ∅ and we have that τ(R−) = 0. This proves that τB
is an equilibrium in B.
Now we show that V (x|pB, τB) = V (x|pBc , τBc) for all x ∈ ∂B. From equation
(A.29) we have
V (x|pB, τB) = VB(x|p, τ) and V (x|pBc , τBc) = VBc(x|p, τ),
so we just need to show VB(x|p, τ) equals VBc(x|p, τ) for all x ∈ ∂B. We first show
that VB(x|p, τ) = V (x|p, τ) for all x ∈ B. Let x ∈ B, since B is an interval or a union
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of intervals we must have µ(B(x, 1
n








) ∩ B × Bo) + τ(B(x, 1
n




) ∩ B × Bo),
where the third line comes from τ2  Γ and Γ(∂B) = 0. Thus, from Lemma A.5
there exists (zn, yn) ∈ B(x, 1n) ∩ B × Bo such that yn ∈ IR(zn| p, τ). Then,
∀n ∈ N, ∃ δ(n) > 0 such that ∀δ ≤ δ(n) 1
n
+ VB(yn,δ)(zn) ≥ V (zn). (A.30)
Note that since yn ∈ Bo we can always find δ0 such that B(yn, δ) ⊆ B for all δ ≤ δ0.
So we can consider δ ≤ min{δ0, δ(n)} in Eq. (A.30). Using that zn ∈ B(x, 1n) and




and V (zn)− V (x) ≥ − 1
n
,
plugging this into Eq. (A.30) yields
∀n ∈ N, ∃ δ(n) > 0 such that ∀δ ≤ min{δ0, δ(n)} 3
n
+ VB(yn,δ)(x) ≥ V (x).
Since B(yn, δ) ⊆ B we have VB(x) ≥ VB(yn,δ)(x) thus the former expression implies
that VB(x) ≥ V (x). But we always have that V (x) ≥ VB(x) and, therefore, V (x) =
VB(x). The same argument shows that V (x) = VBc(x) for all x ∈ Bc.
To conclude we need to prove that VB(x|p, τ) equals VBc(x|p, τ) for all x ∈ ∂B.
Consider x ∈ ∂B. Let {xn}n∈N ⊂ B be a sequence converging to x. Then the
continuity of VB implies VB(xn) → VB(x). At the same time, since xn ∈ B we have
VB(xn) = V (xn) and by continuity V (xn)→ V (x). Then VB(x) = V (x) and the same
is true for Bc, which implies VB(x|p, τ) = VBc(x|p, τ) for all x ∈ ∂B.
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Pasting. First we check that τ ∈ F(µ). Let L1 be any measurable subset of C
we have that
τ1(L1) = τ(L1 × C)
= τB((L1 × C) ∩ (B × B)) + τBc((L1 × C) ∩ (Bc × Bc))
= τB((L1 ∩ B)× B) + τBc((L1 ∩ Bc)× Bc)
= µ|B(L1 ∩ B) + µ|Bc(L1 ∩ Bc)
= µ(L1).
Also, if Γ(L1) = 0 then Γ|B(L1) = Γ|Bc(L1) = 0. Therefore, τB2 (L1) = τBc2 (L1) = 0,
which in turn implies τ2  Γ. Hence τ ∈ F(µ).
Now we show the set
E ,
{
(x, y) ∈ C × C : Π(x, y, p(y), sτ (y)) = ess sup
C
Π(x, ·, p(·), sτ (·)
)}
,
satisfies τ(E) = µ(C). Note that
E ∩ B × B =
{
(x, y) ∈ B × B : Π(x, y, p(y), sτ (y)) = V (x|p, τ)
}
.
It is enough to prove that τB(E ∩ B × B) = µ(B). As we did in the first part of the
proof (see Eq. (A.28)) we can show that
dτB2
dΓ|B (x) = s
τ (x), Γ− a.e. x in B,
so if we prove that V (·|p, τ)|B ≡ V (·|pB, τB) we will be done (the proof for Bc is
analogous). Fix x ∈ B, as in Eq. (A.29) we have
V (x|pB, τB) = ess sup
B












So we just need to verify that V (x|p, τ) = VB(x|p, τ). We show that V (x|p, τ) ≤
VB(x|p, τ), the other inequality always holds. Let I(x) be the interval in B to which
x belongs to. Let yL = inf I(x) and yU = sup I(x), note that yL and yU do not
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necessarily belong to B but they do belong to ∂B. By assumption V (y| pB, τB) =
V (y| pBc , τBc) for y ∈ {yL, yU}, in turn this implies that VB(y|p, τ) equals VBc(y|p, τ)
for y ∈ {yL, yU}. Consider the sets BcL = [H, yL] ∩ Bc and BcU = [yU , H] ∩ Bc then
VB(x|p, τ)
(a)
≥ VB(yU |p, τ)− |x− yU |
= VB(yU |p, τ)− (yU − x)
(b)
≥ U(w, sτ (w))− |yU − w| − (yU − x), Γ− a.e. w in BcU
(c)
≥ U(w, sτ (w))− (w − yU)− (yU − x), Γ− a.e. w in BcU
(d)
≥ U(w, sτ (w))− |w − x|, Γ− a.e. w in BcU ,
where (a) follows from the Lipschitz property (see Lemma 1.1), and (b) from the
definition of VB(yU |p, τ) and Γ(BcU) > 0; (c), (d) hold because for w ∈ BcU we have
x ≤ yU ≤ w. Similarly,
VB(x|p, τ) ≥ VB(yL|p, τ)− |x− yL|
= VB(yL|p, τ)− (x− yL)
≥ U(w, sτ (w))− |yL − w| − (x− yL), Γ− a.e. w in BcL
= U(w, sτ (w))− (yL − w)− (x− yL), Γ− a.e. w in BcL
= U(w, sτ (w))− |w − x|, Γ− a.e. w in BcL.
Since BcL ∪ BcU = Bc this implies that VB(x|p, τ) ≥ V (x|p, τ). This concludes the
proof.

A.3.3 Proofs for Section 1.6.3
Proof of Lemma 1.5. Let (p, τ) be a feasible solution. We show that at any
optimal solution we must have Xl < 0 < Xr, in turn this implies that 0 is a sink loca-
tion. By Lemma A.8 we have that if either of the sets {x ∈ (0, H] : 0 ∈ IR(x|p, τ)}
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or {x ∈ [−H, 0) : 0 ∈ IR(x|p, τ)} is empty then the revenue the platform makes
satisfies 1
γ
·Rev(p, τ) ≤ ψ1 · µ1 · 2 ·H. However, the solution (p, τ) given in Proposi-
tion 1.7 has both sets non-empty because 0 ∈ IR(Xr| p, τ) and 0 ∈ IR(−Xr| p, τ)
with Xr > 0. Furthermore, Rev(p, τ) is strictly large than the revenue of the pre-
demand shock environment or, equivalently, strictly larger than ψ1 · µ1 · 2 ·H. This
implies that any optimal solution must satisfy {x ∈ (0, H] : 0 ∈ IR(x|p, τ)} 6= ∅ and
{x ∈ [−H, 0) : 0 ∈ IR(x|p, τ)} 6= ∅ and, therefore, Xl < 0 < Xr.

Proof of Lemma 1.6. If Xr = H there is nothing to prove, so let’s assume
Xr < H. Fix x ∈ [Xr, H]. From the Lipschitz property (see Lemma 1.1) we have
that V (x| p, τ) ≤ V (Xr| p, τ) + (x − Xr). Moreover, Proposition 1.3 ensures that
τ([Xr, H]× [Xr, H]c) = 0 and, hence, because 0 /∈ [Xr, H] we can apply Lemma A.7
to deduce that
V (x|p, τ) ≤ ψ1, Γ− a.e. x in [Xr, H]. (A.31)
To show that the previous inequality holds everywhere, notice that if V (x| p, τ) > ψ1
the from the Lipschitz continuity property of V (·| p, τ) we could find a subset of of
[Xr, H] with positive Γ measure (in this set Γ coincides with the Lebesgue measure)
in which V (·| p, τ) is strictly larger than ψ1. This is not possible because it would
contradict Eq. (A.31). Putting together both upper bounds yields the desire result.

Proof of Proposition 1.8. Let (p, τ) be optimal for problem (P2) as in Lemma
1.5 so we have 0 < Xr. Note that is Xr = H then the result trivially holds, so let’s
assume Xr < H. Before we begin note that for any x ≥ Xr, by Lemma 1.6 and the
Lipschitz continuity property of V (·|p, τ) (see Lemma 1.1), we must have V (x) ≤ ψ1.
We first prove the second statement of the proposition. Suppose V (Xr) = ψ1
and define the set R , {x ∈ [Xr, H] : V (x) = ψ1}. We show by contradiction that
we cannot have τ2(R
c) > 0 (the complement is taken with respect to [Xr, H]). If
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τ2(R





















≤ ψ1 · τ2([Xr, H])
= ψ1 · µ1 · (H −Xr),
where the last line comes Proposition 1.3. Thus, the quantity Rev[−H,Xr](p, τ) +
γ · ψ1 · µ1 · (H − Xr), strictly upper bounds the platform’s objective. So if we are
able to construct a solution such that attains the upper bound, we will contradict
the optimality of (p, τ). Observe that Lemma A.9 enables us to separate the solu-
tion (p, τ) in [−H,Xr] and (Xr, H]. The separated solution (p[−H,Xr], τ [−H,Xr]) (see
Lemma A.9 for notation) in [−H,Xr] has revenue equal to Rev[−H,Xr](p, τ), and
V (Xr| p[−H,Xr], τ [−H,Xr]) coincides with V (Xr| p, τ) which equals ψ1. For (Xr, H] con-
sider prices p˜(x) = ρ1 for all x ∈ (Xr, H]c, and flows τ˜(L) = µ(pi1(L ∩ D)) for any
measurable set L ⊂ (Xr, H] × (Xr, H]. The pair (p˜, τ˜) is the same solution as in
Proposition 1.6 with the sole difference that we have changed the city to be (Xr, H]
instead of C. Therefore, (p˜, τ˜) is a feasible price-equilibrium in (Xr, H] with revenue
equal to γ ·ψ1 ·µ1 · (H −Xr), and such that V (x| p˜, τ˜) equal to ψ1 for all x ∈ (Xr, H].
Thus we can use Lemma A.9 to paste both solution and obtain an equilibrium in the
entire city. This new equilibrium achieves the upper bound.
Suppose that τ2(R
c) = 0 and define the sets
L+ , {x : µ1 > sτ (x)}, L0 , {x : µ1 = sτ (x)}, L− , {x : µ1 < sτ (x)}.
Then by Lemma 1.5 it holds that Γ(R ∩ L−) = 0. Moreover, if Γ(R ∩ L+) > 0 we
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have









< µ1Γ(R) ≤ µ([Xr, H]),
not possible, where (a) comes from Proposition 1.3. Thus Γ(R ∩ L+) = 0. This
implies that Γ(R ∩ L0) = Γ(R) and
µ1Γ([Xr, H]) = µ([Xr, H]) =
∫
R∩L0
sτ (x) dΓ(x) = µ1Γ(R),
that is, Γ(R) = Γ([Xr, H]) or Γ(R
c) = 0. In turn, Γ− a.e. x ∈ [Xr, H] we have that
V (x) equals ψ1. Since, V (·) is continuous and Γ|[Xr,H] has full support in [Xr, H]
which has non-empty interior we conclude that V (x) = ψ1 for all x ∈ [Xr, H].
For the reminder of the proof we assume V (Xr) < ψ1. We show that if V (·) is not
non-decreasing in [Xr, H] then there is an strict objective improvement. In the proof
we define several critical points in the interval [Xr, H] which will help us to create a
flow separated region (no flow leaves this region). Then we show the objective strict
improvement in this region. In Figure A.1 we provide a graphical representation of
the points just mentioned.
So assume that V (x) is not non-decreasing in [Xr, H], then there exists xˆ > yˆ ≥ Xr
such that V (xˆ) < V (yˆ). Let,
y¯ , sup{z ∈ [yˆ, xˆ] : V (z) = V (yˆ)},
note that since for z = yˆ, V (z) = V (yˆ) thus the set over which we take the supremum
above is both bounded and non-empty. Hence, y¯ is well defined and it corresponds
to the last point z in [yˆ, xˆ] such that V (z) equals V (yˆ). Moreover, because V (·) is
continuous y¯ < xˆ, and for all z ∈ (y¯, xˆ] we have V (z) < V (yˆ) = V (y¯). Let
y0 , inf{z ∈ [Xr, y¯] : ∃x ∈ (y¯, H] such that z ∈ IR(x)},
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if for all z ∈ [Xr, y¯] and for all x ∈ (y¯, H] we have z /∈ IR(x), we let y0 = y¯. That is,
y0 is the smallest z in [Xr, y¯] to which some location in (y¯, H] is indifferent to travel
to. Note that for all z ∈ (y0, xˆ] we have V (z) < V (y0). Also, the definition of y0 and
Lemma A.5 imply that τ([−H, y0]× (y0, H]) = 0 and τ((y0, H]× [−H, y0]) = 0. Let
y1 , inf{z ∈ [xˆ, H] : V (z) > V (y0)},
that is, y1 is the first value after xˆ for which V (·) hits V (y0). Note that when well
defined y1 satisfies that τ([y1, H] × [−H, y1]) = 0. If this is not the case then since
atoms do not have measure we would have τ((y1, H]× [−H, y1)) > 0 and, therefore,
by Lemma A.5 we can find (x, y) ∈ (y1, H] × [−H, y1) such that y ∈ IR(x). Then
Lemma 1.3 would contradict the minimality of y1.




V (·) < V (yˆ)
No flow crossing this point
No flow crossing this point
towards Xr
Figure A.1: Graphical representation of yˆ, xˆ, y¯, y0 and y1.
There are two cases:
1. y1 is not well defined: In this case we have that for all z ∈ [xˆ, H], V (z) ≤ V (y0).
Recall that from our previous discussion we have that V (z) < V (y0) for all z ∈
(y0, xˆ]. Also, Property 1 (which we prove at the end of the present proof) establishes
that τ2((y0, xˆ]) > 0. Using this observations we create a new solution (p˜, τ˜) with
revenue strictly larger than that of (p, τ).
Let B = [−H, y0] and note that we have both τ(B×Bc) = 0 and τ(Bc×B) = 0, so
we can use the separation result in Lemma A.9. Hence (pB, τB) (see Lemma A.9 for
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notation) is a price-equilibrium pair in B. Its revenue equals the revenue of (p, τ)
in B, and V (y0| pB, τB) = V (y0).
For Bc we choose flows τBc(L) = µ(pi1(L ∩ D)) for all L ⊂ Bc × Bc. That is all
drivers stay at their initial location. It is not hard to see that sτ
Bc
(x) equals µ1,
Γ−a.e. x in Bc. We choose prices pBc(x) = p0 for all x ∈ Bc, where p0 is such that
α · p0 ·min{1, λ1 · F (p0)
µ1
} = V (y0), (A.32)
note that since V (y0) ≤ ψ1, p0 is well defined. That is, the solution (pBc , τBc) is
the same solution as in pre-demand shock environment but in smaller city, Bc and
with a larger price across all locations. Using Proposition 1.1 it is not hard to see
that the revenue associated with this solution is γ · V (y0) · µ1 · (H − y0).
By Lemma A.9, we can paste the two previous solutions to create a new solu-


















≤ V (y0) · τ2((y0, xˆ]) + V (y0) · τ2((xˆ, H])
(b)
= V (y0) · µ([y0, H])
= V (y0) · µ1 · (H − y0)
= Rev[y0,H](p˜, τ˜),
where (a) comes from τ2((y0, xˆ]) > 0, (b) comes from the fact that under τ no flow
leaves or enters [y0, H], and the last two lines from the definition of (p˜, τ˜) restricted
to [y0, H].
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2. y1 is well defined: In this case there exists z ∈ [xˆ, H] such that V (z) > V (y0). Also,
we must have y1 > xˆ, and we already argued that τ([y1, H]× [−H, y1]) = 0. There
are two more cases.
a) ∀y ∈ (y0, y1], ∀x > y1, x /∈ IR(y): This together with Lemma A.5 imply that
τ([y0, y1] × ([−H, y0] ∪ [y1, H])) = 0, and we also have τ(([−H, y0] ∪ [y1, H]) ×
[y0, y1]) = 0. From this we can construct a new feasible solution (p˜, τ˜) with
revenue strictly larger than that of (p, τ).
Let B = [−H, y0) ∪ (y1, H] and note that we have both τ(B × Bc) = 0 and
τ(Bc×B) = 0, so we can use the separation result in Lemma A.9. Thus (pB, τB)
(see Lemma A.9 for notation) is a price-equilibrium pair in B. Its revenue equals
the revenue of (p, τ) in B, and V (y0| pB, τB) = V (y0) and V (y1| pB, τB) = V (y0).
For Bc we choose flows τBc(L) = µ(pi1(L ∩ D)) for all L ⊂ Bc × Bc. We choose
prices pB
c
(x) = p0 for all x ∈ Bc, where p0 is as in Eq. (A.32). As we argued
before this solution forms an price-equilibrium pair with revenue equal to V (y0) ·
µ1 · (y1 − y0).
We can then paste both solutions (see Lemma A.9) to obtain a solution (p˜, τ˜) in
the entire city. As before, it yields a strict revenue improvement.
b) ∃ y ∈ (y0, y1], ∃ x > y1 such that x ∈ IR(y): Then the following points are well
defined
y1 , sup{x ∈ [y1, H] : ∃ y ∈ [y0, y1] such that x ∈ IR(y)},
y
1
, inf{y ∈ [y0, y1] : ∃ x ∈ [y1, H] such that x ∈ IR(y)}.
That is, y1 is largest point after y1 for which some location in [y0, y1] has drivers
indifferent to travel to it. As for y
1
, it corresponds to the smallest point in
[y0, y1] that has drivers willing to travel to some location in [y1, H]. Note that
from the definition of y1 and Lemma A.5 we can deduce that there is no flow
crossing y1 in any direction, that is, τ([−H, y1] × [y1, H]) = 0. Also, from
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Property 2 (which we prove at the end of the present proof) for any z ∈ [y
1
, y1],
y1 ∈ IR(z). This together with Lemma 1.3 imply that for any z ∈ [y1, y1],
V (z| p, τ) = V (y1)− |y1 − z|.
The idea is to again construct an strict objective improvement. First, define yc
to be such that V (y0) + (y
c − y0) = V (y1), that is, yc = V (y1) − V (y0) + y0.
Next we argue that yc ∈ (y0, y1). In fact, by the definition of y1 we must have
V (y1) > V (y0) thus yc > y0. Also, if yc ≥ y1 then
V (y0) + (y
c − y0) ≥ V (y0) + (y1 − y0)⇔ V (y1) ≥ V (y0) + (y1 − y0),
and since V (y1) = V (y1) + (y1 − y1) we would have
V (y1) + (y1 − y1) ≥ V (y0) + (y1 − y0)⇔ V (y1)− V (y0) ≥ y1 − y0,
which, since y1 > y0, implies that V (y1) > V (y0), contradicting the definition of
y1. From this we can also infer that y
c − y0 = y1 − y1.
Second, let h , y1 − yc and for any set L ⊆ C × C define the set
Lh , {(x+ h, y + h) ∈ C × C : (x, y) ∈ L}.
We now construct a new solution (p˜, τ˜). Let B = [−H, y0) ∪ (y1, H], so that
Bc = [y0, y1]. Following our previous scheme of proof we construct two price-
equilibrium pairs one in B and another in Bc, and then we paste them to create
(p˜, τ˜). As we did before we can use the separation result (see Lemma A.9) to
obtain a solution (pB, τB) in B such that V (y0|pB, τB) = V (y0) and V (y1|pB, τB) =
V (y1).







+µ(pi1(L∩([yc, y1]×[y0, y1])∩D)), (A.33)
We next show that this flow belongs to FBc(µ|Bc) and that it is an equilibrium
for some prices pB
c





1 (K) = τ
(
((K × Bc) ∩ ([y0, yc]× [y0, y1]))h
)
+ µ(pi1((K × Bc) ∩ ([yc, y1]× [y0, y1]) ∩ D))
= τ
(
((K ∩ [y0, yc])× [y0, y1])h
)
+ µ(K ∩ [yc, y1])
= τ
(
((K + h) ∩ [y0 + h, yc + h])× [y0 + h, y1 + h]
)
+ µ(K ∩ [yc, y1])
= τ
(
((K + h) ∩ [y1, y1])× [y1, y1 + h]
)




((K + h) ∩ [y1, y1])× C
)
+ µ(K ∩ [yc, y1])
= µ((K + h) ∩ [y1, y1]) + µ(K ∩ [yc, y1])
= µ((K ∩ [y0, yc]) + h) + µ(K ∩ [yc, y1])
(b)
= µ(K ∩ [y0, yc]) + µ(K ∩ [yc, y1])
= µ(K),
where (a) holds because by construction in [y1, y1] the flow there can be trans-
ported only inside the same set and, therefore, τ([y1, y1] × [y1, y1 + h]c) equals
zero. Equality (b) comes from the fact that µ is invariant under translation
(it is a multiple of the Lebesgue measure). Therefore, τB
c
1 coincides with µ|Bc .




2  Γ. Hence, τBc belongs to












(x) = µ1 Γ−a.e. x in [yc, y1].
(A.34)
We choose the prices pB
c
as follows. In [yc, y1] we set constant prices equal to p1
such that
α · p1 ·min{1, λ1 · F (p1)
µ1
} = V (y1),




























x+ h, p(x+ h), sτ (x+ h)
)
, (A.36)
such prices are well defined because the new Radon-Nikodym is smaller than the
old one (shifted by h) in K. For x ∈ Kc we set the prices equal to zero. Now we
need to verify that this selection of prices and flows yields an equilibrium. That
is, we need show that the set
EBc =
{


















measure equal to µ(Bc). First, from Property 3 we have












V (y1) + (x− y0) if x ∈ [y0, yc]
V (y1) if [y
c, y1].
(A.37)
For the first term in Eq. (A.33) observe that τ((EBc ∩ [y0, yc]× [y0, y1])h) equals
τ
({






(y−h)) = V (y1)+(x−y1)
})
,
using that Γ(Kc) = 0 and Eq. (A.47) one can verify that this expression equals
τ
({
(x, y) ∈ [y1, y1]× [y1, y1] : Π(x, y, p(y), sτ (y)) = V (x| p, τ)
})
.
In turn, from the definition of y
1
and y1, and the fact that τ is an equilibrium
flow this last expression equals µ([y1, y1]). For the second term in Eq. (A.33) we
have
EBc∩[yc, y1]×[y0, y1]∩D =
{











Thus the second term in Eq. (A.33) equals
µ
({







(x)) = V (y1)
})
= µ([yc, y1]) = µ([y0, y1]),
where the first equality comes from Eq. (A.34) and the discussion that it follows
it. The second equality comes from µ being invariant under translation and
yc − y0 = y1 − y1. Putting all these together yields
τB
c
(EBc) = µ([y1, y1]) + µ([y0, y1]) = µ([y0, y1]) = µ(Bc).
In order to create the new solution (p˜, τ˜) we just use Lemma A.9 to paste the two
solutions we constructed in B and Bc. Note that the pasting is allowed because
V (y0| pBc , τBc) = V (y0) and V (y1| pBc , τBc) = V (y1).
We now finally show the objective improvement. It is sufficient to prove that





















V (x| pBc , τBc) dτBc2 (x)
= Rev[y0,y1](p˜, τ˜),




2 (Bc) = τB
c
(Bc×Bc) = µ(Bc) = τ(Bc×C) = τ(Bc×Bc) = τ(C ×Bc) = τ2(Bc).
In (c) we simply use Eq. (A.37).
In what follows we provide a complete proof of the three properties that we use
to obtain the result.
Property 1. τ2((y0, xˆ]) > 0.
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Proof of Property 1. First we show that ∃ h ∈ (0, xˆ− y0) such that τ((y0, y0 +




) × [xˆ, y1]) > 0, which thanks to Lemma A.5 implies that for all n ∈ N
large enough there exists (xn, yn) ∈ (y0, y0 + 1n) × [xˆ, y1] such that yn ∈ IR(xn).
Our envelope result (see Lemma 1.3) ensures that V (xn) = V (yn)− |yn − xn|. Since
yn ∈ [xˆ, y1] we must have V (yn) ≤ V (y0) for all n ∈ N large (when y1 is not well
defined we replaced by H and the argument still goes through). Furthermore, xn
converges to y0 so the continuity of V (·) yields
V (y0) = lim
n→∞
V (xn) = lim
n→∞
V (yn)− |yn − xn| ≤ V (y0)− lim
n→∞
(yn − xn) < V (y0),
not possible. We conclude that ∃h ∈ (0, xˆ−y0) such that τ((y0, y0 +h)× [xˆ, y1]) = 0.
Note that the same must be true for some h ∈ (0, (xˆ− y0)∧ (y1−y0)2 ). We fix h in this
interval with the property we just proved.
Next, note we also have that τ((y0, y0 + h) × (y1, H]) = 0; otherwise, by Lemma
A.5 we can find (x, y) ∈ (y0, y0 + h) × (y1, H] such that y ∈ IR(x), which implies
that y ∈ IR(y1). Using the envelope result delivers V (y1) = V (y) − |y − y1| and
V (x) = V (y) − |y − x|. Since V (y1) = V (y0) we have (y1 − x) = V (y0) − V (x), but
our choice of h implies that y1 − x > h thus
h < (y1 − x) = V (y0)− V (x) ≤ |y0 − x| ≤ h,
again a contradiction. The last inequality comes from the Lipschitz property (see
Lemma 1.1). In summary, we have that there exists h ∈ (0, (xˆ − y0) ∧ (y1−y0)2 ) such
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that τ((y0, y0 + h)× [xˆ, H]) = 0. To conclude the proof note the following
0
(a)
< µ((y0, y0 + h))
= τ((y0, y0 + h)× C)
(b)
= τ((y0, y0 + h)× [y0, H])
= τ((y0, y0 + h)× [y0, xˆ)) + τ((y0, y0 + h)× [xˆ, H])




where (a) comes from the fact that the measure µ has full support in C. The equality
(b) holds because by construction no flow leaves [y0, H], and (c) is true because τ2  Γ
and Γ does not have atoms in [y0, xˆ]. This concludes the proof of Property 1.
Property 2. Both y1 and y1 are achieved in the set where they are defined.
Furthermore, for any z ∈ [y
1
, y1], y1 ∈ IR(z).
Proof of Property 2. First we show both
∃ yq ∈ [y0, y1] such that y1 ∈ IR(yq) and ∃ xq ∈ [y1, H] such that xq ∈ IR(y1).
(A.38)
Let us begin with the first statement. Let xn be a sequence in A converging to y1,
where
A = {x ∈ [y1, H] : ∃ y ∈ [y0, y1] such that x ∈ IR(y)}.
Then there exists a sequence {yn} ⊂ [y0, y1] such that xn ∈ IR(yn). Note that since
{yn} ⊂ [y0, y1] and xn ∈ [y1, H], Lemma A.3 implies that xn ∈ IR(y1). Fix  > 0 and
δ > 0 then we can find n0(δ) such that for all n ≥ n0(δ) we have B(xn, δ/2) ⊂ B(y1, δ).
This implies that VB(xn,δ/2)(y1) ≤ VB(y1,δ)(y1) for all n ≥ n0(δ). Fix n ≥ n0(δ), because
xn ∈ IR(y1) we know that
∃ δ0(, n) such that ∀δˆ ≤ δ0(, n) VB(xn,δˆ)(y1) ≥ V (y1)− .
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Let r0 = δ0(, n) ∧ δ2 then for all δˆ ≤ r0 we have
VB(y1,δ)(y1) ≥ VB(xn,δ/2)(y1) ≥ VB(xn,δˆ)(y1) ≥ V (y1)− .
This shows that for any , δ > 0 we have VB(y1,δ)(y1) ≥ V (y1)−. That is, y1 ∈ IR(y1).
Now we prove that y
1
∈ A where
A = {y ∈ [y0, y1] : ∃ x ∈ [y1, H] such that x ∈ IR(y)}.
By the definition of y
1
we can always construct a sequence {yn} ⊂ A converging to
y
1
. From the definition of A there exists another sequence {xn} ⊂ [y1, H] such that
xn ∈ IR(yn) for all n. Fix  > 0 then we can always find n0() such that for all
n ≥ n0() we have |yn − y1| ≤ /3. Fix n ≥ n0() then since xn ∈ IR(yn) we have




but from the Lipchitz property we can deduce that
VB(xn,δ)(y
n) ≤ VB(xn,δ)(y1) +

3





Replacing this in Eq. (A.39) yields
∃ δ0(, n) such that ∀δ ≤ δ0(, n) VB(xn,δ)(y1) ≥ V (y1)− ,
that is, xn ∈ IR(y1). This concludes the proof for Eq. (A.38).
Next, we show that for all z ∈ [y
1
, y1], y1 ∈ IR(z). First, from our previos
argument we know there exists yq and xq as in Eq. (A.38). Then Lemma A.3 implies
y1 ∈ IR(z) for all z ∈ [yq, y1]. Observe that this yields y1 ∈ IR(xq) because xq ∈
[yq, y1]. Take z ∈ [y1, yq] then since xq ∈ IR(y1) from Lemma A.3 we conclude that
xq ∈ IR(z). Using envelope result, Lemma 1.3, we have that V (xq) = V (z)+(xq−z).
Furthermore, fix  > 0 then since y1 ∈ IR(xq) we have
∃ δ0() such that ∀δ ≤ δ0() VB(y1,δ)(xq) +  ≥ V (xq) = V (z) + (xq − z). (A.40)
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Thus for any δ ≤ δ0(), the Lipchitz property and Eq. (A.40) yield
VB(y1,δ)(z) ≥ VB(y1,δ)(xq)− (xq − z) ≥ V (z) + (xq − z)− (xq − z)−  = V (z)− ,
which implies that y1 ∈ IR(z). This concludes the proof of Property 2.
Property 3. Both Eq. (A.34) and Eq. (A.37) hold.
Proof of Property 3. Let us star with Eq. (A.34). In order to prove the first
part in Eq. (A.34) consider the following set
K =
{









We want to show that Γ(Kc) = 0 (the complement is taken with respect to [y0, y
c]).
















(x+ h) dΓ(x) = τ2(K



















[y0 + h, y








This together with Eq. A.41 yield a contradiction. To prove the second part of Eq.
(A.34) consider any R ⊂ [yc, y1], and observe that
τB
c
2 (R) = τ
(
[y1, y1]× (R+ h)
)




where the second equality comes fromR+h ⊂ [y1, y1+h] and τ([y1, y1]×[y1, y1+h]) =
0.
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Finally, we provide a proof for Eq. (A.37). Let Z(x) , min{V (y0) + (x −












− |w − x|, Γ− a.e. w in Bc, (A.42)
and that Z(x) is the smallest with such property. First, fix x ∈ [yc, y1] so Z(x) =
V (y1). Note that from our choice of prices in [y
c, y1] we have











−|w−x|, Γ−a.e.w in[yc, y1].




and y1, Lemma A.3 and Lemma 1.3 we have that V (y1) − |y1 − y1|
equals V (y1| p, τ) and, therefore,
V (y1) ≥ U(w, p(w), sτ (w))− |w − y1|+ |y1 − y1|, Γ− a.e. w in [y1, y1]
≥ U(w, p(w), sτ (w)), Γ− a.e. w in [y1, y1].
We can use this together with the fact that [y0, y
c] + h = [y1, y1] to obtain




w + h, p(w + h), sτ (w + h)
)
, Γ− a.e. w in [y0, yc]
≥ U
(
w + h, p(w + h), sτ (w + h)
)













− |w − x|, Γ− a.e. w in [y0, yc],
Inequality (a) comes from the fact that Γ in the interval under consideration is in-
variant under a shift; (b) comes from Eq. (A.47). That is, for x ∈ [yc, y1] Eq. (A.42)
is satisfied. It is left to verify that Z(x) is the smallest value satisfying Eq. (A.42).
For any  > 0, since x ∈ [yc, y1] we have
0 < Γ(B(x, ) ∩ [yc, y1])
= Γ
(



















hence V (y1) is the smallest value satisfying Eq. (A.42).
Now we show Eq. (A.42) for x ∈ [y0, yc]. Fix x ∈ [y0, yc] so Z(x) = V (y0)+(x−y0).
Note that V (y0) equals V (y1), and from the definition of y1 and the envelope result
we have that V (y1) equals V (y1)− (y1 − y1). Therefore,
Z(x) = V (y1)− (y1 − y1) + (x− y0)
(a)













− |w − x|, Γ− a.e. w in [yc, y1],
where (a) follows from w ≥ yc and yc − y0 = y1 − y1. Line (b) holds from our choice
of prices in [yc, y1]. Hence, Z(x) upper bounds (almost surely) the desire quantity
in [yc, y1], so we just need to prove the same bound for [y0, y
c]. Note that from the
definition of y
1
and y1 we have that
V (x+ h) = V (y1) + (x+ h− y1) = V (y1) + (x− y0) = Z(x),
and thus
Z(x) = V (x+ h| p, τ)
(a)
≥ U(w, p(w), sτ (w))− |w − (x+ h)|, Γ− a.e. w in [y1, y1]
(b)









(w))− |w − x)|, Γ− a.e. w in [y0, yc],
where (a) comes from the definition of V (x + h| p, τ), (b) from the invariance under
translation of Γ. Line (c) follows from Eq. (A.47). Therefore, Z(x) satisfies Eq.
(A.42). To see why Z(x) is the smallest value satisfying this equation observe that























where in (a) we use that yc − y0 = y1 − y1. This implies that Z(x) is the smallest
value satisfying Eq. (A.42), completing the proof.
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Proof of Proposition 1.9. If Xr = H there is nothing to prove, so assume
Xr < H. Let (p, τ) be a feasible solution such that V (·|p, τ) is non-decreasing. Due
to Proposition 1.8 we can always restrict attention to this type of solution. We
proceed by contradiction. Assume that there exists x˜ ∈ (Xr, H] such that
V (x˜) < min{V (Xr) + (x˜−Xr), ψ1} , Z(x˜). (A.43)
First, we construct an interval I˜ such that τ2(I˜) > 0 and V (x) < Z(x) for all x ∈ I˜.
Then, we show that Z(x) can be achieved in a feasible manner by appropriately
creating a price-equilibrium pair (p˜, τ˜) that mimics the flow generated by τ in (Xr, H].
The final step of the proof is to use the interval I˜ and the flow τ˜ to show an strict
objective improvement.
Interval construction. From Eq. (A.43) and the continuity of V (·) we can
deduce the existence of an interval [a˜, b˜] ⊂ (Xr, H] such V (x) < Z(x) for all x ∈ [a˜, b˜].
Furthermore, the Lipchitz property (see Lemma 1.1) and Lemma 1.6 imply that
V (x) < Z(x) for all x ∈ [a˜, c˜] where c˜ is the minimum between H and the value c
such that V (a˜) + (c− a˜) = ψ1. Also, Proposition 1.8 and Lemma A.5 together with
Lemma 1.3 imply that τ([a˜, c˜]× C) = τ([a˜, c˜]× [a˜, c˜]). Putting all of this together we
conclude that there exists an interval I˜ = (a˜, c˜) such that τ2(I˜) > 0 and V (x) < Z(x)
for all x ∈ I˜.
Flow mimicking. Define the collection of intervals
I , {I ⊂ (Xr, H] : I = [a, b], a < b, b ∈ IR(a), a is minimal and b is maximal}.
There are two cases: I = ∅ and I 6= ∅. We only do the latter because its treatment
contains the former.
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Suppose I 6= ∅, then there exists Xr < a < b such that b ∈ IR(a), where a and
b are minimal and maximal with this property, respectively. We first look at some
properties of the equilibrium in each element of I and then we look at its complement.
Note that from the minimality of a we have that for any x < a, a /∈ IR(x).
Similarly, for any x > b we have x /∈ IR(b). This, together with Proposition 1.8
and Lemma A.5 imply that [a, b] is a flow-separated region, that is, there is no flow
coming in nor flow going out of [a, b], τ([a, b]× [a, b]c) = 0 and τ([a, b]c × [a, b]) = 0.
Observe that our flow separation result in Lemma A.9 implies that in each interval
I ∈ I we have an equilibrium. Furthermore, from Lemma 1.3 we must have
V (x) = V (a) + (x− a), ∀x ∈ [a, b].
From the previous discussion we infer that the elements in the collection I are disjoint
intervals and, since V is non-decreasing, the collection is at most countable.
For any a, b such that [a, b] ∈ I we define
t(a) , V (a)− V (Xr) +Xr, and t(b) , V (b)− V (Xr) +Xr.
Note that since V is non-decreasing we have V (a) ≥ V (Xr) and, therefore, t(b) >
0 HXr a bt(a) t(b)
V (Xr)
ψ1
V (x| p, τ )
Z(x)
Figure A.2: Graphical representation of t(a) and t(b).
t(a) ≥ Xr. Also, for any such b we have t(b) < Yr. The points t(a), t(b) are the
corresponding points to a, b in the interval [Xr, Yr] (see Figure A.2). Furthermore,
t(·) is a non-decreasing mapping.
We denote by Ic the collection of intervals whose elements are the intervals that
do not belong to I. Observe that the elements in I and Ic alternate in a consecutive
226
manner. That is, if we have an interval (c, d) ∈ Ic then it can only be followed by
and interval [a, b] ∈ I with a = d. In the case that I = (c, d) ∈ Ic is not followed by








Note that (Xr, H] = K ∪ Kc up to a set of Γ measure zero. Also, for each interval
I ∈ Ic we must have that for all measurable sets A ⊂ I, τ(A × A) = µ(A) = τ2(A);
otherwise, by Lemma A.5 we would get a contradiction with the definition of I. In
turn, this implies that dτ2
dΓ
(x) = µ1, Γ− a.e. x in Kc.
We denote by It the collection of intervals {[t(a), t(b)]}[a,b]∈I , and Ict is defined in
analogous manner. Also, Kt and Kct are defined similarly to K and Kc replacing I
with It and Ic with Ict , respectively.
The idea now is to construct a solution (p˜, τ˜) in (Xr, H] and then paste it with
the old solution (p, τ) restricted to [−H,Xr). To construct (p˜, τ˜) we will make use
of the collections It and Ict . For each element in these collections we will create a
price-equilibrium. For intervals [t(a), t(b)] ∈ It the idea is that the solution (p˜, τ˜) has
the same equilibrium than (p, τ) in [a, b]. For the interval in Ict we choose prices such
that no drivers will have an incentive to move. Finally, using Lemma A.9 we will
paste the equilibria generated in all the intervals.
First, we show how to construct prices and an equilibrium in some [t(a), t(b)]. Fix
[a, b] = I ∈ I and denote the mimicking set [t(a), t(b)] by It. Choose prices pIt(x)
equal to p(x+(a− t(a))) for all x ∈ It. For the flows, we define τ It for any L ⊆ It×It
by
τ It(L) = τ
(
L+ (a− t(a), a− t(a))
)
,
that is, τ It mimics τ in I × I. It can be shown that (see Property 1 at the end of this
proof) (pIt , τ It) forms a price-equilibrium pair in It such that τ
It ∈ FIt(µ|It). Also,
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(x+ a− t(a)), Γ− a.e. x in It. (A.44)
Furthermore, because I ∈ I we have
V (x|pIt , τ It) = V (x+a−t(a)|p, τ) = V (a)+(x−t(a)) = V (Xr)+(x−Xr) = Z(x), ∀x ∈ It,
that is, for all intervals It the associated solution (p
It , τ It) achieves the upper bound
Z(x).
Second, we show how to set the prices and construct an equilibrium everywhere
else. Consider any two consecutive sets in I, I1 = [a1, b1] and I2 = [a2, b2]. The
corresponding mimicking sets are [t(a1), t(b1)] and [t(a2), t(b2)]. We need to set prices







= Z(x), ∀x ∈ Jt.
Since Z(x) ≤ ψ1 these prices are guaranteed to exist. We define the measure τJt for
any measurable set L ⊆ Jt × Jt by
τJt(L) = µ(pi1(L ∩ D)).
This measure has dτJt2 /dΓ = µ1, Γ − a.e in Jt. It can be shown that (see Property
2 at the end of this proof) (pJt , τJt) forms a price-equilibrium pair in Jt such that
τJt ∈ FJt(µ|Jt) and V (x| pJt , τJt) equals Z(x) for all x ∈ Jt.
Third, the solutions {(pIt , τ It)}It∈It and {(pJt , τJt)}Jt∈Ict cover the whole interval
(Xr, H]. Moreover they are defined in disjoint interval, and are such that the respec-
tive V (·) functions coincide at the boundaries of the interval (these functions coincide
with Z(·)). Thus, we can apply Lemma A.9 to paste all these solutions and obtain a
new solution (p˜, τ˜) in (Xr, H]. As mentioned before we can use the same lemma to
paste this solution with the old solution restricted to [−H,Xr]. This would yield a
solution in the entire city.
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V (x|p, τ) · sτ (x) dΓ(x) +
∫
Kc











V (x|p, τ) · sτ (x) dΓ(x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=(b)
.
Let us develop the integral of the term (a). Let I be equal to [a, b] and It equal to
[t(a), t(b)] then∫
[a,b]
V (x|p, τ) · sτ (x) dΓ(x) =
∫
[t(a),t(b)]




V (x|pIt , τ It) · sτIt (x) dΓ(x),
where in the first line we use the invariance under translation of Γ, and in the second











Z(x) · sτ˜ (x) dΓ(x) + (b).




V (x|p, τ) · sτ (x) dΓ(x) <
∫
Kct
Z(x) · sτ˜ (x) dΓ(x). (A.45)
Define the following functions
Ve(x) =

V (x|p, τ) if x ∈ Kc,
V (a|p, τ) if x ∈ [a, b], some [a, b] ∈ I,
Ze(x) =

Z(x) if x ∈ Kct ,
Z(t(a)) if x ∈ [t(a), t(b)], some [t(a), t(b)] ∈ It.
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We verify that Ve(x) ≤ Ze(x) for all x ∈ (Xr, H], and the we use this inequality to
prove the objective improvement. Let x ∈ Kc then there exists an interval (c, d) ∈
Ic with x ∈ (c, d). If x ∈ Kct then the upper bound is trivial. If x /∈ Kct then
x ∈ [t(a), t(b)] for some [t(a), t(b)] ∈ It. We must have that a ≥ d; otherwise, since
(c, d) ∈ I, it must be the case that b ≤ c. In turn, this implies that [t(a), t(b)]∩(c, d) =
∅ which contradiction our current assumption. Therefore,
Ve(x) = V (x|p, τ) ≤ V (d|p, τ) ≤ V (a|p, τ) = Z(t(a)) = Ze(x).
Let x ∈ [a, b] for some [a, b] ∈ I. If x ∈ Kct , t(b) < x otherwise we would have that
t(a) ≤ a ≤ a ≤ t(b), that is, x ∈ [t(a), t(b)] ∈ It. Under our current assumption this
is not possible. Then,
Ve(x) = V (a|p, τ) < V (b|p, τ) = Z(t(b)) ≤ Z(x) = Ze(x), (A.46)
that is, when x ∈ K ∩ Kct we have Ve(x) < Ze(x). If x ∈ [t(aˆ), t(bˆ)] for some
[t(aˆ), t(bˆ)] ∈ It. Using similar arguments as before we can show that aˆ ≥ a and,
therefore,
Ve(x) = V (a|p, τ) = Z(t(a)) ≤ Z(t(aˆ)) = Ze(x).
Now, recall that in the Interval construction part of the proof we defined an
interval I˜ = [a˜, c˜] in which the function V (·|p, τ) is uniformly strictly bounded by
Z(·). Now we relate this interval to Kct by showing that there exists  > 0 such that
(c˜− , c˜) ⊆ Ict with Ict ∈ Ict . The idea is to use that (c˜− , c˜) ⊂ I˜ and (c˜− , c˜) ⊂ Kct
together with Eq. (A.46) to show an strict objective improvement.
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= V (c˜)− V (Xr) +Xr
= (V (c˜)− V (a˜)) + (V (a˜)− V (Xr)) +Xr
(2)
< (V (c˜)− V (a˜)) + (Z(a˜)− Z(Xr)) +Xr
(3)
≤ (c˜− a˜) + (a˜−Xr) +Xr
= c˜,
where (1) comes from the fact that t(·) is non-decreasing and c˜ = H, line (2) follows
from the V (a˜) < Z(a˜) and V (Xr) = Z(Xr). Inequality, (3) holds because both V and
Z are 1−Lipschitz functions. In the case that c˜ < H we have V (a˜) + (c˜ − a˜) = ψ1.
Also, we always have that t(b) ≤ Yr where Yr is such that V (Xr) + (Yr −Xr) = ψ1.
From this we deduce that Yr < c˜ and, therefore, we have that sup[t(a),t(b)]∈It t(b) < c˜.
Either way we can always find  ∈ (0, c˜− a˜) such that the interval (c˜− , c˜) does not
intersect with any interval in It. Hence, since Ict are all the intervals that do not
belong to It we must have that (c˜− , c˜) ⊆ Ict for some Ict ∈ Ict .
Because (c˜ − , c˜) is a subset of both Kct and (a˜, c˜), for x ∈ (c˜ − , c˜) ∩ Kc we
have Ve(x) < Ze(x). Also, for x ∈ (c˜ − , c˜) ∩ K from equation Eq. (A.46) we have
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Ve(x) < Ze(x). That is, Ve(x) < Ze(x) for all x ∈ (c˜− , c˜) and, therefore,∫
Kc
V (x|p, τ) · sτ (x) dΓ(x) =
∫
(Xr,H]


































which proves Eq. (A.45). To conclude, we provide a proof for both Property 1 and
Property 2.
Property 1. (pIt , τ It) forms a price-equilibrium pair in It such that τ
It ∈






(x+ a− t(a)), Γ− a.e. x in It.
Proof of Property 1. We first show that τ It ∈ FIt(µ|It). It is clear that τ It ∈
M(It×It), and that τ It2  Γ. To see why τ It1 coincides with µIt consider a set K ⊂ It
then τ It1 (K) equals
τ It1 (K × It) = τ((K + a− t(a))× (It + a− t(a))) = τ((K + a− t(a))× [a, b])
= τ((K + a− t(a))× C)
= µ(K + a− t(a))
= µ(K),
where the fourth line holds because the set K + a− t(a) is contained in [a, b], and we
know there is no flow leaving this interval. Next, using a similar argument we show
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(x) dΓ(x) = τ It(It ×K)












(x+ a− t(a)) dΓ(x).
Using this last property and the prices definition is easy to see that




(y))− |y − x| > u) = 0}
= inf{u ∈ R : Γ(y ∈ It : U(y, p(y + a− t(a)), dτ2
dΓ
(y + a− t(a)))
− |y − x| > u) = 0}
= inf{u ∈ R : Γ(y ∈ I : U(y, p(y), dτ2
dΓ
(y))
− |y − (x+ a− t(a))| > u) = 0}
= VI(x+ a− t(a)| p, τ),
but from out flow separation result (see Lemma A.9) we have that VI(x + a −
t(a)| p, τ) = V (x + a − t(a)| p, τ). Using this same approach, the definition of τ It
and the fact that τ is an equilibrium in [a, b] it is easy to verify the equilibrium
condition.
Property 2. The pair (pJt , τJt) forms a price-equilibrium pair in Jt such that
τJt ∈ FJt(µ|Jt) and V (x| pJt , τJt) equals Z(x) for all x ∈ Jt.
Proof of Property 2. From the definition of τJt it is clear that τJt ∈ FJt(µ|Jt).
Also, dτJt2 /dΓ = µ1, Γ−a.e in Jt. To see why V (x|pJt , τJt) equals Z(x) for all x ∈ Jt,
note that for fixed x ∈ Jt




(y))−|y−x| > Z(x)) = Γ(y ∈ Jt : Z(y)−|x−y| > Z(x)) = 0,
where in the first equality we use the definition of pJ(t) together with dτJt2 /dΓ = µ1,
Γ − a.e in Jt. In the second equality we use the Lipschitz property of the function
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Z(·). That is, Z(x) ≥ V (x| pJt , τJt). This upper bound (Γ−a.e) is tight. Let  > 0
then
0 < Γ(B(x, /2) ∩ Jt)
≤ Γ(y ∈ B(x, /2) ∩ Jt) :  > |x− y|+ (Z(x)− Z(y)))
= Γ(y ∈ B(x, /2) ∩ Jt) : Z(y)− |y − x| > Z(x)− )




(y))− |y − x| > Z(x)− ),
thus Z(x) is the smallest upper bound (Γ−a.e) and we have Z(x) = V (x| pJt , τJt). It
is not hard to verify that the equilibrium condition reduces to
τJt((x, y) ∈ Jt × Jt : Z(y)− |y − x| = Z(x)) = µ(Jt),
and by the definition of τJt this is immediately satisfied.

Proof of Theorem 1.2. The result follows directly from Proposition 1.9, and
the fact that [Xl, Xr] is an attraction region where V (·) is pinned down.

Proof of Theorem 1.3. We separate the proof in several steps. First, we argue
that there are at most three attraction regions in the any optimal solution. Then we
show that any optimal solution does not have drivers moving to the interval [Wr, Xr]
and [Xl,Wl]; otherwise, the platform can incentivize the movement of a positive
fraction of drivers outside of the center and make strictly larger revenue. After this
we put into practice Theorem 1.1 which prescribes what are the optimal prices and
post-relocation supply in each attraction region. In the final main step of the proof
we argue that the optimal solution has to be symmetric. We present the proof of two
properties that we will use during the main arguments, Property 1 and Property 2,
after the main proof.
Attraction regions identification: Lemma 1.5 establishes that at an optimal
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solution the attraction region of the origin is well defined with Xl < 0 < Xr. So Our
first attraction region is the interval [Xl, Xr].
The second and third attraction regions correspond to the intervals [Yl, Xl] and
[Xr, Yr] with Yl and Yr being sink locations. WLOG consider only the right interval,
if Yr = Xr we do not identify any attraction region to the right of Xr. Assume that
Xr < Yr, we will show that A(Yr) = [Xr, Yr] and Yr /∈ A(z) for any z 6= Yr. In order,
to show this we first show that Yr ∈ IR(Xr| p, τ). From Theorem 1.2 we know that
V (x) equals V (Xr) + (x − Xr) for all x ∈ [Xr, Yr]. Fix  > 0 and δ0 ∈ (0, Yr − Xr)
then for any δ ≤ δ0 define the set
Kδ , {y ∈ B(Yr, δ) ∩ [Xr, Yr] : U(y) = V (y)}.
Since µ((Yr−δ, Yr]) > 0 and τ((Yr−δ, Yr]×(C \ (Yr−δ, Yr])) = 0 (otherwise we would
obtain a contradiction with Theorem 1.2), we must have that τ2((Yr − δ, Yr]) > 0.
This together with Lemma A.2 and τ2  Γ imply that Γ(Kδ) > 0. Hence,
0 < Γ(Kδ)
= Γ(y ∈ Kδ :  > 0)
= Γ(y ∈ Kδ : V (Xr) > V (Xr)− )
= Γ(y ∈ Kδ : V (y)− |y −Xr| > V (Xr)− )
= Γ(y ∈ Kδ : U(y)− |y −Xr| > V (Xr)− )
≤ Γ(y ∈ B(Yr, δ) : U(y)− |y −Xr| > V (Xr)− )
This implies that VB(Yr,δ)(Xr) ≥ V (Xr) − . By the choice of  and δ we conclude
that limδ↓0 VB(Yr,δ)(Xr) is V (Xr). In other words, Yr ∈ IR(Xr| p, τ). Now, Yr cannot
belong to any other attraction region; otherwise, by the Lemma 1.3 the value function
would not be as in Theorem 1.2. Therefore, Yr is a sink location and [Xr, Yr] ⊆ A(Yr).
If there existed x ∈ A(Yr) but x /∈ [Xr, Yr], the value function would not be as in
Theorem 1.2. In conclusion, A(Yr) = [Xr, Yr] and Yr /∈ A(z) for any z 6= Yr.
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No supply in [Wr, Xr]: Next we argue that at an optimal solution (p, τ) we must
have that τ2([Wr, Xr]) = 0, the same is true for the left side. Suppose by contradiction
that τ2([Wr, Xr]) > 0 and denote this amount of supply by qr, we construct a new
solution (p˜, τ˜) that yields an strict objective improvement. Observe that,
0 < qr = τ(C × [Wr, Xr]) = τ([Wr, Xr]× [Wr, Xr]) ≤ µ([Wr, Xr]) = µ1 · (Xr −Wr).
That is, from the total amount of initial supply in [Wr, Xr] we have that qr units
stay within [Wr, Xr] and a total of µ1 · (Xr −Wr) − qr units travel to [0,Wr]. Note
that for this qr units of mass their V is bounded by ψ1 and, therefore, what the
platform can make from them is strictly bounded by ψ1 · qr (times a scaling factor).
Let X˜r ∈ [Wr, Xr) be such that qr = µ1 · (Xr − X˜r). In the new solution, we will
modify the attraction region [Xl, Xr] to be [Xl, X˜r]. We will maintain the same prices
and post-relocation supply in the origin’s attraction region. However, to the right
side of X˜r we will set new prices that will be consistent with a new value function
and flows that upper bound those of the old solution, see Figure A.3.




µ([X˜r, Xr]) = qr
ψ1
V (x| p, τ )
V (x| p˜, τ˜ )
Figure A.3: No supply in [Wr, Xr]. The new solution moves the right end of the
attraction region from Xr to X˜r, so now a mass qr of drivers can travel towards
the periphery. From this mass the platform now makes ψ1 instead of V (x) with
V (x) < ψ1.
We begin our construction of (p˜, τ˜) with the interval I1r = [X˜r, Y˜r], where Y˜r is
such that ψ1 = V (X˜r) + (Y˜r − X˜r). Let h , 2 · (Xr − X˜r), we define flows for any
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L ⊆ I1r × I1r by
τ I
1

























x+ h, p(x+ h), sτ (x+ h)
)
, ∀x ∈ K, (A.47)
and zero otherwise. We prove, in Property 1 (see end of present proof), that (pI
1
r , τ I
1
r )
is a price-equilibrium pair in I1r such that V (x| pI1r , τ I1r ) = V (X˜r) + (x − X˜r) and
Γ(Kc) = 0.
In the interval I2r = (Y˜r, H] we can achieve the optimal solution when there is no
demand shock. As in the optimal solution in the pre-demand shock environment (see
Proposition 1.6) we set prices equal to ρ1 and the flows are such that dτ
I2r /dΓ equals
µ1, Γ− a.e in I2r .
The interval I0r = [Xl, X˜r] is more involved. Observe that all the initial flow to
the right of the origin that we have to allocate in [0, X˜r] equals µ1 ·Xr − qr. This is
exactly the same amount of drivers in [0, Xr] that travels to [0,Wr] according to τ .
Our new solution will generate the same post-relocation supply than τ in [0,Wr] but
this time only using drivers from [0, X˜r].
We use the same prices, that is pI
0
r (x) = p(x) for all x ∈ [Xl, X˜r]. For the flows
we define them through two measures: the flow that goes from [Xl, 0] to [Xl, 0] and
the flow that goes from [0, X˜r] to [0, X˜r]. For the first flow we use τ
` = τ |[Xl,0], for the
second measure τ r we will use a monotone coupling (see e.g, [60] for details). Define
the initial supply to the right measure µr to be equal to µ|[0,X˜r], and the final supply
Sr to be
Sr(B) , τ([0, Xr]× B), for any measurable set B ⊆ [0, X˜r].
Note that Sr([0,Wr]) equals µ
r([0, X˜r]). Given this we define τ
r by
τ r(L) , (F [−1]µr , F [−1]Sr )#m(L), for any measurable set L ⊆ [0, X˜r]× [0, X˜r],
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where # correspond to the push-forward operator. For any measure ν defined in
[0, X˜r] we define its cumulative function and pseudo-inverse by
Fν(y) , ν([0, y]), ∀ y ≥ 0 and F [−1]ν (t) , inf{y ≥ 0 : Fν(y) ≥ t},
∀t ∈ [0, µr([0, X˜r])]. Effectively, τ r transports the initial mass in [0, X˜r] to the final
supply distribution (considering only drivers that come from the right) in [0,Wr] as
prescribed by τ . The final flow measure τ I
0
r correspond to τ `+τ r|[0,X˜r]. In Property 2
below we show that (pI
0
r , τ I
0
r ) is a price-equilibrium pair such that Rev[Xl,Wr](p




The solution (p˜, τ˜) is constructed by pasting (see Lemma A.9) the old solution is
[−H,Xl) with the new solution in I0, I1r and I2r . The pasting is possible because the
equilibrium utility function coincide in the boundaries of these intervals. This new
solution preserves the platform’s revenue in [−H,Wr]∪ [Yr, H] but it strictly improves
























V (x|p˜, τ˜) · sτ˜ (x) dx+
∫
[X˜r,Yr]















V (x|p˜, τ˜) · sτ˜ (x) dx+ ψ1 · qr +
∫
[Wr,Xr]














V (x) · sτ (x) dx = 1
γ
·Rev[Wr,Yr](p, τ),
where (a) follows because τ˜ does not put mass in [Wr, X˜r], (b) because Yr− Y˜r equals
2 · (Xr − X˜r). Using the fact that τ2([Wr, Xr]) = qr we obtain (c), while (d) follows
from Eq. (A.48) and (e) from V (x| p˜, τ˜) being equal to V (x+ h) for all x ∈ [X˜r, Y˜r].
In conclusion, any optimal solution both τ2([Wr, Xr]) and τ2([Xl,Wl]) must equal
zero.
Using Theorem 1.1: All the conditions in Theorem 1.1 are met. So, for any of
the three attraction regions if (p, τ) is not already as in the statement of the theorem
we can find at least a weak improvement. That is, we can restrict to solution as in
Theorem 1.1. Therefore, the prices are as stated in the present theorem, and there
exists βlc ∈ [Wl, 0], βrc ∈ [0,Wr], βlp ∈ [Yl, Xl] and βrp ∈ [Xr, Yr] such that
sτ (x) =

0 if x ∈ (βrc , βrp) ∪ (βlp, βlc),
ψ−1x (V (x| p, τ)) otherwise,
with ∫ βrc
βlc




ψ−1x (V (x|p, τ))dΓ(x) = µ1 ·(Yr−Xr),
∫ βlp
Yl
ψ−1x (V (x|p, τ))dΓ(x) = µ1 ·(Xl−Yl).
Note that the fact that βlc ∈ [Wl, 0] and βrc ∈ [0,Wr], does not come directly from
Theorem 1.1 but rather is a consequence of that any optimal solution must satisfy
both τ2([Wr, Xr]) = 0 and τ2([Xl,Wl]) = 0. Also, observe that Theorem 1.1 only
gives us a solution in each attraction but above we have stated the solution for the
entire city. The only missing interval are [−H, Yl] and [Yr, H]. In this intervals, as
in the pre-shock environment, the solution set prices equal to ρ1 and the supply at
every location is µ1, in turn, the V equals ψ1 in this region. This gives a complete
solution to the platform’s problem up to three values: V (0), Xl, Xr.
Symmetry: In the last main step of the proof we argue that the solution is
symmetric. After proving this, the solution will take the exact form in the statement
of the present theorem.
Note that given a value for V (0) and an central attraction region characterize byXl
andXr we can characterize the optimal solution as we did in Using Theorem 1.1. So
fix these three values and the optimal solution associated to them. We now proceed to
construct a new solution that yields a strict objective improvement when the solution
is not symmetric. WLOG assume that |Xl| > Xr and let δ = (|Xl|−Xr)/2. Consider
the solution (p˜, τ˜) associated to the values
V˜ (0) = V (0), X˜l = Xl + δ, X˜r = Xr + δ.
Note that with this values we have |X˜l|, W˜r ≥ Wr and Y˜i = Yi+2 ·δ for i ∈ {l, r}. We
next show that this new solution yields a weak objective improvement in the center,
and a strict objective improvement in the periphery.
Note that given V˜ (0), X˜l and X˜r Theorem 1.2 characterizes V (·| p˜, τ˜). It has the
same shape than V (·| p, τ) except that now the dip in [Y˜l,Wl] is smaller, while the














Figure A.4: Symmetry argument.
first the solution in the center, [X˜l, X˜r]. This interval contains the same amount
of drivers that the old attraction region. The difference is that it lost a mass of
µ1 · δ drivers to the left and gain the same mass to the right. As in the discussion
that follows Theorem 1.1 the optimal solution in [X˜l, X˜r] can be obtained using a
knapsack argument. This new attraction region is symmetric, |X˜l| = X˜r, with equal
mass of drivers at both sides of the origin. Therefore the knapsack solution must be
symmetric, with β˜c ∈ [0,Wr] such that
sτ˜ (x) = ψ−1x (V (x| p˜, τ˜)) = ψ−1x (V (x| p, τ)), ∀x ∈ [−β˜c, β˜c],
and equals zero otherwise, and∫ β˜c
−β˜c
ψ−1x (V (x| p˜, τ˜) dΓ(x) = µ1 · (X˜r − X˜l) = µ1 · (Xr −Xl).
Note that β˜c ∈ [0,Wr] is a consequence of the having βlc ∈ [Wl, 0] and βrc ∈ [0,Wr]
in the old solution. Theorem 1.1 prescribes how to formally implement this solution
through prices and flows. We omit the details of how to construct the flows, but we
note that the optimal prices are given p˜(x) = ρlocx (s
τ˜ (x)). In the case that β˜ = 0 then
sτ˜ (0) = µ1 · (Xr −Xl) and p˜(0) is such that U(0, p(0), sτ˜ (0)) = V (0). The platform’s






V (x| p˜, τ˜) · sτ˜ (x) dx =
∫ β˜c
−β˜c
V (x) · ψ−1x (V (x)) dx.
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This expression is an upper bound for the platform’s revenue under (p, τ) in [Xl, Xr].










V (x) · ψ−1x (V (x)) dx+
∫ βrc
|βlc|








V (x) · ψ−1x (V (x)) dx+
∫ βrc
|βlc|








V (x) · ψ−1x (V (x)) dx+
∫ βrc
β˜c









ψ−1x (V (x)) dx+
∫ βrc
β˜c






That is, the new solution in the center is a weakly improvement over the old solution.
Now let us consider the periphery. Since |X˜l| = X˜r both right and left periphery
are symmetric. Thus the optimal solution as given by Theorem 1.1 is the symmetric
at both sides. The post-relocation supply is characterize by β˜p ∈ [X˜r, Y˜r] such that
sτ˜ (x) = ψ−1x (V (x| p˜, τ˜)) = ψ−1x (V (Xr) + (x−Xr)− 2 · δ), ∀x ∈ [β˜p, Y˜r],
and equals zero otherwise, and∫ Y˜r
β˜p
ψ−1x (V (x| p˜, τ˜) dΓ(x) = µ1 · (Y˜r − X˜r) = µ1 · (Yr −Xr) + µ1 · δ.
The optimal prices are p˜(x) = ρlocx (s
τ˜ (x)). As before we omit the characterization of
the equilibrium flow as their existence is guaranteed by Theorem 1.1. The platforms
revenue in the periphery is
1
γ
·Rev[−H,X˜l]∪[X˜r,H](p˜, τ˜) = 2 ·
∫ Y˜r
β˜p
V (x| p˜, τ˜) ·ψ−1(V (x| p˜, τ˜))dx+2 ·ψ1 ·µ1 · (H− Y˜r),
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where we have dropped the subindex x from ψ−1x to stress the fact that in this part of
the city this subindex does not change the congestion function. We need to compare
this revenue with the revenue of the old solution in the periphery. Not that since
|Xl| > Xr we must have







V (x) · ψ−1(V (x)) dx+
∫ Yr
βrp
V (x) · ψ−1(V (x)) dx




V (x) · ψ−1(V (x)) dx+ 2 ·
∫ Yr
βrp
V (x) · ψ−1(V (x)) dx




V (x) · ψ−1(V (x)) dx+ 2 ·
∫ Y˜r
βrp+2·δ
V (x| p˜, τ˜) · ψ−1(V (x| p˜, τ˜)) dx




V (x) · ψ−1(V (x)) dx− 2 ·
∫ βrp+2·δ
β˜p










V (x) · ψ−1(V (x)) dx− 2 ·
∫ Yl+(Y˜r−β˜p)
Yl+(Yr−βrp)




V (x) · ψ−1(V (x)) dx−
∫ Yl+(Y˜r−β˜p)
Yl+(Yr−βrp)
V (x) · ψ−1(V (x)) dx










In conclusion, we have constructed a new symmetric solution that yields an strict




r , τ I
1
r ) forms a price-equilibrium pair in I1r such that V (x|pI1r , τ I1r )
equals V (X˜r) + (x− X˜r) and Γ(Kc) = 0.
Proof of Property 1. We first show that τ I
1
r ∈ FI1r (µ|I1r ). It is clear that
τ I
1
r ∈ M(I1r × I1r ), and that τ I
1
r
2  Γ. To see why τ I
1
r
1 coincides with µI1r consider a






1 (K × I1r ) = τ((I + h)× (I1r + h))
= τ((I + h)× [X˜r + h, Yr])
= τ((I + h)× C)
= µ(I + h)
= µ(I),
where the fourth line holds because the set I + h is contain in [X˜r + h, Yr], and we
know there is no flow leaving this interval. Next, using a similar argument we show
the property for dτ
I1r








(x) dΓ(x) = τ I
1
r (I1r × I) = τ([X˜r + h, Yr]× (I + h))














that is, Γ(Kc) = 0. As for the equilibrium utility function let x ∈ [X˜r, Y˜r) we have







(y))− |y − x| > u) = 0}
= inf{u ∈ R : Γ(y ∈ I1r : U(y, p(y + h),
dτ2
dΓ
(y + h))− |y − x| > u) = 0}
= inf{u ∈ R : Γ(y ∈ [X˜r + h, Yr] : U(y, p(y), dτ2
dΓ
(y))
− |y − (x+ h)| > u) = 0}
≤ V (x+ h| p, τ).
Actually this upper bound is tight. Indeed, Fix any  > 0 and consider δ > 0 small
enough such that (x+ h) /∈ B(Yr, δ). We have τ2({y ∈ B(y, δ)∩ [X˜r + h, Yr] : U(y) =
V (y)}) > 0 which implies that Γ({y ∈ B(Yr, δ) ∩ [X˜r + h, Yr] : U(y) = V (y)}) > 0
and, therefore,
0 < Γ({y ∈ B(Yr, δ) ∩ [X˜r + h, Yr] : U(y) = V (y), + y − (x+ h) > |y − (x+ h)|})
= Γ({y ∈ B(Yr, δ) ∩ [X˜r + h, Yr] : U(y) = V (y), U(y)− |y − (x+ h)|
> V (x+ h)− })
≤ Γ({y ∈ [X˜r + h, Yr] : U(y)− |y − (x+ h)| > V (x+ h)− })







(y))− |y − x| > V (x+ h)− }),
therefore V (x| pI1r , τ I1r ) equals V (x+ h) for all x ∈ [X˜r, Y˜r), and by continuity for all
x ∈ I1r . Since V (x+ h) equals V (X˜r) + (x− X˜r) we obtain the desired result.
Now we need to verify that this selection of prices and flows yields an equilibrium.
That is, we need show that the set
EI1r =
{












r measure equal to µ(I1r ). Observe that τ(EI1r ) equals
τ
({












(x, y) ∈ [X˜r + h, Yr]× [X˜r + h, Yr] : Π(x, y, p(y), sτ (y)) = V (x| p, τ)
})
.
There is no τ flow of drivers leaving [X˜r + h, Yr] so the fact that τ is an equilibrium





r , τ I
0
r ) is a price-equilibrium pair such that Rev[Xl,Wr](p




Proof of Property 2. First a couple of observations, note that for any y ∈ [0, X˜r]
and the set [0, y] then
τ r1 ([0, y]) = τ
r([0, y]× [0, X˜r]) = m
(




t ∈ [0, µr([0, X˜r])] : 0 ≤ t ≤ Fµr(y)
)
= Fµr(y),
and the same argument holds for τ r2 and S
r, this characterizes the first and second
marginals of τ r. Furthermore, it’s not difficult to see that for y1, y2 ∈ [0, X˜r] we have
τ r([0, y1]×[0, y2]) = m
(




Next, we show that τ I
0
r ∈ FI0r (µ|I0r ) is an equilibrium in I0r . In order to do so we
first show thatτ I
0




corroborate they coincide with sτ . Third, we compute VI0r (·| pI
0
r , τ I
0
r ) and verify is
coincides with V (·| p, τ) in I0r . Finally, we check the equilibrium condition.
Clearly τ I
0
r is a non-negative measure in I0r ×I0r because is the sum of non-negative
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measures. Now we check that τ
I0r
1 = µ|I0r . Consider a measurable set B ⊆ I0r then
τ
I0r
1 (B) = τ((B ∩ [Xl, 0])× [Xl, 0]) + τ r((B ∩ [0, X˜r])× [0, X˜r])
= τ((B ∩ [Xl, 0])× C) + µr(B ∩ [0, X˜r])
= µ(B ∩ [Xl, 0]) + µ(B ∩ [0, X˜r])
= µ|I0r (B)
and thus we also have τ
I0r
1  Γ. For the second marginal of τ I0r we have
τ
I0r
2 (B) = τ([Xl, 0]× (B ∩ [Xl, 0])) + τ r([0, X˜r]× (B ∩ [0, X˜r]))
= τ([Xl, 0]× (B ∩ [Xl, 0])) + Sr(B ∩ [0, X˜r])
= τ([Xl, 0]× (B ∩ [Xl, 0])) + τ([0, Xr]× (B ∩ [0, X˜r]))










(x) = sτ (x), Γ− a.e. x in I0r .
Next we compute the equilibrium utilities. We show that V (x|pI0r , τ I0r ) equals V (x|p, τ)
for all x ∈ I0r . Observe that Γ − a.e. y in I0r we have U(y, pI0r (y), sτI
0
r (y)) =
U(y, p(y), sτ (y)), and, therefore, V (x| p, τ) ≥ V (x| pI0r , τ I0r ). Using the same argu-
ment that we used for the proof of Property 1 we can argue that this upper bound is
tight, that is, V (x| p, τ) = V (x| pI0r , τ I0r ).
Now the equilibrium condition. Consider the equilibrium set
EI0r ,
{
(x, y) ∈ I0r × I0r : U(y, pI
0
r (y), sτ




we need to verify that τ I
0
r (EI0r ) equals µ(I0r ). First, for τ l(EI0r ) we have
τ l(EI0r ) = τ
({
(x, y) ∈ [Xl, 0]× [Xl, 0] : U(y, p(y), sτ (y))− |y − x| = V (x| p, τ)
})
= τ([Xl, 0]× [Xl, 0])
= τ([Xl, 0]× C)
= µ([Xl, 0])
where we have used our choice of prices, the relation between dτ
I0r
2 /dΓ and s
τ , and
the fact that τ is an equilibrium flow that does not setnd flow out of [Xl, 0]. For
τ r|[0,X˜r], note that its second marginal is Sr and, therefore, Lemma A.2 implies that
τ r|[0,X˜r](EI0r ) = τ r
({
(x, y) ∈ [0, X˜r]× [0, X˜r] : V (y| p, τ)− |y − x| = V (x| p, τ)
})
,
and because V (z| p, τ) equals V (0)− z for any z ∈ [0, X˜r] we have
τ r|[0,X˜r](EI0r ) = τ r
({




(x, y) ∈ [0, X˜r]× [0, X˜r] : x ≥ y
})
= µr([0, X˜r])− τ r
({

















τ r([0, q]× [0, X˜r])






µr([0, q]) ∧ Sr([0, X˜r])






µr([0, q]) ∧ Sr([0, X˜r])
− µr([0, q]) ∧ Sr([0, q])
}
= 0,
where in the last line we used that µr([0, q]) ≤ Sr([0, q]). Adding up τ l(EI0r ) with
τ r|[0,X˜r](EI0r ), yields that τ I
0
r (EI0r ) equals µ(I0r ), and the equilibrium condition is satis-
fied. Finally, the revenue condition in the statement of the Property is immediately
satisfied as dτ
I0r
2 /dΓ coincide with s






B.1 Proofs for Section 2.3.2
Proof of Lemma 2.1. Let x0 be in the interior of C, a bounded subset of R2











Let Zk , mini=1,...,k ‖Xi − x0‖. First, note that since x0 is in the interior of the
bounded region we can always find a ball B(x0, ) that is contain in C (below we take
 small enough). From this and the fact that the points Xi are drawn uniformly at
random in C, we have the following lower and upper bounds for any i = 1, . . . , k
pi · (z ∧ )2
|C| = P[‖Xi − x0‖ ≤ z ∧ ] ≤ P[‖Xi − x0‖ ≤ z] ≤
pi · z2
|C| .
Second, from these bounds and the fact that the points Xi are IID we deduce(




∨ 0 ≤ P[Zk > z] ≤
(





This yields the following bound for E[Zk]∫ √|C|/pi
0
(










































· (RC − ) = 0,


































































where in the last step we use that for any 0 < δ < 1 the limit as k ↑ ∞ of √k ∫ δ
0
(1−
z2)kdz is approximately 0.886. 
B.2 Proofs for Section 2.4
Proof of Theorem 2.1. We make use of Proposition B.1 which we state and
prove after the proof of this theorem. We prove each statements in the theorem.
(i) First we show that qn as given in the statement is always an stable equilibrium.
We have that qn = n + z
2
n with zn = ρn/(1 − ρn). Any equilibrium solves











which is clearly satisfied. To verify stability we proceed using the Lyapunov
method. Let V (q) = |q − qn|, then V˙ (q) = sgn(q − qn) · fn(q). We need to
verify that V˙ (q) < 0 for q 6= qn (for n large enough). By Proposition B.1
part (i), if q ∈ (qn, qn + δ] we have that V˙ (q) = fn(q) < 0, and if ∈ [qn − δ, qn)
V˙ (q) = −fn(q) < 0 for δ > 0 small enough. Hence, qn is a locally asymptotically
stable equilibrium.
If α > 1/3 or if α = 1/3 and β < β∗1 by Proposition B.1 we have that fn(q) > 0
for all q ∈ [0, qn). Therefore the same Lyapunov analysis as before leads to the
conclusion that qn is a globally asymptotically stable equilibrium.
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(ii) Both equilibria q and q˜n can be found by equating g1,n(q) and g2,n(q). This turns
out to be equivalent to solving the equation
(n− q) + n · ρn√
n− q = n · (1− ρn). (B.1)
For the current values of α and β, Proposition B.1 part (iii), we know the latter
equation has two solutions: q˜n and q. Let’s start with q˜n. From Proposition B.1 we
know that in a vicinity to the left of q˜n we have fn(q) < 0, that is, in a vicinity to
the left of q˜n we have dQ˜n(t)/dt < 0 and, therefore, the systems moves away from q˜n.
Similarly, in a vicinity to the right of q˜n we have fn(q) > 0 and, therefore, the system
moves away from q˜n. This shows that this equilibrium is unstable.
For q we can use the same Lyapunov analysis as before, together with Proposition
B.1, to show that it is a locally asymptotically stable equilibrium.
To conclude we need to provide a closed form characterization the two equilibria.
We transform the equation that defines them, Eq. (B.1), in to a cubic equation.
Consider the change of variables w =
√
n− q, then the equation becomes
w3 − n · (1− ρn) · w + n · ρn = 0. (B.2)
The solution to this equation can be found in [62]. When the term −4n3 · (1− ρn)3 +
27n2 · ρ2n is non-positive the three possible solutions to (B.2) are real and given by
wi = 2
√















, i = 0, 1, 2.
In order to verify that −4n3 · (1 − ρn)3 + 27n2 · ρ2n ≤ 0, note that this is equivalent
to 27ρ2n ≤ 4n1−3α · (nα(1− ρn))3. For large n, this last inequality holds for α < 1/3.
The same is true for α = 1/3 and β > β∗1 . Therefore, the solutions wk are all real.















and w1 ≥ 0 for large n. Since we are using the change of variables w = √n− q, we
can disregard w2 as a solution and take w0 and w1 to compute the solutions of our
original equation. Because q ≤ q˜n we obtain that q = n− w20 and q˜n = n− w21.

Proposition B.1 Suppose limn→∞(1− ρn)nα = β and that ρn ↑ 1. Let β∗1 = 3/41/3
then
(i) there exists n0 such that for all n ≥ n0 there exists qn > n for which
fn(q)

= 0 if q = qn
< 0 if q > qn
> 0 if q ∈ [n, qn).
(ii) if α > 1/3, or if α = 1/3 and β < β∗1 , there exists n0 such that for all n ≥ n0
we have fn(q) > 0 for all q ∈ [0, qn).
(iii) if α < 1/3, or if α = 1/3 and β > β∗1 then there exists n0 such that for all
n ≥ n0 there exist q and q˜n with 0 ≤ q < n− (n·ρn2 )2/3 < q˜n < n− 1 such that
fn(q)

= 0 if q ∈ {q, q˜n}
< 0 if q ∈ (q, q˜n)
> 0 if q ∈ [0, q) ∪ (q˜n, qn).
Proof of Proposition B.1. First note that from the definition of fn we have
fn(q) = λn − 1s¯√
|q−n|∨1 + s¯
·min(n, q). (B.3)
Next prove each part of the statement separately.










The left hand side is a decreasing function of q with maximum value equal to 2
for q ≥ n + 1. Also, since ρn < 1 we have that 1/ρn > 1. If n is large enough
so that 1/ρn < 2, we can always find a solution qn > n such that fn(qn) = 0.
Moreover, fn(qn) < 0 for q > qn, and fn(qn) > 0 for q ∈ [0, qn).
(ii) First suppose that q ∈ [n, qn), from what we did in the proof of (i) we can
conclude that fn(q) > 0 for n large enough. For q ∈ [n− 1, n), fn(q) > 0 if and
only if 2 > q/(nρn). Since ρn ↑ 1 and q is at most n this last inequality holds
for all n large enough.














> n · (1− ρn),





















n) > n · (1− ρn) we have that fn(q) > 0. Observe that
gn(x
∗
n) > n · (1− ρn)⇔ (n · ρn)2/3 (
1
22/3
+ 21/3)︸ ︷︷ ︸
β∗1
> n · (1− ρn),
which is equivalent to ρ
2/3
n β∗1 > n
1/3−α · (1 − ρn)nα. If α > 1/3 then, because
(1 − ρn) · n1/3 → β, the last inequality above holds for all n sufficiently large.
If α = 1/3 the last inequality above becomes ρ
2/3
n · β∗1 > (1 − ρn) · n1/3, and if
β < β∗1 , since (1−ρn) ·n1/3 → β and ρn ↑ 1, we would have gn(x∗n) > n · (1−ρn)
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for all n sufficiently large. Therefore in both cases we have that fn(q) > 0 for
all q < n− 1.
(iii) Similarly, we can argue that if α < 1/3, or if α = 1/3 and β > β∗1 then
gn(x
∗
n) < n · (1 − ρn) for n sufficiently large. When gn(x∗n) < n · (1 − ρn)
the function gn(x) (recall this is a convex function) crosses n · (1 − ρn) at two
points: x1,n and x1,n, with 1 < x1,n < x
∗
n < x1,n ≤ n. Defining q = n− x1,n and
q˜n = n− x1,n we conclude the result.

B.3 Proofs for Section 2.5
Proof of Proposition 2.1. We make use of Eq. (2.9) and Proposition B.1.
(i) Note that from Proposition B.1 part (i) we have that fn(k) ≥ 0 for all k ∈
[n, qn], since bqnc ≤ qn from Eq. (2.9) we deduce that pin(k) is increasing for all
k ∈ [n, bqnc] ∩ N. Moreover, because fn(k) < 0 for k > qn and qn < bqnc + 1
from Eq. (2.9) we have that pin(k) decreases for all k ∈ (bqnc,∞) ∩ N. Finally,
using a similar argument and Proposition B.1 part (ii), we deduce that pin(k)
is increasing for all k ∈ [0, n] ∩ N.
(ii) Note that from Proposition B.1 part (iii) we have that fn(k) ≥ 0 for all k ∈
[0, q], fn(k) < 0 for all k ∈ (q, q˜n), and fn(k) ≥ 0 for all k ∈ [q˜n, qn). Eq.
(2.9) then implies that pin(k) increases for k ∈ [0, bqc] ∩ N, it decreases for
k ∈ (bqc, bq˜nc] ∩ N, and it increases for k ∈ (bq˜nc, bqnc) ∩ N.

Proof of Theorem 2.2. This result relies on Proposition 2.2 which is stated in
the main text in the Proof sketch of Theorem 2.2 discussion. We provide a proof for
Proposition 2.2 after the present proof.
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We prove each statement in the theorem separately.
(i) We analyze different cases. First we consider α ∈ (1/3, 1). In this case from
Proposition 2.1 part (ii) we now that pin(k) ≤ pin(n) for all k, for all n large
enough. Moreover, from Proposition 2.2 part (i) we have that for  ∈ (0, 1/β)











P[Qn(∞) < n] =
n−1∑
k=0
pin(k) ≤ n · pin(n)
= n · pin(n)
pin(bqnc)
· pin(bqnc)







Next, consider α = 1/3 and β < β∗2 . Let pin(k|β) be the steady-state probability
when λn is such that (1−ρn)n1/3 = β. For notational clarity we use λn(β), qn(β)
and q(β) instead of λn, qn and q. It is possible to show that for β < β
′ and n






, ∀k ≤ n− 1. (B.4)
Before we show Eq. (B.4), we will use to conclude this part of the proof. Fix
β < β∗2 then we can find β
′ ∈ (max{β∗1 , β}, β∗2) for which Eq. (B.4) holds and,
therefore, from Proposition 2.2 we can take  ∈ (0, g(β′)) such that for n large
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enough we have














≤ n · pin(bq(β
′)c|β′)
pin(bqn(β′)c|β′)





























Hence, Eq. (B.4) is satisfied if and only if
λn(β
′)bqn(β
′)c−k ≤ λn(β)bqn(β′)c−k ⇔ λn(β′) ≤ λn(β)













since both expression in the last inequality above converge to β′ and β (respec-
tively) and β′ > β, we can always find n large enough so that the inequality is
true. This shows Eq. (B.4).
(ii) Consider first α ∈ (0, 1/3). Write








We next bound both terms and then show they converge to zero. The first term
in Eq. (B.5) is bounded above
bqnc∑
k=n
pin(k) ≤ pin(bqnc) · (bqnc − n+ 1)
= pin(bqnc) · (bqnc − qn + qn − n+ 1)
≤ pin(bqnc) · (
ρ2n
(1− ρn)2 + 1),
where in the last inequality we used that bqnc ≤ qn, and Theorem 2.1 part (i)













, ∀k > bqnc.
Let












< 1 ⇔ ρ
2
n
(1− ρn)2 < bqnc+ 1− n
which is equivalent to
ρ2n
(1− ρn)2 < 1− (qn − bqnc) + qn − n,
from Theorem 2.1 part (i), the last inequality becomes (qn − bqnc) < 1, which
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is always true. then
∞∑
k=bqnc+1






























where (a) holds because the term 1 + 1/
√
`− n is decreasing in `. Putting the
upper bounds for Eq. (B.5) together yields
P[Qn(∞) ≥ n] ≤ pin(bqnc) ·
( ρ2n





Observe that the term in brackets is O(nγ) for some γ > 0. Also, we can always
consider  > 0 such that β2/2 >  and then we can use Theorem 2.2 to find n0
such that for all n ≥ n0





− ) · n1−2α
)
.
Since pin(bqc) ≤ 1 and 1− 2α > 0 we conclude that





− ) · n1−2α
)
·O(nγ) −→ 0, as n→∞.
Note that for α = 1/3 and β > β∗2 the same argument holds, we only need
to chose  > 0 such that |g(β)| > . This is always possible since for β > β∗2
Theorem 2.2 establishes that g(β) < 0. This concludes the proof.
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1√|n− k| ∨ 1
)]
(B.6)
























= xn · log(ρn) +
[√


















In the expression above we can use that xn →∞, xn = bqnc − qn + ρ
2
(1−ρ)2 and


















xn +O(1) = O(1).


















(ii) We assume that α < 1/3 and we take m = bqc. Note that since α < 1/3 we
have
27ρ2n
4n · (1− ρn)3 → 0, as n→∞.
Then, we can use Theorem 2.1 and do a Taylor expansion to deduce that


















Hence, since α < 1/3 we deduce that
n− q = n · (1− ρn) +O(n(1+α)/2). (B.7)
























































Let’s look at each one of the terms A, B and C. For A, using Eq. (B.8), we
have that
(n−bqc) log(ρn) = n·(1−ρn) log(ρn)+O(n(1−α)/2) = −n·(1−ρn)2+O(n1−3α)+O(n(1−α)/2),
and because α < 1/3, we have that A/n1−2α → −β2. So we only need to case
analyze B and C. From the proof of part (i) we have
C =
ρn
(1− ρn) + log(1− ρn) +O(1) = o(n
1−2α),
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) + x−√n− x− (n− x) log(1 + 1√








bqc log( nbqc) + bqc −
√








= n− bqc log( nbqc)− bqc+ o(n
1−2α)











using that α < 1/3 it follows that this last expression, when scaled by 1/n1−2α,







→ −β2 + β
2
2

















, r(β), as n→∞. (B.8)
Observe that since we are considering β ≥ β∗1 the arccos(·) term is well defined


































Let’s look at each one of the terms A, B and C. For A, using Theorem 2.1 we
have that
A = (n−bqc) log(ρn) = n·(1−ρn)·r0,n(ρn) log(ρn)+o(1) = −n(1−ρn)2r0,n(ρn)+o(n1/3).
Similarly to part (ii) above, for C we deduce
C =
ρn
(1− ρn) + log(1− ρn) +O(1) =
ρn
(1− ρn) + o(n
1/3).
Finally, for B (similarly to part (ii) above)
B = n−
[
bqc log( nbqc) + bqc −
√
















and, therefore, using that n1/3(1 − ρn) → β, n − bqc = n(1 − ρn)r0,n(ρn) and




































, g(β), as n→∞.
(B.9)
It is possible to verify that g(β) satisfies g(β∗1) > 0 and it is strictly decreasing
for β ≥ β∗1 , with limβ→∞ g(β) = −∞, see Figure B.1. Therefore, there exists
β∗2 > β
∗
1 such that g(β
∗
2) = 0. Thus we have verified that g(β) is such that if
β∗1 < β < β
∗
2 then g(β) > 0, whereas if β > β
∗








Figure B.1: Function g(β) as defined in Eq. (B.9), g(β) is strictly decreasing and it
crosses zero at β∗2 .
Proof of Theorem 2.3. We make use of the lemmata B.1 and B.2 which we
first state and then prove after the proof of this theorem. We also make use of
Proposition 2.3 which is stated in the main text and proven in this appendix.
In order to simplify notation let p+n = P[Qn(∞) ≥ n]. Let β = β∗2 and α = 1/3






















































∀n ≥ n1. Next, fix  > 0 then by Proposition 2.3 we have that there exists n2 such
that
exp(−+ c) ≤ pin(bqnc)
pin(bqc) ≤ exp(+ c), ∀n ≥ n2.
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Therefore, for all n ≥ max{n1, n2}




≤ B(C) · exp(+ c),











Now we want to find the tightest upper and lower bound. To do this it is enough
to maximize the LHS and minimize the RHS above as a function of C. Since all the


























we have that pL(pH) ∈ (0, 1) increases with pH . In particular, limpH→1 pL(pH) = 1
and limpH→0 pL(pH) = 0, as desired.

Lemma B.1 Fix α ∈ (0, 1/3) and β > 0, or α = 1/3 and β > β∗1 . Suppose that




























· P[Qn(∞) < n]















where r(β) = limn→∞ r0,n(ρn).
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Lemma B.2 Fix α ∈ (0, 1) and β > 0. Suppose that limn→∞ nα(1− ρn) = β and let



























· P[Qn(∞) ≥ n]
pin(bqnc)

































































































· s2n − s
bn+1
2n
1− s2n , (B.10)




· (1 + 1√
n− x),
is decreasing in [0, q + bn] for n large, we show this at the end of the proof. Next we
show that both terms in Eq. (B.10) above converge to a constant. First note that
from Theorem 2.1 we have that q = n− z2n where z2n is given by n · (1− ρn) · r0,n(ρn).
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Note that 1 − r0,n(ρn) is of order O(n−(1−3α)/2) if α < 1/3 and r0,n(ρn) converges to














For the rest of the proof we will use b˜n to denote bn+(q−bqc). Note that |(q−bqc)| ≤ 1.







































































the last two terms above times bn converge to zero. Hence,

















(1−α)) which is o(1) when α < 1/3 and converges to −C2/(2β3/2 ·r(β)3/2)
when α = 1/3. The first three terms converge to C2. Indeed, recall that q solves the
equation
(n− q) + nρn√





= n(1− ρn). (B.11)
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Hence


















































































→ C2 − 1{α=1/3} · C
2
2(β · r(β))3/2 .































note that the function (βr(β))3/2 is strictly increasing and equal to 1/2 at β = β∗1 .
Because we are considering β > β∗1 , the last expression above is positive. Finally,
since this limit is a lower bound we obtain the desired lower bound for the lim inf.
A similar argument shows that
1
bn
















Next we move to the upper bound. We first note that
bqc+bn∑
k=bqc−bn
pin(k) ≤ pin(bqc) · (2 · bn + 1).
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Now we bound the terms in [0, bqc − bn − 1] and [bqc+ bn + 1, n− 1] separately.
1

















































































bn · (1− s1n) ,









in (b) the inequality of arithmetic and geometric means, and in (c) the fact that hn(x)






































− 3n2 + n(8√n− x+ 6) + 4x√n− x− 12√n− x+ 3x2 − 6x
)





















z˜2n + bn + (n− z˜2n)bn −
b2n
2
− 2(n− 1) log
( z˜n + 1√
z˜2n + bn + 1
)]
,
If we denote this last expression s˜1n then for bn(1− s˜1n) we have that
bn(1− s˜1n) = bn − 1
nρn
[















= bn − 1
nρn
[





























































where in the last equality we used that when α < 1/3 then (1−r0,n) = O(n−(1−3α)/2).
This last expression converges to 1
2
(C2 − 1{α=1/3} · C22(β·r(β))3/2 ), which is a positive
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quantity. Therefore, for n large enough we have s˜1n ≤ 1 and, thus
1








bn · (1− s1n) ≤
s˜bn1n












C2 − 1{α=1/3} · C22(β·r(β))3/2
) ,
where is the second inequality we used that for n large enough s˜1n ≤ 1.
Next we move to the range [bqc+ bn + 1, n− 1]. First observe that
n−1∑
k=bq˜nc
pin(k) ≤ pin(n) · (n− bq˜nc) ≤ pin(n)
pin(bqnc)
· (n− bq˜nc)→ 0,
where the limit follows from Proposition 2.2 part i). Thus,
1































































bn · (1− s2n) .












































































Denoting this last expression by s˜2n we have that










































= ρn · n · b
2
n











= ρn · n · b
2
n
2bqc2 − ρn ·
b2n
4z˜3n
+ bn · (1− ρn)2 · (1− rn) · rn + o(1)
= ρn · n · b
2
n




where from the first to second equality we we did a Taylor expansion around zero
of the functions log(1 + x), log((1 − x)/(1 + x)) and √1− x, and collected the o(1)
terms. In the last equality we used that when α < 1/3 then (1− rn) = O(n−(1−3α)/2).
As before we can argue that s˜2n ≤ 1 for n large. From this we have
1






bn · (1− s2n) ≤
s˜bn2n












C2 − 1{α=1/3} · C22(β·r(β))3/2
) .






· (1 + 1√
n− x),
we show is decreasing in (0, q + bn] for n large. First,
dhn
dx













so hn(x) is decreasing if and only if x ≤ 2((n− x)3/2 + n− x). Note that the LHS in
the previous inequality is strictly increasing and the RHS is strictly decreasing. Also,
at x = 0 the LHS is below the RHS, and for x = n the converse is true. Therefore,
there if for some y,
y
2







then the same is true for all x ≤ y. Consider y = q + bn and let `n = 1− bnn−q




n− q − bn
)














· (q − nρn)
nρn
)
= (n− q)3/2`n ·




note that for n large enough nρn(
√





[ q + bn
`n(nρn(
√







= n(1−3α)/2(nα(1− ρn)r0,n(ρn))3/2, (B.13)
where we used that n − q = n(1 − ρn)r0,n(ρn). Since `n → 1, Hn → 1. If α < 1/3
then for n large enough the previous inequality hold. If α = 1/3 and β > β∗1 , the
LHS in Eq (B.13) converges to 1/2 and the RHS to (βr(β))3/2. This last function is
strictly increasing and equal to 1/2 at β = β∗1 . This implies that for n large enough
Eq. (B.13) is satisfied, completing the proof.






















































































Next we compute limits for bn(1 − s1n) and bn(1 − s2n). Before we begin note that






n/(1− ρn)2 and let b˜n = bn + (qn − bqnc) then
bn(1− s1n) = bn
b˜n
[

































































For bn(1− s2n) we have
bn(1− s2n) = bn
b˜n
[















































Finally, since this limit is a lower bound we obtain the desired lower bound for the
lim inf.

























so we just need to upper bound both summation on the right hand side of Eq. (B.15)












































where in (a) we used the inequality of arithmetic and geometric means, and the fact
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that the function inside the summation is increasing. For s1n we have
s1n =
1

















ρn · bn ·
[





ρn · bn ·
[
− 2zn + 2 log(zn + 1) + 2
√
z2n − bn − 2 log(
√
z2n − bn + 1) + bn
]
,
then denoting the last expression above by s˜1n we have



























































































where we used the inequality of arithmetic and geometric means, the fact that the
function inside the summation is decreasing, and that for app ` ≥ bqnc+ 1 the terms
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in the summation are strictly bounded above by 1. For s2n, if we let z˜
2






























z˜2n + bn − 2z˜n + bn
]
,
denoting this last term by s˜2n we have




z˜2n + bn − 2z˜n + bn
]




































Finally, since this limit is an upper bound we obtain the desired upper bound for the
lim sup. 
Proof of Lemma 2.2. This result is a direct consequence of Lemmata B.1 and
B.2 which were stated and proved right before the present proof. 
Proof of Proposition 2.3. Consider the following






, y ∈ (−(β∗2 − β∗1), (β∗2 − β∗1)) = D.
Note that n1/3(1 − ρn(y)) = β∗2 + y > β∗1 and ρn(y) ↑ 1, hence we can always find





























Furthermore, observe that both q and qn are continuous functions of y,










since we are using the floor function, fn(·) might not be continuos. In the first step
of this proof we show that the potential jumps of fn(·) in D converge to zero (Step
1). Then we show that there exists a sequence γcn such that fn(γ
c
n)→ c (Step 2) and
γcn → 0 (Step 3).
Step 1. Fix  > 0. First, we prove that there exists n˜ such that for all n ≥ n˜ we
have that
∀y ∈ D, ∃δ > 0 such that ∀y˜ : |y˜ − y| < δ ⇒ |fn(y˜)− fn(y)| < . (B.17)
We choose n˜ such that for all n ≥ n˜:




∣∣∣ log [ nbq(z)c+ 1]∣∣∣ ≤ 6 , and supz∈D
∣∣∣ log (1 + 1√












This is possible because for any z ∈ D, (bqn(z)c − n) ↑ ∞.
Let n ≥ n1 and fix y ∈ D, we consider the first three terms in fn(·), see Eq.
(B.16). Let Qn(y˜) = bqn(y˜)c − bq(y˜)c and Rn(y˜) = qn(y˜) − q(y˜), and note that
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|Qn(y˜)− Rn(y˜)| ≤ 2 for any y˜. Also, Rn(y˜) log(ρn(y˜)) is continuous; therefore, there
exists δ1 such that
|Rn(y˜) log(ρn(y˜))−Rn(y) log(ρn(y))| ≤ /9, ∀y˜ : |y˜ − y| < δ1.
Using this, for the first term in Eq. (B.16), we have∣∣∣Qn(y˜) log(ρn(y˜))−Qn(y) log(ρn(y))∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣(Qn(y˜)−Rn(y˜)) log(ρn(y˜)) +Rn(y˜) log(ρn(y˜))
− (Qn(y)−Rn(y)) log(ρn(y))−Rn(y) log(ρn(y))
∣∣∣
≤ 2| log(ρn(y˜))|+ 2| log(ρn(y))|




for all y˜ such that |y˜− y| < δ1. For the second term in Eq. (B.16), observe that since
q(·) is continuous there always exists δ2 > 0 such that for all y˜ with |y˜ − y| < δ2 we























)]∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣ log [ nbq(y˜)c+ 1 · (1 + 1√n− bq(y˜)c − 1
)]∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣ log [ nbq(y˜)c+ 1]∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣ log (1 + 1√





Finally, for the third term in Eq. (B.16), since qn(·) is continuous there always exists





















Putting the three inequalities jus proved together, for δ ≤ min{δ1, δ2, δ3}, delivers




then Eq. (B.17) ensures that ∆n → 0.
Step 2. We construct γcn and show that fn(γ
c
n)→ c. Fix y1 ∈ (−(β∗2−β∗1), 0) and
y2 ∈ (0, β∗2 − β∗1), we next argue that there exists n2 such that for all n ≥ n2 it holds
that fn(y1) > c > fn(y2). Indeed, consider first y1 and note that β
∗
2 +y1 ∈ (β∗1 , β∗2). For
g(·) as in Proposition 2.2 part iii), one has g(β∗2 + y1) > 0. So, again by Proposition
2.2 part iii) we have that for any 1 ∈ (0, g(β∗2 + y1)) there exists n1,2 such that for
all n ≥ n1,2 we have
c < n1/3 · (g(β1)− 1) < fn(y1).
A similar argument that leverages the fact that g(β∗2 +y2) < 0 shows that there exists
n2,2 such that for all n ≥ n2,2 we have fn(y2) < c. We take n2 = max{n1,2, n2,2} to
conclude that for all n ≥ n2 it holds that fn(y1) > c > fn(y2). To conclude consider
n ≥ max{n1, n2} then, by Step 1 we can always find γcn ∈ (y1, y2) such that
c− ∆n
2
≤ fn(γcn) ≤ c+
∆n
2
Taking limit at both sides and using that ∆n → 0, we conclude that fn(γcn)→ c.
Step 3. To conclude the proof we need to argue that γcn → 0. Note from the





This implies that there exists a subsequence {γck(n)} that convergences to a point
γˆc ≥ . Let










then k(n)1/3(1− ρˆk(n))→ β?2 + γˆc. Because g(β?2 + γˆc) < 0 from Proposition 2.2, for
′ > 0 such that g(β?2 + γˆ
c) + ′ < 0, we can deduce that for all n large enough
fk(n)(γ
c
k(n)) ≤ n1/3(g(β?2 + γˆc) + ′) ≤ c− ′.
However, from Step 1 we know that fk(n)(γ
c
k(n))→ c. This, together with the previous
inequality yields a contradiction. The case when lim infn→∞ γcn <  can be treated
similarly and is thus omitted. Therefore, for any  > 0
 ≤ lim inf
n→∞
γcn ≤ lim sup
n→∞
γcn ≤ ,
since  is arbitrary we have that γcn → 0, which concludes the proof.

Proof of Proposition 2.4. We prove both statement separately.
(i) We show that
lim
n→∞
P[Qn(∞) < bqnc − C ·
√
log(n) · n1.5α] = 0,
the other case in analogous. To reduce notation let bn = C ·
√
log(n) · n1.5α for
some C > 0 that we will choose later in the proof then
P[Qn(∞) < bqnc − bn] ≤ P[Qn(∞) < n] + P[n ≤ Qn(∞) ≤ bqnc − bn]




by Theorem 2.2 part (i) the first term converges to zero. For the second term we
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where in (a) we used the inequality of arithmetic and geometric means. We next
show the last term above converges to zero.
Recall that qn = n+ z
2
n where zn =
ρn
(1−ρn) . We have
sn =
1

















ρn · bn ·
[





ρn · bn ·
[
− 2zn + 2 log(zn + 1) + 2
√
z2n − bn − 2 log(
√
z2n − bn + 1) + bn
]
,
denote this last term by s˜n. Then
s˜n =
1
ρn · bn ·
[






























































Hence, s˜n → 1 and









+O(n−α/2 log(n)3/2) = O(log(n)). (B.18)
From this we can deduce that bn · (1− s˜n)→ +∞ (which implies that s˜n ≤ 1) and
bn·(1−s˜n)2 = O(log(n))·(1−s˜n) = O(log(n))·O(n−3α/2
√
log(n)) −→ 0 as n→∞.








































→ β3C2/4. So if we choose C such that







(ii) We show that
lim
n→∞
P[Qn(∞) < bqc − C ·
√
log(n) · √n] = 0,
283
the other case is analogous. To reduce notation let bn = C ·
√
log(n) · n for some
C > 0 that we identify later then


















































































in (b) the inequality of arithmetic and geometric means, and in (c) the fact that
the term we are summing in the second summation is decreasing in ` is decreasing
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− 3n2 + n(8√n− x+ 6) + 4x√n− x− 12√n− x+ 3x2 − 6x
)


























− 2(n− 1) log
( z˜n + 1√




If we denote this last expression s˜1n then for (1− s˜1n) we have that
(1− s˜1n) = 1− 1
bnnρn
[









































































































hence, s˜n → 1 and












From this we can deduce that bn · (1− s˜n)→ +∞ (which implies that s˜n ≤ 1) and




) −→ 0 as n→∞.
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where r(β) = limn→∞ r0,n(ρn), and the term in brackets in the expression above is



















The Scope of Sequential Screening With Ex-Post
Participation Constraints
C.1 Proofs for Section 3.5
Proof of Lemma 3.1. The proof of this result is standard and thus omitted.

Proof of Lemma 3.2. The fact that the optimal solution is a threshold allo-
cation is explained in the main text. Thus, we only need to provide a proof for θ̂
being in the interval [θ̂1, θ̂K ]. Note that for all θ below θ̂1, µk(θ) is negative for all
k ∈ {1, . . . , K}. Therefore, µ¯(θ) is negative for all θ below θ̂1. Similarly, for all θ
above θ̂K , µ¯(θ) is positive. Since the allocation is of the threshold type, it is optimal
to set x(θ) equal to 0 for θ below θ̂1 and to set x(θ) equal to 1 for θ above θ̂K . This
necessarily implies that θ̂ is in [θ̂1, θ̂K ]. 
Proof of Theorem 3.1. We first show the sufficiency of our condition and then
its necessity. We denote by Ω the space of non-decreasing allocations, that is,
Ω , {x : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] : x(·) is non-decreasing}.
Sufficiency. We assume condition (APR) holds, we want to verify the static contract
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is optimal. In order to do so we dualize the IC constraints. The Lagrangian is

















where wL, wH correspond to the multipliers for the ex-post IR constraints, and λ ∈
{λHL, λLH} to the multipliers for IC constraints. In the Lagrangian above we have
chosen the multipliers as follows
wL = αL − αHrHH(θ̂), wH = αH + αHrHH(θ̂), λHL = αLrLH(θ̂), λLH = 0, (C.1)
these multipliers are non-negative because rHH(θ̂) ≤ 0, rLH(θ̂) ≥ 0 and
wH = αH + αHr




(θ̂)⇔ θ̂ ≥ 0.
Hence, maximizing the Lagrangian over non-decreasing allocation xL and xH yields an
upper bound for the relaxed problem. Note that this choice of multipliers eliminates
the uL and uH terms in the Lagrangian. We next show that under (APR) the solution

















To prove this first note that the optimal solution xL on the left hand side of (C.2)
must be of the threshold type, that is, xL(θ) = 1{θ≥θ?}, because xL(·) is non-decreasing











dz, ∀θ? ∈ [0, 1].
Replacing the value of λHL, this equation can be cast over values θ
?












, ∀θ?1 ≤ θ̂ ≤ θ?2 (C.3)
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Condition (APR) ensures the equation above always hold. Indeed, condition (APR)












Taking  ↓ 0 yields the left hand side inequality in (C.3). The right hand side
inequality in (C.3) can be verified using an analogous argument. This shows (C.2),
that is, the static contract maximizes the part of the Lagrangian that corresponds to
interim type L. We now prove the same for type H. Note first that the optimality









































where in (a) we have used the definition of rHH(·) and in (b) our assumption that
rHH(·) is increasing. Thus, we have proved that for this choice of Lagrange multipliers
the static contract maximizes the Lagrangian. Since the value of the Lagrangian
coincides with the primal objective at the static solution, and this solution is always
primal feasible. We conclude that the static contract is optimal.
Necessity. We differ this proof to the proof of Proposition 3.1. In it we show that
whenever condition (APR) is not satisfied, there is a contract different from the static
one with a strictly larger revenue. 
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Proof of Proposition 3.1. Assume (APR) does not hold, then by Lemma C.1














Consider a solution in which we set uL = uH = 0, and
xL(θ) =

0 if θ < θ1
x if θ1 ≤ θ ≤ θ2
1 if θ2 < θ,
xH(θ) =

0 if θ < θ̂







FH(z)dz. We next show that this solution is feasible
and that yields an strict revenue improvement over the static contract.
Feasibility. The ex-post participation constraints are clearly satisfied. Also,
since θ1 < θ̂ < θ2 we have xL ∈ (0, 1), and both xL(·) and xH(·) are non-decreasing















By replacing the allocations and ex-post utilities we obtain that the IC constraints

























note that we are using here that by Lemma C.1 the denominator on the right hand
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where the inequalities come from the fact that rLL(·) is an increasing function and













note that we are using here that by Lemma C.1 the denominator on the left hand side
is strictly positive. This inequality together with (C.6) yields (C.5) and, therefore,
the proposed solution is feasible.
Revenue improvement. We need to prove that∫ θmax
θ̂









































RLH(θ, θ̂) > min
θ̂≤θ≤θmax
RLH(θ̂, θ).

















Proof of Lemma C.1. Note that both rLH(·, θ̂) and rLH(θ̂, ·) are continuous
functions. Thus the maximum and the minimum in the statement are achieved by
some θ˜a ∈ [0, θ̂] and θ˜b ∈ [θ̂, θ], respectively. Therefore, by assumption, we have that
RLH(θ˜a, θ̂) > R
LH(θ̂, θ˜b).
Using the continuity of both function we can find θa < θ̂ and θb > θ̂ such that the
inequality above is satisfied.




LH(z)dz. Note that since θb > θ̂ ≥ θ̂a
(see Lemma 3.2) we have RLH(θ̂, θb) > 0. Therefore, R
LH(θa, θ̂) > 0 which imply the
desired inequalities. 
Proof of Lemma 3.3. From Lemma 3.2 we have that θ̂L ≤ θ̂ ≤ θ̂H . For ex-
ponential distributions, θ̂L = 1/λL and θ̂H = 1/λH . Therefore, θ̂ ∈ [1/λL, 1/λL].
Moreover, θ̂ must satisfy (3.8), if not we could increase it or decrease and obtain an
strict revenue improvement.
We provide a proof for the rest of the properties for general distributions satisfying
(DHR). Note first that θ̂ can be seen as a function of αL and αH but since αH equals
1 − αL, we can effectively consider θ̂ just a function of αL. Then, when αL equals 0
is as we only had type H buyers and, therefore, the optimal threshold is θ̂H . While
when αL equals 1 is as we only had type L buyers so the optimal threshold is θ̂L.
Hence, θ̂(0) equals θ̂H and θ̂(1) equals θ̂L.












αLfL(z)µL(z) + (1− αL)fH(z)µH(z)dz,




L) ≤ `(θ̂(αbL), αbL)
= `(θ̂(αbL), α
b
L − αaL) + `(θ̂(αbL), αaL)








Recall that θ̂ is in [θ̂L, θ̂H ] and, therefore, θ̂L ≤ θ̂(αaL) < θ̂(αbL) ≤ θ̂H . This in turn
implies that
µL(z) > 0 and µH(z) < 0, ∀z ∈ (θ̂(αaL), θ̂(αbL)),
so for z in (θ̂(αaL), θ̂(α
b
L)) we have
αaLfL(z)µL(z) + (1− αaL)fH(z)µH(z) < αbLfL(z)µL(z) + (1− αbL)fH(z)µH(z),
which contradicts (C.7). 
Proof of Proposition 3.2. We make use of Theorem 3.1. Condition (APR)
for the exponential distribution is
max
θ≤θ̂
{ θ̂e−λLθ̂ − θe−λLθ





e−λHθ − e−λH θ̂
}
. (C.8)




e−λH θ̂ − e−λHθ and g(θ) ,
θe−λLθ − θ̂e−λLθ̂


















· e−θ̂(λL−λH) ≤ θ̂ · e−θ̂(λL−λH) ⇐⇒ θ̂ ≤ 1
λL − λH . (C.11)
Now, suppose condition (APR) holds and
θ̂ >
1
λL − λH (C.12)
From equations (C.9),(C.10) and (C.11) we see that






{ θ̂e−λLθ̂ − θe−λLθ





e−λHθ − e−λH θ̂
}
(C.13)
contradicting the fact that condition (APR) holds.
For the other direction, assume equation (3.9) holds. We first prove that for θ ≤ θ̂
we have g(θ) ≤ g(θ̂), indeed
g(θ) ≤ g(θ̂)⇐⇒ θ̂e
−λLθ̂ − θe−λLθ




⇐⇒ λH · (θ̂e−λLθ̂ − θe−λLθ) ≥ (e−λH θ̂ − e−λHθ) · (λLθ̂ − 1) · e−θ̂(λL−λH)
⇐⇒ λH θ̂ · (1− θ
θ̂
e−λL(θ−θ̂))− (1− e−λH(θ−θ̂)) · (λLθ̂ − 1) ≥ 0,
so we just need to see that this last inequality holds for θ ≤ θ̂. For doing so define
H(θ) , λH θ̂ · (1− θ
θ̂
e−λL(θ−θ̂))− (1− e−λH(θ−θ̂)) · (λLθ̂ − 1),
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and note that H(θ̂) = 0 and
H(0) = λH θ̂ + (e
λH θ̂ − 1) · (λLθ̂ − 1) ≥ λH θ̂ + λH θ̂(λLθ̂ − 1) = λH θ̂ · λLθ̂ > 0,
where the inequality comes from convexity of the exponential function and the fact
that θ̂ ≥ 1/λL. Furthermore the derivative of H is given by
dH
dθ
= λH(λLθ − 1)e−λL(θ−θ̂) − λH(λLθ̂ − 1)e−λH(θ−θ̂),
and it can be easily verified that for θ ≤ θ̂ we have dH/dθ ≤ 0. This together to the




{ θ̂e−λLθ̂ − θe−λLθ






Now we prove that for θ ≥ θ̂ we have g(θ) ≥ g(θ̂). Note that if we prove this we are
done because this and what we have just proven imply condition (APR). As before
we do
g(θ) ≥ g(θ̂)⇐⇒ θe
−λLθ − θ̂e−λLθ̂




⇐⇒ λH(θ̂e−λLθ̂ − θe−λLθ) ≥ (λLθ̂ − 1) · (e−λH θ̂ − e−λHθ) · e−θ̂(λL−λH)
⇐⇒ λH(θ̂ − θe−λL(θ−θ̂))− (λLθ̂ − 1) · (1− e−λH(θ−θ̂)) ≥ 0,
note that the LHS of this last inequality is again the function H(·) but this time
defined for θ ≥ θ̂. We have H(θ̂) = 0. It is easy to prove that for θ̂ ≤ θ ≤ θ˜
the function H(θ) is increasing, and then for θ > θ˜ is decreasing, where θ˜ > θ̂ and
dH(θ˜)/dθ = 0. Also,
lim
θ→∞
H(θ) = λH θ̂ − (λLθ̂ − 1) ≥ 0,
hence for θ ≥ θ̂ we have H(θ) ≥ 0 and, therefore, g(θ) ≥ g(θ̂) for all θ ≥ θ̂, as desired.

Proof of Corollary 3.1. Recall that for any λL > λH from Lemma 3.3 we have
1
λL





λL ≤ 2λH ⇐⇒ 1
λH
≤ 1
λL − λH ,
therefore, for any αL ∈ [0, 1] equation (3.9) is satisfied. Then by Proposition 3.2 we
conclude that the static contract is optimal for any αL ∈ [0, 1]. 
Proof of Corollary 3.2. First we show θ̂(·) is continuous from the right at




and suppose θ̂(αnL) does not converge to θ̂(0) = 1/λH . That is,
∃ > 0,∀n0,∃n ≥ n0, | 1
λH
− θ̂(αnL)| > ,
since θ̂(αnL) ≤ 1λH we have
| 1
λH
− θ̂(αnL)| > ⇐⇒
1
λH
− θ̂(αnL) > .
This in turn means that we can create a subsequence {α`nL } ⊂ {αnL} such that
∀n, 1
λH
−  > θ̂(α`nL ). (C.14)
But since θ̂(α`nL ) is a maximizer of Π




−λLθ̂(α`nL ) +(1−α`nL )θ̂(α`nL )e−λH θ̂(α
`n









because λL > λH we can bound the LHS above to obtain
θ̂(α`nL )e








−λH 1λH . (C.15)
Note that the function θe−λHθ has a unique maximum at θ = 1/λH and since θ̂(α`nL )






−λH( 1λH +δ()) > θ̂(α`nL )e
−λH θ̂(α`nL ), ∀n,
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−λH 1λH , ∀n,
so taking the limit over n gives a contradiction. In conclusion we have proved that
θ̂(·) is continuous from the right at zero. Now, to finalize the proof recall that we are




λL−λH . However, since θ̂(0) = 1/λH and
θ̂(·) is continuous from the right we can always find α¯L ∈ (0, 1] such that
1
λH
≥ θ̂(α¯L) ≥ 1
λL − λH ,
so thanks to Proposition 3.2, the sequential contract is optimal when we set αL > α¯L.
Note that the same arguments is valid for 1/λL. That is, we can show that θ̂(αL) is
continuos from the left at 1 and then using the fact that
1




we can find α¯H ∈ [α¯L, 1) such that
1




hence in [α¯H , 1] the static contract is optimal. All of this implies that since θ̂(·) is a
non-increasing function we can always find α¯ ∈ (0, 1) with the desired property. 
Proof of Corollary 3.3. Fix λH and αL. Suppose the result is not true, that
is,
∀λ¯L ≥ 2λH ,∃λL ≥ λ¯L, θ̂(λL) ≤ 1
λL − λH .
From this we can construct a sequence λnL ≥ 2λH such that
lim
n→∞
λnL =∞ and θ̂(λnL) ≤
1
λnL − λH
, ∀n ∈ N,














However, since θ̂(λnL) maximizes Π










−λH 1λH ≤ Πstatic(θ̂(λnL)).





−λH 1λH ≤ 0,
a contradiction. 
C.2 Proofs for Section 3.6














s.t xk(θ) non-decreasing, ∀k ∈ {L,H}








We separate this proof into two parts. In part 1 we show that the optimal solution
has the structure in the statement of the theorem. Note that it is enough to provide
a proof for the structure of the allocation, the transfers can be readily derived from
Lemma 3.1. In part 2 we derive the properties about the thresholds, xL and uH and
uL.
Part 1. For any optimal solution to (PR) two possible situations may arise:
1. The allocation has at least one interval in which is continuously strictly increas-
ing.
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2. The allocation does not have an interval in which is continuously strictly in-
creasing, but is a piecewise constant non-decreasing function.
For each interim type, we prove that if we are in case (1), we can modify the
allocation in that interval to be constant and obtain at least a weak improvement in
the objective. This implies that for any optimal allocation, we can construct another
optimal allocation that is a piecewise constant non-decreasing function. Therefore,
we can always assume we are in case (2). In this case, we show that for interim type
L there is only one intermediate step, and for interim type H there is no intermediate
step.
We split the proof in interim type L and H. Let x?L(θ) and x
?
H(θ) denote the
optimal allocations. We begin with interim type L.
• interim type L case (1): Suppose there is an interval (θ1, θ2) in which x?L(θ) is
continuously strictly increasing. Before we start with the main argument, note
that if θ̂L > θ1 then we can set x
?
L(θ) to be equal to x
?
L(θ1) for all θ in (θ1, θ̂L).
This strictly increases the objective function while maintaining feasibility. So
we can assume θ̂L ≤ θ1, which in turn implies that µL(·) is non-negative in the
interval (θ1, θ2).
Now we give the main argument. Note that by Theorem 1 in [44, p. 217], x?L(θ)
must maximize the Lagrangian:1

















with λ,wL, wH ≥ 0. Define LL(·) by
LL(θ) , αLµL(θ)fL(θ)− λFH(θ),
1To use this theorem we need to verify that there is a feasible solution that strictly satisfies all
inequalities. We can take uL = uH > 0, xL(θ) = 1{θ≥θL} and xH(θ) = 1{θ≥θH} with θH < θL.
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then it must be the case that LL(θ) = 0 for all θ ∈ (θ1, θ2). Suppose this is
not true, then we could have θ̂ ∈ (θ1, θ2) such that LL(θ̂) > 0, since LL(·)
is a continuous function this must also be true for all θ ∈ (θ̂ − , θ̂ + ) for
 > 0 small enough. But then we can obtain a strict improvement by setting
x1(θ) = x
?
L(θ̂ + ) for all θ ∈ (θ̂ − , θ̂ + ). A similar argument holds when





= λ ≥ 0, ∀θ ∈ (θ1, θ2), (C.16)









Going back to (PR), we have that the part of objective associated to x?L in








where in the equality we have used (C.16). Now, consider modifying x?L to be
x˜?L equal to x
?
L(θ̂) in (θ1, θ2). Then from (C.16), (C.17) and (C.18) we get∫ θ2
θ1












therefore, the modified x˜?L has the same objective value than the old one. Also,
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where in (a) we used equation (C.17).
• interim type L case (2): Suppose for x?L(·) there exists θ1 < θ2 < θ3 and
0 < x1 < x2 < 1 such that x
?
L(θ) = x1 in (θ1, θ2) and x
?
L(θ) = x2 in (θ2, θ3).
Since type’s L allocation is piecewise constant we must have x?L(θ
−






Then, the part of objective associated to interim type L in these intervals is
αL · x1 ·
∫ θ2
θ1




If µL(θ̂) ≤ 0 for some θ̂ ∈ (θ1, θ3) then because of (DHR), µL(θ) ≤ 0 for all
θ ≤ θ̂ and, therefore, we can always find a better solution by setting x?L(θ) = 0
for all θ ≤ θ̂ (note that this does not affect feasibility in (PR)). So assume








otherwise we could increase x1 and obtain an strict improvement in the objec-













: In this case consider decreasing x2 by 2 >
0 and increasing x1 by 1 > 0, in such a way that equation (C.20) remains




FH(z)dz − 2 ·
∫ θ3
θ2
FH(z)dz = 0. (C.21)
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which under our current assumption is non-negative. So we can weakly
improve our objective, indeed we can do it so until x1 + 1 and x2− 2 are
equal,














since x2 > x1 we have 2 > 0 and, therefore, we have shown that it is
possible to increase x1 and to decrease x2 in such a way the objective is













: In this case consider increasing x2 by 2 > 0
and decreasing x1 by 1 > 0 in such a way that equation (C.20) remains
with equality. By doing this the change in the objective is strictly positive,









This proves the result for interim type L and case (2).
In conclusion, putting together what we have proved for type L in cases (1) and
(2), we can always consider x?L to be a step function with at most one intermediate
step as in the statement of the proposition.
Now we proceed with interim type 2.
• interim type H case (1): Suppose there is an arbitrary interval (θ1, θ2) in
which x?H(θ) is continuously strictly increasing. Before we start with the main
argument, note that if θ̂H < θ2 then we can set x
?
H(θ) to be equal to x
?
H(θ2) for
all θ in (θ̂H , θ2). This strictly increases the objective function and maintains
feasibility. So we can assume θ̂H ≥ θ2, which in turn implies that µH(·) is
non-positive in the interval (θ1, θ2).
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Now we give the main argument. Note that by Theorem 1 in [44, p. 217], x?H(θ)
must maximize the Lagrangian

















with λ,wL, wH ≥ 0. Define LH(·) by
LH(θ) , αHµH(θ)fH(θ) + λFH(θ),
then it must be the case that LH(θ) = 0 for all θ ∈ (θ1, θ2). Suppose this is
not true, then we could have θ̂ ∈ (θ1, θ2) such that LH(θ̂) > 0, since LH(·)
is a continuous function this must also be true for all θ ∈ (θ̂ − , θ̂ + ) for
 > 0 small enough. But then we can obtain an strict improvement by setting
x2(θ) = x
?
H(θ̂ + ) for all θ ∈ (θ̂ − , θ̂ + ). A similar argument holds when





= −λ, ∀θ ∈ (θ1, θ2). (C.23)
Also note that by the second mean value theorem for integrals, there exists








Going back to (PR), we have that the part of objective associated to x?H in









where in the equality we have used (C.23). Now, consider modifying x?H to be
x˜?H equal to x
?
H(θ̂) in (θ1, θ2). Then from (C.23), (C.24) and (C.25) we get∫ θ2
θ1












therefore, the modified x˜?H has the same objective value than the old one. Also,
































where in (a) we used equation (C.24).
• interim type H case (2): Suppose x?H(·) is an optimal solution to (PR) for
which there exists θ1 < θ2 and 0 < x < 1 such that x
?
H(θ) = x in (θ1, θ2).
Similar to the proof of type L assume x?H(θ
−





Then the part of the objective for the interim type 2 in this interval is




If µH(θ̂) ≥ 0 for some θ̂ ∈ (θ1, θ2) then because of (DHR), µH(θ) ≥ 0 for all
θ ≥ θ̂ and, therefore, we can always find a better solution by setting x?H(θ) = 1
for all θ ≥ θ̂ (note that this does not affect feasibility in (PR)). So assume









otherwise we could decrease x and obtain an strict improvement in the objective.
Now, consider splitting the interval in half, that is, take θ̂ = (θ1 + θ2)/2 and












We can modify x?H(θ) in (θ1, θ2) as follows and obtain an, at least weakly,
objective improvement. For θ ∈ (θ1, θ̂) set x?H(θ) = x − 1 and for θ ∈ (θ̂, θ2)
























which by equation (C.28) is non-negative. Then we can keep increasing 2 until
either x − 1 = x?H(θ−1 ) or x + 2 = x?H(θ+2 ). This proofs we can, at least
weakly, improve the objective. It also proves that we can modify the solution
in such a way that for one of the two halves of the intervals the step reaches
the boundary bound given by either x?H(θ
−




2 ). For the half that did
not reach the boundary, we can do the same procedure described above and







2 )). Note that this process can be potentially infinite,
in which case a more rigorous argument is required.
Suppose the process described above goes for infinitely many steps. In this case,
an allocation sequence {xnH(θ)}n∈N defined in [θ1, θ2] is generated. To prove that


















To prove this, let {θn, θn, θ̂n}n∈N be the sequence generated in the infinite process
where:
– θn and θn correspond to the lower and upper bound of the interval. For
example, at the beginning θ1 = θ1 and θ1 = θ2. At the next iteration we
will have either θ2 = θ1 and θ2 = θ̂ or θ2 = θ̂ and θ2 = θ2. Note that for
all n ∈ N: θn, θn ∈ [θ1, θ2].
– θ̂n is defined to be the half of the interval. So θ̂1 = θ̂, and θ̂2 = (θ2 + θ2)/2.
From these definitions we have that θn and θn are bounded monotonic sequences






then all three quantities, θn, θn and θ̂n, converge to the same limit which we
denote by θ∞ ∈ [θ1, θ2] (if the limit was not the same we could continue iterating








1 ) if θ < θ∞
x?H(θ
+
2 ) if θ ≥ θ∞,
∀θ ∈ [θ1, θ2].
Finally, we can use the almost surely version of the dominated convergence
theorem to obtain (C.29). This completes the proof for interim type 2 and case
(2).
In conclusion, putting together what we have proved for type H in cases (1) and
(2), we can always consider x?H to be a threshold allocation as in the statement of
the proposition.
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s.t χ ∈ [0, 1], θ1 ≤ θ2











• uL = 0: From the formulation above it is clear that is always optimal to set
uL = 0.
• θ̂L ≤ θ1: Suppose the opposite, that is, θ̂L > θ1. This implies that between θ1
and θ̂1, µL(·) is negative. Then, we can increase θ1 while keeping feasibility and,
at the same time, increasing the objective function. Note this argument is also
valid when θ1 = θ2. Also, note that we can obtain a strict improvement only
when x > 0; however, when x = 0 we can only obtain a weak improvement. In
either case, we can always consider θ̂L ≤ θ1.
• θH ≤ θ̂H : Suppose the opposite, θH > θ̂H . Since µH(θ) > 0 for all θ ≥ θ̂H , we
can can decrease θH and obtain an objective improvement while maintaining
feasibility.











otherwise, we could decrease uH and, by doing so, improve the objective. Since
uH > 0, equation (C.30) yields











then it must be true that θ1 < θH ; otherwise, from equation (C.31) we would















which implies ∫ θ1
θH
FH(z)dz < 0,
a contradiction. Thus, θ1 < θH .
Now consider, a new contract for type H which consists on decreasing the cut-off
θH by  > 0 sufficiently small, but at the same time maintaining the equality in
equation (C.30). Specifically, let θH() = θH −  > 0 (which we can do because











note that by taking  small we still have uH() > 0. We claim that this new
contract, characterized by θ1, θ2, x, θH() and uH(), yields a larger objective
























We obtain a similar expression for the new contract’s objective. Specifically,
the first two terms in the expression above are the same and the third term
differs in θH . Hence, the new contract yields an improvement over the old one







Since θH() < θH this last inequality is true. Thus, if uH > 0 we can always
construct a new contract yielding a larger objective value and, therefore, at any
optimal contract we must have uH = 0.





















which implies θH = θ2, a contradiction.
• θ1 ≤ θH : First we show that θ1 ≤ θ̂H . Suppose the opposite, that is, θ1 > θ̂H .



























That is, the IC constraint is not binding. Therefore, since θ1 > θ̂H ≥ θ̂L we can
slightly decrease θ1 and, in this way, obtain an objective improvement whenever
x > 0. When x = 0, because θ2 ≥ θ1, we can decrease θ2 and obtain an objective
improvement as well. Hence, at any optimal solution we must have θ1 ≤ θ̂H .









Using that θ1 ≤ θ̂H implies θH < θ̂H , we can slightly increase θH (maintaining
feasibility) and thus obtain an objective improvement. In conclusion, at any
optimal solution we must have θ1 ≤ θH .
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FH(z)dz: since θ̂L ≤ θ, the part of the objective that
involves x is always non-negative and, therefore, it is optimal to make x as







FH(z)dz, thus the result.

Proof of Theorem 3.3. We divide the proof into two part. In part 1 we show
that the solution to the relaxed problem and the original problem coincide. In part
2 we prove that the three conditions that we state after the theorem are sufficient to
characterize the optimality of the static contract.
Part 1. It is enough to show that the solution of (PR) is feasible in (P). From



























Let θ1, θH , θ2 and x be the optimal solution to (PR). If this solution corresponds to
the optimal static contract or yields the same objective than it, we are done because
this contract is always feasible in (P). If this solution is different from the optimal













This is true because the contract (u1, u2, x1, x2) = (0, 0,1{θ≥θH},1{θ≥θH}) is a feasible
static contract and, therefore, its associated revenue is bounded by that of the optimal
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static contract. From the formulation of (PR) we know that θ̂L ≤ θ1 ≤ θH ≤ θ2, this














Also, since x ≤ 1 we must have θ1 < θH . Note that since θ̂L ≤ θ1 < θ2 the denomi-
nator above is strictly positive.
Now we argue that the contract optimizing (PR) characterized by θ1, θH , θ2 and
x is feasible for (P). Since the high to low IC constraint is satisfied, we only need

















FL(z)dz. In order to see why (C.34) holds,
































































Using this, together with equation (C.33), delivers equation (C.34). This concludes
the proof for Part 1.
Part 2. In this part we prove the following optimality conditions for the thresh-
olds θ1 ≤ θH ≤ θ2:
1. RLH(θ1, θ2) ≤ minθ2≤θ RLH(θ2, θ);
2. maxθ≤θ2 R
LH(θ, θ2) ≤ RLH(θ1, θ2);
3. αL ·RLH(θ1, θ2) + αHrHH(θH) = 0.
It is enough to prove that under the conditions the optimal contract characterized
by (θ1, θH , θ2) is optimal for (PR). To prove this we use a Lagrangian relaxation (we
do not relax the monotonicity constraints) and show that this relaxation is optimized
by the contract characterized by (θ1, θH , θ2).
First, we establish some properties that can be derived from conditions (1) to (3).
Condition (3) implies that θ2 ≥ θ̂L; otherwise, θ1, θ2 < θ̂L which would imply that
RLH(θ1, θ2) < 0. In turn, condition (3) would give R
HH(θH) > 0 which would imply
that θ̂H < θH . Since θH ≤ θ2 we would have θ̂H < θH ≤ θ2 < θ̂L, that is, θ̂H < θ̂L
which is not possible. Moreover, condition (2) together with the fact that θ2 ≥ θ̂L
imply that θ1 ≥ θ̂L. This yields RLH(θ1, θ2) ≥ 0, and thus we can use condition (3)
again to deduce that θH ≤ θ̂H . In summary, θ̂L ≤ θ1 and θH ≤ θ̂H .
Now we provide the main argument. If θ1 = θ2, then we also have θ1 = θ2 =
θH . Condition (3) implies that the contract characterize by (θ1, θH , θ2) is the static
contract. Conditions (1) and (2) together yield (APR) and, therefore, from Theorem
3.1 we deduce that the static contract is optimal. Next suppose that θ1 < θ2, and
define
Ω , {x : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] : x(·) is non-decreasing}.
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We use x? to denote the solution characterize by (θ1, θH , θ2). The Lagrangian for
(PR) is

















consider the following multipliers
λ = αL ·RLH(θ1, θ2), wL = λ+ αL, wH = −λ+ αH ,
note that λ and wL are non-negative, and for wH we have
wH ≥ 0⇔ αH + αHrHH(θH) ≥ 0⇔ rHH(θH) ≥ −1
if and only if
[θH − hHH(θH)] ≥ −hHH(θH)⇔ θH ≥ 0,
where in the first if and only if we used condition (3) in our hypothesis. Thus when



















where we can reduce attention to threshold strategies because xL(·), xH(·) are non-
decreasing (see, e.g., [52] or [57]). If we are able to show that L(x,u,λ,w) evaluated
at our candidate solution is an upper bound for the RHS above we are done. Let’s





































where in the first equality we used condition (3) and the inequality comes from the
fact that rHH(·) is non-decreasing. Now we look into the first term in equation (C.36),


















































which thanks to condition (1) in our hypothesis is true. A similar argument holds for

































we conclude that max(u,x)∈Ω L(u,x,λ,w) ≤ L(0,x?,λ,w), as required. 
Lemma C.2 Let θi ∈ [0, 1] for i = 1, 2, 3 be such that θ1 < θ2 < θ3. Also, consider























































































Proof of Proposition 3.3. We use the sufficient condition in Theorem 3.3.
First note that since the support of the exponential distribution is unbounded from
above, we can take θ2 = ∞ which eliminates condition (1). Conditions (2) and (3)
can be cast as
θ1e
−θ1(λL−λH) ≥ θe−θ(λL−λH) ∀θ ≥ 0 and αL ·λHθ1e−θ1(λL−λH) = −αH ·(λHθH−1),
(C.37)
By optimizing the first term in (C.37) we obtain
θ1 =
1
λL − λH ,







λL − λH .





−λLθ1 + αH(θ1 − 1
λH
)λHe
−λHθ1 < 0. (C.38)
To prove this inequality notice that since θ̂ is the optimal static cutoff we have
αLθ̂e






























− αLe−λLθ1L − αHe−λHθ1L
(a)
≤ λH(αLθ̂e−λLθ̂ + αH θ̂e−λH θ̂)− αHe−λHθ1L
(b)
< λH(αLθ̂e
−λLθ̂ + αH θ̂e−λH θ̂)− αHe−λH θ̂
= λHαLθ̂e















where (a) comes from equation (C.39), (b) is true because the function −e−λHθ in-
creasing and θ1 < θ̂, (c) comes from equation (3.8). And (d) comes from θ1 < θ̂.
With this we have proven (C.38) and thus




































· (θH − 1
λH
),
where in (a) and (c) we used the definition of θH , and in (b) we used equation (C.38).












but replacing θ1 with 1/(λL − λH) in this last expression we get θH > θ1.
























C.3 Proofs for Section 3.7
Proof of Theorem 3.4. In Lemma C.3 (which we state and prove after this
proof) we show that A is non-empty. Next we prove the necessary and sufficient
condition.
We prove both directions separately. First we show that if there exists λ ∈ A
satisfying the properties then the static contract is optimal. Then we show that if the
static contract is optimal then we can always solve for λ satisfying the properties.
Define
Ω , {x : [0, 1] −→ [0, 1] : x(·) is non-decreasing}, and ΩK , Ω× · · · × Ω︸ ︷︷ ︸
K times
.
For the first part we use a Lagrangian relaxation approach. That is, we dualize the IC
constraints for a specific set of multipliers. This gives an upper bound to the seller’s
problem. Then we show that for our choice of multipliers the relaxation is maximized






























where λ correspond to the multipliers associated with the ICs, and w to the multi-
pliers associated with the ex-post IR constraints. Let us define λ to be equal to the
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(λij)i,j∈{1,··· ,K}2 we are assuming to exist, that is λ ∈ A, and let






λkj,∀k ∈ {1, . . . , K}. (C.40)
Note that by our choice of λ (λ ∈ A), wk is non-negative for all k. With this choice
of w the first summation in the Lagrangian becomes zero. Now, we need to show
that for this choice of multipliers the Lagrangian is maximized at the static contract.





































Note that the RHS of (C.41), for each k, is maximized at some threshold contract
θk ∈ [0, 1]. So to prove that (C.42) is an upper bound of (C.41) is enough to show
that for all k and for any θk ∈ [0, 1]∫ θmax
θk
(























































dz, ∀θk ≥ θ̂,
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dz, ∀θk ≤ θ̂,


























In summary, proving that (C.43) holds is equivalent to showing that both (C.44) and



















αk · µk(θ̂) · fk(θ̂)−
∑








where the last equality comes from the choice of the multipliers. Since the limit is







































































Since we are assuming that the minimum is an upper bound to the maximum above,
we can conclude that both (C.44) and (C.45) hold (with equality). This concludes
the proof for the first direction.
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For the second direction we need to show that if the static contract is optimal then
we can find λ satisfying condition (APRM). Theorem 1 in Luenberger (1969, p. 217)
gives then the existence of Lagrange multipliers such that the static contract maxi-
mizes the Lagrangian(here we use the interior point condition in the assumptions).
In other words, ∃λ,w ≥ 0 such that
L(xs,0,λ,w) ≥ L(x,u,λ,w), ∀u,x ∈ RK+ × ΩK . (C.47)
Note that (C.47) holds for any u,x ∈ RK+ × ΩK . Thus we can first consider x equal














, ∀u ∈ RK+ .
Which implies that






λjk = 0, ∀k,








as required. Now, fix k and consider a solution x ∈ ΩK such that xj ≡ xs for all
j 6= k and xk is 1{θ≥θk} for some θk ∈ [0, 1]. Then equation (C.47) delivers equation
(C.43). And we already saw that (C.43) is equivalent to both equations (C.44) and















































that is, condition (APRM) holds for any k. We only need to check that λ ∈ A.
Observe that both the maximum and the minimum are bounded from below and
above (respectively) by
αk · µk(θ̂) · fk(θ̂)−
∑
j:j 6=k λjk · F j(θ̂)
F k(θ̂)
. (C.48)
To see this we can take the limit as before. For the maximum we take the limit of θ
approaching to θ̂ from below. This limit converges to the expression in (C.48) and is
bounded above by the maximum. The same argument applies to the minimum but
this time taking the limit from above θ̂. In turn implies that
αk · µk(θ̂) · fk(θ̂)−
∑








and we can conclude that λ ∈ A. 
Lemma C.3 The set A is non-empty.
Proof of Lemma C.3. We want to show that A 6= ∅, which amount to proving
that the linear system
K∑
j=1,j 6=k
λjk · F j(θ̂) = αk · µk(θ̂) · fk(θ̂) + F k(θ̂) ·
K∑
j=1,j 6=k
λkj, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , K},






λjk, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , K},
with (λ,w) ≥ 0 has a solution. We begin by writing down the system with matrices
and then we apply Farkas’ lemma.
First, the vector λ is given by
(λ12, λ13, · · · , λ1K︸ ︷︷ ︸
Type1
, λ21, λ23, · · · , λ2K︸ ︷︷ ︸
Type2
, · · · , λK1, λK2, · · · , λKK−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
TypeK
),
note that the terms λkk for any k ∈ {1, . . . , K} do not form part of the vector. Now,
consider matrix A with K(K − 1) +K columns and 2K rows given by
A =
F1 F2 · · · FK 0K×K
B1 B2 · · · BK IK×K
 ,
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where 0K×K is the zero matrix of dimension K ×K and IK×K is the identity matrix
of dimension K ×K. Also, Fk is a matrix of dimension K × (K − 1) defined by
Fkij =

−F k(θ̂) if i = k
F k(θ̂) if i < k, j = i
F k(θ̂) if i > k, j = i− 1
0 if o.w
,
and Bk is a matrix of dimension K × (K − 1) defined by
Bkij =

1 if i = k
−1 if i < k, j = i
−1 if i > k, j = i− 1
0 if o.w
.
Finally, let b be a vector defined by
b = (αLµ1(θ̂)f1(θ̂), α2µ2(θ̂)f2(θ̂), · · · , αKµK(θ̂)fK(θ̂), αL, · · · , αK).




 = b, λ,w ≥ 0.
Now we use Farkas’ lemma, if this system does not have a solution then it must be




 ≥ 0, bᵀ ·
yF
yB
 < 0. (C.49)
Explicitly, we have (yF , yB) solve
F k(θ̂) · (yFj − yFk )− (yBj − yBk ) ≥ 0, ∀k,∀j 6= k
yBk ≥ 0, ∀k
K∑
k=1
αkµk(θ̂)fk(θ̂) · yFk +
K∑
k=1
αk · yBk < 0.
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Let yFm be equal to mink{yFk } (m is the index that achieves the minimum) then
K∑
k=1

















θ̂ − F k(θ̂)
fk(θ̂)
)











































= yBm ≥ 0,
a contradiction. Where in (a) we use the fact that
∑K
k=1 αkµk(θ̂)fk(θ̂) = 0, in (b) we
use the definition of yFm, in (c) we use the first set of equations in (C.49) and in (d)
we use the fact that
∑K
k=1 αk = 1 and y
B
m ≥ 0. 
Proof of Proposition 3.4. We make use of Lemma C.4 which we state and
prove after the present proof. In that lemma we need to define the function












for any λ ≥ 0. For exponential distributions Lk(z|λ) becomes:
























Hence, Lk(·|λ) is concave, which means that it crosses zero at most two times. Using
Lemma C.4 we conclude that in the exponential case allocations have at most one
step in which randomization occurs. 
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Lemma C.4 For any dual-feasible variable λ associated to the IC constraints define












If Lk(z|λ) crosses zero at most p times then the optimal allocation xk has at most
bp/2c intervals where randomization occurs.
Proof of Lemma C.4. We divide the proof into two parts. In the first part
we construct a new dual problem and state the complementary slackness conditions.
This part of the proof follows the general theory of linear programming in infinite
dimensional space developed by [6]. In the second part we exploit the complementary
slackness conditions to show that the optimal allocation xk has at most bp/2c intervals
where randomization occurs.
Part 1. Define the cone of non-negative non-decreasing functions
K , {x : [0, θmax]→ R|x is non-negative and non-decreasing function}.
(Primal Cone)











s.t xk(·) ∈ K, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , K}
xk(θ) ≤ 1, ∀θ ∈ [0, θmax] ,∀k ∈ {1, . . . , K}




xk(z)F¯k(z)dz ≥ uk′ +
∫ θmax
0
xk′(z)F¯k(z)dz, ∀k, k′ ∈ {1, . . . , K}.
Note that the dual cone of K is
K∗ = {β :
∫ θmax
θ
β(z)dz ≥ 0, ∀θ ∈ [0, θmax]}. (Dual Cone)
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The Lagrangian is




































where βk are the dual variables associated with the monotonicity constraints, ηk are
dual variables associated with the constraints xk(θ) ≤ 1. While λ,w correspond to
the dual variables associated with the IC an non-negativity constraints respectively.













λ`k = 0, ∀k







= ηk(z)− βk(z), ∀k, ∀z ∈ [0, θmax]
λ,w, ηk(·) ≥ 0, βk ∈ K∗, ∀k.
And we must have complementary slackness:
• For the monotonicity constraints (the cone constraints) this means that if xk(·)
changes at some θ then
∫ θmax
θ
βk(z)dz = 0. Also x(0) ·
∫ θmax
0
β(z)dz = 0. All of
this for all k.
• For the upper bound constraints: (1−xk(θ)) · ηk(θ) = 0 for all θ ∈ [0, θmax] and
for all k.
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Part 2. Consider an optimal primal-dual pair. Let xk be the primal solution for
interim type k, and βk, ηk and λ,w the corresponding dual solutions. Observe that
from dual feasibility we must have
fk(z) · Lk(z|λ) = ηk(z)− βk(z), ∀z ∈ [0, θmax]. (C.50)
Let us denote by zˆ1 < · · · < zˆp the points where Lk(·|λ) crosses zero, and we let
zˆ0 = 0 and zˆp+1 = θmax. Note that Lk(θmax|λ) = α · θmax > 0, and by the feasibility
of λ we have Lk(0|λ) = −wk/fk(0) ≤ 0.
Let z?1 , inf{z ∈ [0, θmax] : xk(z) = 1} (if xk(z) never equals 1 we take z?1 = θmax).
We can assume that z?1 > 0, otherwise xk(z) would be equal to 1 everywhere in
[0, θmax] and the result would follow. In turn, there has to be a change on xk around
z?1 and, therefore, complementary slackness implies that
∫ θmax
z?1
βk(z)dz = 0. Moreover,
since xk(z) < 1 for all z < z
?
1 complementary slackness implies that ηk(z) = 0 for all
z < z?1 . Therefore, Eq. (C.50) becomes
fk(z) · Lk(z|λ) = −βk(z), ∀z ∈ [0, z?1). (C.51)
Let q be the largest index in {0, 1, . . . , p} such that zˆq ≤ z?1 . Note that z?1 ∈ [zˆq, zˆq+1].
We show the following claim:
Claim 1. Lk(·|λ) is positive in (zˆq, zˆq+1) and z?1 = zˆq.
Proof of Claim 1. First suppose that Lk(·|λ) is positive in (zˆq, zˆq+1) we show
that z?1 = zˆq. If not then for any z ∈ (zˆq, z?1) we have Lk(z|λ) > 0 which thanks to













βk(z)dz < 0, (C.52)
but this contradicts the fact that βk ∈ K∗. That is, z?1 ≤ zˆq but since zˆq ≤ z?1 we
conclude that zˆq = z
?
1 . To complete the argument suppose Lk(·|λ) is negative in
(zˆq, zˆq+1) then, in particular, Lk(·|λ) is negative in (z?1 , zˆq+1) and from Eq. (C.50) we
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deduce that βk(z

















a contradiction. In the second bracket we use the fact that βk ∈ K∗. This concludes
the proof of Claim 1.
This shows that xk(·) equals 1 in (zˆq, θmax] and that it changes value at zˆq.
Now, from Claim 1 we now that Lk(·|λ) is negative in (zˆq−1, zˆq) and, therefore,
from Eq. (C.51) we deduce that βk(·) is positive in (zˆq−1, zˆq). This together with∫ θmax
z?1
βk(z)dz = 0 imply that xk(·) is constant in (zˆq−1, zˆq) (by means of complemen-
tary slackness any change would yield a contradiction). Let’s denote the value of
xk(·) in (zˆq−1, zˆq) by χq. Note that of χq = 0 we are done. Similarly to what we did
before we define z?2 , inf{z ∈ [0, zˆq−1] : xk(z) = χq}. Note that z?2 < zˆq−1. If z?2 = 0
then we xk(·) equals χq for all values below zq and, therefore, there is nothing more
to prove. So assume z?2 > 0. If z
?
2 = zˆq−1 then xk(·) changes value at zˆq−1 and, there-
fore, by complementary slackness
∫ θmax
zˆq−1
βk(z)dz = 0. However, Lk(·|λ) is positive in
(zˆq−2, zˆq−1) which by Eq. (C.51) implies that βk is negative in (zˆq−2, zˆq−1) but this
would contradict the dual feasibility of βk. Hence, we can assume that z
?
2 < zˆq−1.
Let q2 be the largest index in {0, 1, . . . , q − 1} such that zˆq2 ≤ z?2 . Note that
z?2 ∈ [zˆq2 , zˆq2+1]. As before we can show that Lk(·|λ) is positive in (zˆq2 , zˆq2+1) and
z?2 = zˆq2 . Note that this implies that the value χq of xk(·) extends for at least two
intervals, namely, (zˆq−2, zˆq−1) and (zˆq−1, zˆq).
The previous argument can be applied iteratively over all intervals defined by
zˆ1 < · · · < zˆp. Since in each step of the argument we cover two interval we deduce
that there can be at most bp/2c different value of χq′ where q′ is defined in every
step as we did before. Moreover, if Lk(0|λ) < 0 then in the interval (0, zˆ1) the dual
variable βk(·) is positive. Because
∫ θmax
zˆ1
βk(z)dz = 0 (this follows from the steps of
the argument) and x(0) · ∫ θmax
0
β(z)dz = 0 we must have x(0) = 0 and so in the last
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interval xk equals 0. 
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